The subject of Japanese–Korean relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries leading to Japan’s eventual annexation of Korea in 1910 [end page 246] remains extremely controversial and even evokes powerful emotional reactions in both countries Korea today. Recently, a remark made by Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi that the Japanese annexation of Korea was based on a "legally valid" agreement between the two countries raised a furor in South Korea. Given such emotions surrounding the issue, it would be very difficult for anyone to come up with an impartial study of Japan’s annexation of Korea. With the publication of The Abacus and the Sword, Peter Duus of Stanford University has done a valuable service by shedding significant new light in our understanding of the Japanese expansion into Korea. The book is an extremely important work, based on meticulous research and careful analysis. As a Korean, this reviewer is particularly impressed by the author’s judicious treatment of the complex and controversial issues surrounding Japan’s annexation of Korea.

The Abacus and the Sword is a study of Japanese imperialism toward Korea between 1876, when the Treaty of Kanghwa was signed, and 1910, when Korea was formally annexed into the Japanese Empire, but it focuses largely on the period from 1895 to 1910. The first part of the book deals with the political process of extending Japanese influence and control over Korea, while the latter part treats the economic penetration, with each domain reinforcing the other.

According to Duus, Japanese imperialism under the Meiji government was formulated very much as a response to the intrusion of the Western imperialists into East Asia. Attributing Japan’s imperialistic impulse to its success in modernization, Duus gives several reasons that prompted Japan to embark on this course. Quick in adapting to the new concept of world order as defined by the Western powers, Meiji Japan was obsessed with finding what it called its "proper place" in the new international order. As it turned out, "only when Japan consolidated its colonial empire ... the Meiji leaders finally felt that Japan had been accepted as a full-fledged power by the Western nations" (15). Also the intrusion of the Western powers caused "a perennial anxiety over [Japan’s] national security," and this concern for national security moved Japan to expand its influence over Korea as a "preemptive" measure "aimed as much at denying territory to others as in acquiring it for Japan" (17). However, as Japan became incorporated into the world economy dominated by the Western powers, Korea and China came to be regarded as sources of raw materials and markets that were essential to the burgeoning manufacturing industry of Japan. The forces behind the Japanese expansion into Korea were, according to Duus, a complex coalition of the Meiji leaders prodded by "domestic politicians, journalists, businessmen, and military leaders, with a subimperialist Japanese community in Korea" (23).

One of the themes that Duus emphasizes is what he calls the "asymmetry" he sees in the policy the Meiji leadership pursued toward the Western [end page 247] powers on the one hand and toward their neighboring countries on the other. Obsessed with the desire to restore national prestige, the Meiji leaders strove to join the rank of the world powers on an equal footing and worked toward revising unequal treaties that the Western powers had imposed on Japan. Toward Korea, however, Japan negotiated the Treaty of Kanghwa and the supplementary treaty whose terms were even more "unequal" to Korea than what Japan had had to accept from the Westerners. Thus the early Japanese policy toward Korea was more concerned with establishing what Duus calls "free trade imperialism" within the context of the new world order than with extending political or territorial ambition. Accordingly, Japanese policy up until 1894 was to assist Korea in undertaking a self-strengthening program to maintain its independence. However, according to Duus, the Japanese effort was not successful because of its lack of commitment and unwillingness to challenge China’s dominant position in Korea.

The outbreak of the Tonghak rebellion in 1894, however, changed Japanese policy toward Korea. Fearing the Korean dynasty might be in the throes of disintegration, the Meiji leaders decided upon military intervention to challenge China and to keep Korea from falling under the control of another power, according to Duus. Although Japan did not have "a master plan for Korea" at this time, Duus discerns two clear objectives sought by the Meiji leadership—to institute basic reforms in Korea and to acquire economic advantages for Japan, both in the name of preserving Korean "independence." While encouraging the new Korean government to undertake drastic reforms, Japan secured an agreement to have significant political and economic influence in Korea. "If this agreement did not establish a Japanese protectorate in a formal sense," writes Duus, "it moved in that direction by setting up a ‘dyarchic’ reform commission" (81). However, the Japanese effort to promote reform encountered difficulties in building and maintaining a coalition of the reform-minded Koreans who were willing to collaborate with Japan. Frustrated, Inoue Kaoru pressured the Korean government into accepting Japanese advisers in key positions "to consolidate the de facto Japanese protectorate" (91). In the end, however, the Japanese attempt to create a de facto protectorate ended in failure due to the Triple Intervention and their inability to find reliable Korean allies. Duus presents a good picture of the extent of Japan’s political and economic interest in Korea as early as 1894–95, and his analysis of Japanese maneuvering in Korea is very insightful. It is significant that he sees the Japanese effort at this time as an attempt to establish a protectorate in Korea.

