In preindustrial economies, families and households were the primary units of both production and consumption, and economic activities were organized around family and kinship. Under the primacy of the family as a social institution, marriage and childbearing were imperative for subsistence and protection. Women and, to a lesser degree, men depended on the ensuing family relations and kin network, and conjugal and parent-child relations were considered unbreakable, lifelong commitments.

The expansion of market economies increased global interactions, thus restructuring societies internally and leading to profound changes in many aspects of family life (Caldwell 1976; Freedman 1975; Goode 1963). The transition from agrarian to industrial economies resulted in the separation of work and home, along with an increasing division of labor in economic activities, with men becoming the primary breadwinners and women adopting the role of full-time homemakers (Oakley 1976; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996). As the macroeconomic structural change proceeded, however, paid employment of women outside the home increased dramatically after World War II in much of the industrialized world (Oppenheimer 1994; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Shimada and Higuchi 1985). These changes made the combination of market and family roles increasingly more difficult. This was particularly so for married women, given the persistence of cultural expectations regarding the gender division of labor, resulting in a “double shift” among women employed full-time (Hochschild 1991; Tsuya and Bumpass 1998).

The growth of market economies was also accompanied by changes in views toward marriage and family. The transition from family-based production to individual wage earning eroded the once sacred notions of marriage as lifelong commitment and obligations to one’s family, emphasizing instead individual well-being and self-satisfaction (Lesthaeghe 1983). To be sure, societies have different preexisting family values and systems, and these cultural differences and differing histories have left unique imprints on family life, serving as filters through which market economies have altered family life. Nonetheless, family systems in societies with distinctively different familial-cultural backgrounds are being pushed in similar directions, even while each retains certain aspects of its unique cultural history.
Objectives

In the context of these transformations, this volume compares marriage, work, and family life in Japan, South Korea (referred to as "Korea" hereafter in the volume for linguistic simplicity), and the U.S. The comparative perspective taken in this volume draws on major differences among the three countries in cultural heritage and in the timing and rapidity of industrial development. The dominance of family obligations inherent in the Confucian background of Japan and Korea contrasts dramatically with the individualistic orientation of the U.S., thus presenting a strong test of the influence on family life of modern market economies. Industrialization occurred very early in the U.S., though at a much slower pace than in Japan and Korea. In Japan it developed more recently and at a more rapid pace, and in Korea development has occurred most recently and at an extremely rapid pace. The project on which this volume is based was