The 1895 assassination of Queen Min, which Duus characterizes as "the hideous event, crudely conceived, and brutally executed" (111), and the flight of King Kojong into the Russian legation the following year put Japan "in limbo" as it was now faced with the challenge of Russia. Unwilling as yet to [end page 248] fight the czarist government, Japan tried to negotiate to define mutual spheres of influence. In the race for concessions after 1895, Japan successfully maneuvered through many difficulties to acquire full control of railroads. But its attempt to gain fiscal control over the Korean government by means of loans ended in failure, despite endless negotiations. The reasons for this failure lay within Japan. They include lack of sufficient capital and the reluctance of the Meiji leadership to fully commit its resources to gain economic control.

By the turn of the century, Japan emerged as the strongest power in Korea, according to Duus. When Katsura Tarò became prime minister in 1901, one of his goals was to establish a protectorate in Korea.¹ A major obstacle, however, was Russia, whose presence in Manchuria was growing after 1900. Duus sees three options for Japan at this time: the partition of Korea, the neutralization of Korea, and the so-called exchange of Manchuria for Korea. When Japan approached Russia with the third option, the latter added conditions that included the demilitarization of Korea in the exchange. Since Japan "saw Korea as a keystone of national defense" (175), the negotiations hit a snag, and animosity between Russia and Japan heightened. In May 1903, when Russian troops occupied Yongamp’o, Japan decided on war against Russia in order to settle the Korea problem once and for all. The Russo-Japanese War allowed Japan to gain significant inroads on the peninsula. After landing its troops there, Japan forced the Korean government to sign a protocol in February 1904 whereby Japan obtained the right to occupy strategic areas for the war against Russia in return for the Japanese pledge to "guarantee the independence and territorial integrity" of Korea.

Then, in May 1904, the Japanese government adopted a blueprint that embodied the consensus of both moderates and advocates of a more aggressive policy. On the premise that "the fate of Korea so directly affected the security of the Japanese empire that no other country could be allowed to swallow it up," the blueprint aimed "to acquire full rights for a protectorate over Korea and to acquire key economic rights as well" (184). The adoption of this blueprint was a momentous decision. "For the first time since the decision to open Korea in 1876," writes Duus, "the Japanese leadership had committed unequivocally to assuming direct political control over Korea" (186). He insists that not until May 1904 did the Japanese leadership reach consensus on extending direct political control over Korea, that until that time the Japanese policy had been tentative. Once the decision was made, Japan proceeded to establish a de facto protectorate at all levels of the Korean government, even before signing a treaty to that effect. In April 1905, when victory in the war against Russia became clear, Japan decided to go through the process of signing a formal protectorate treaty, and sent Itò Hirobumi to Korea for that purpose. Here, Duus gives a balanced description and analysis of the signing of the treaty, including the recent assertion made by Professor Lee Tai-jin (Yi [end page 249] T’aejin) that the original document of the treaty discovered in the Seoul National University Library lacked the authentic signature of the Korean emperor and his official seal.

Even after establishing the protectorate over Korea, the Meiji leadership still remained divided on the question "not whether Japan should pursue an expansionist policy but rather what kind of expansionist policy it should follow" (203), in which Yamagata Aritomo emphasized security issues while Itò Hirobumi pressed for economic and cultural influence, according to Duus. In the end, when Itò’s "moderate" policy of helping Korea to undertake reform failed, Japan proceeded toward annexation. The author gives a thoughtful analysis of those Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese as well as those who opposed, including the righteous armies that unsuccessfully resisted Japan with arms.

The second part of the book deals with the economic aspects of Japanese penetration into Korea. "Trade," according to Duus, "was the economic magnet that attracted Japanese to the peninsula before annexation" (248). But, in terms of volume, Japan’s trade with Korea accounted for only a small portion of its total external trade between 1906 and 1910—7 percent of exports and 3 percent of imports. The trade was nevertheless important to Japan because in Korea, unlike elsewhere, the Japanese handled all aspects of the transactions. Japan bought from Korea mainly agrarian products, such as rice and soybeans, and sold at first cheap goods manufactured in England, such as cloth and woven goods, and later more Japan-made goods, eventually gaining a monopoly on textile goods in Korea. Increasing numbers of Japanese merchants peddling within Korea, many of whom were out to make quick money and engaged in unethical practices, caused cultural frictions and complaints among Koreans, according to Duus. The Japanese economic "penetration was not the result of one decisive stroke but of a slow accumulation of actions and initiatives, coming from the bottom up as well as the top down" (288).

The Japanese settlers in Korea also played an important role in expanding Japanese influence. This migration to Korea took place in several waves. The initial wave came with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and included mostly petty merchants, peddlers, construction workers, and so forth, whom Duus characterizes as "this swarm of penny capitalists and carpetbaggers" who were "often rapacious and dishonest" (290–291). After 1905, the Japanese government wanted its settlers to take root in Korea as colonists and encouraged further migration to help consolidate and expand Japanese influence. Duus offers a persuasive analysis of the so-called "push" and "pull" factors in these migrations. By 1910, the number of Japanese settlers in Korea reached over 170,000, creating the largest overseas Japanese community in the world. They were largely concentrated in towns and cities, forming communities separate from the Koreans, and a large majority were engaged in tertiary [end page 250] occupations (commerce, government, and service). Duus well describes their lives and activities in Korea.

Many Japanese were interested in acquiring agricultural land in Korea. Here, Duus offers a perceptive analysis of the Japanese acquisition of Korean land. Even before Japanese landownership was officially legalized in 1906, many Japanese had taken advantage of loose Korean conveyancing practices to acquire land there. They bought land largely for investment purposes, using Koreans as tenant farmers. Although the Japanese landlords included both individuals and corporations, such as the Oriental Development Company, most of those active in land investment were petty, not large, capitalists, according to Duus. He estimates that by 1910 "perhaps 7 to 8 percent of all arable [land in Korea] was under Japanese control" (377).

In general, the Japanese held a very low view of the Koreans, regarding them as "uncivilized" and "backward." Duus presents a fascinating analysis of the intellectual contradiction in Japanese attitudes: on the one hand, Japan and Korea shared a common heritage in culture and ethnicity; on the other, the Koreans were seen as embodying the most undesirable qualities in life. This awareness "militated against the most blatant form of racism but not against an ideology of subjection" (399). Thus, the Japanese discussions of "common ancestry" and "racial affinity," coupled with a Darwinian notion of racial struggle, ultimately justified the Japanese annexation of Korea as "natural, rational, and perhaps inevitable" (423).

Duus concludes with a thought-provoking discussion of Japanese imperialism toward Korea. He argues that Japanese imperialism in Korea was "an act of mimesis" (424), whereby Japan practiced what it had learned from the Western powers while itself remaining a victim of the predatory powers. On the controversial issue of whether the Meiji leaders intended from the beginning to annex Korea, Duus observes much "tentativeness" in the earlier policy, leading him to conclude that not until May 1904 did the Meiji leaders reach a consensus on complete domination. While mimicking Western practices, Japan nevertheless developed its own characteristic style of imperialism. First, Duus asserts that Japanese imperialism was defensive in nature. The perception of Japan’s military "backwardness" led the Meiji leaders to develop "a ‘paranoid’ vision of the international order," and to justify the annexation of Korea "as a means of protecting their country" (426). Second, because of the relative "backwardness" of the Japanese economy, large capitalists in Japan were in general indifferent to colonial development; instead, "the shock troops of Japanese imperialism in Korea were," according to Duus, "not powerful metropolitan business interests but restless, ambitious, frugal elements from the middle and lower strata of Japanese society" (431). Finally, Japan’s own experience of overcoming "backwardness" in the immediate past led the Japanese to claim that they could introduce the Korean people to "civilization" bet-[end page 251]ter than any one else, and thus they insisted that "Japan was helping the Koreans to improve themselves" (433), not exploiting them, just as family members help each other.

It is unfortunate that this otherwise remarkable work contains quite a few errors in romanizing the names of Korean individuals and places. To cite a few examples, Kim Ok-kiun should be Kim Ok-kyun, Kim Ga-jin should be Kim Ka-jin (not two different individuals as the index has them), Sin Sang-hun should be Sim Sang-hun, Ryonganp’o (136) should be Yongamp’o (177), both Sanlangjin (185) and Samlangjin (333) should be Samnangjin, and so forth. Also, Homer Hulbert was not "a British journalist" (193), but an American citizen (a graduate of Dartmouth and Union Theological Seminary) who went to Korea in 1886 as one of the first three teachers invited from the United States.

Regarding the controversy surrounding the Japanese annexation of Korea, I would like to make a few personal observations. I should state at the outset that I believe the primary responsibility for Korea’s loss of its independence in 1910 lies with the Koreans and their government as they failed to undertake the drastic reforms that were necessary to meet the challenge and threat posed by the predatory powers. The failure of the Koreans, however, does not necessarily exonerate Japan for its aggressive act against its neighbor. Japan’s annexation of Korea and its subsequent colonial rule brought about tragic consequences for both countries and implanted bitter memories in the psyche of the Korean people. Let it be said unequivocally that the Japanese colonization was historically wrong, all the rationalizations and justifications attempted by certain sectors in Japan notwithstanding.

This does not mean that I am in any way implying that Duus is not critical of the Japanese policy toward Korea. On the contrary, I have nothing but admiration for his judicious scholarship. There are, however, a few questions that need to be raised. First, on the issue of when Japan decided to annex Korea, Duus asserts that the Meiji leaders did not decide on the complete domination of Korea until May 1904, when the Katsura cabinet formally adopted such a plan. However, this assertion should not be interpreted as saying that Japan did not have imperialistic ambitions over Korea before 1904. The official decision in 1904 could not have been made in a vacuum. Even though the government might not have formally decided on annexation yet, one cannot deny that there were already multiple forces at various levels within Japan working toward establishing hegemonic power in Korea, as this book convincingly demonstrates. The decision for annexation was consequent upon a cumulation of such forces. To ignore this is to see only a tree without recognizing the forest.

The second question deals with Itò Hirobumi’s so-called moderate policy toward Korea. It has often been claimed by Western scholars that Itò, as the Resident-General in Korea, pursued his reform policy primarily out of the desire [end page 252] to help Korea. Duus follows the same line: "Itò, who took a more optimistic view of their [Koreans’] potential for reform, was willing to try the tactics of guided change" (199). Thus, Itò’s basic task as Resident-General was, according to Duus, "to bring about fundamental institutional and economic reform" (198). Duus asserts that annexation followed when Itò’s policy failed, implying that if only Korea had followed Itò’s advice, it would have been spared the fate of being annexed by Japan.

It may be possible that Itò had been genuinely interested in pushing for reform in Korea, although I am not convinced of this. (I believe that Itò’s deeds in Korea betray his true intentions far more loudly than his public utterances.) But the question is, who were the reforms to benefit, Japanese or Koreans? In our own time, America’s military involvement in Somalia has demonstrated that even the most altruistically motivated intervention by a foreign power invites violent reactions from the native population. For the Koreans who had been suspicious of the ulterior motives of Japan for several decades around the turn of the century, there was no way for them to accept any Japanese proposal for change, even if it would have helped them. In fact, Duus effectively portrays the difficulties Japan encountered in building up a group of Koreans who were willing to collaborate with its efforts. Moreover, Itò had talked about annexing Korea as early as 1895. In his conversation with Sir Ernest Satow after the Sino-Japanese War, Itò stated plainly that the idea of Korean independence was "impracticable" and that Korea "must be either annexed or be placed under the protection of some other Power" (172). There were good reasons for the Koreans to suspect Itò’s true motives in Korea.

Western scholars have also frequently asserted that the Japanese decision to annex Korea arose out of concern for its own security needs. Duus follows a similar line: "The debate over the future of Korea revolved around how best it could serve Japan’s national defense needs" (204). In fact, one of the main arguments Duus presents is that the constant anxiety over Japan’s security led the Meiji leaders to annex Korea in order to preempt other powers from taking control of their neighbor. Implied in this argument is that the Japanese annexation of Korea was a defensive move rather than an act of aggression. If Japan was indeed acting in its own security interest, there was really no need to annex Korea at the time it did in 1910. There was no international power in Korea that posed even a remote threat to Japan after 1905. Having defeated China and Russia militarily in 1895 and 1905, respectively, Japan made a successful diplomatic move to gain a completely free hand in Korea with the full support of both Great Britain and the United States. By 1905, all of the four powers that may have had some interest in the matter had already conceded Korea to Japan. Thus, security could not have been the real reason for Japan’s annexation. Rather, the security concern was an excuse it used to justify its act of aggression.

These issues aside, The Abacus and the Sword is a work of remarkable scholarship. [end page 254] Thorough and comprehensive, it sets a new standard in the study of the Japanese domination of Korea. Duus’s exhaustive use of historical sources, both primary and secondary, enhances the authoritativeness of his scholarship even further. Drawing often from comparative studies of European practices of imperialism, he analyzes various issues of Japanese imperialism with insight and perspicacity. This book is a model of lucidly written, erudite scholarship. In my opinion, it is the best and most authoritative study of the Japanese annexation of Korea that has appeared so far in any language, including Japanese and Korean.

Yông-ho Ch’oe
University of Hawai‘i

1. In n. 12 on p. 172, Duus raises doubt on the assertion made by Katsura’s biographer that one of the goals of Katsura, when he became prime minister in 1901, was to establish a protectorate in Korea, on the ground that Duus could not locate any document to verify this claim. In his unpublished autobiography, now in the National Diet Library, Katsura did indeed write that the establishment of a protectorate in Korea was one of the platforms for his first prime ministership in 1901. See Meiji shiryò kenkyû renrakukai, "Meiji shiryò," vol. 7 (1961) [privately circulated?], p. 5.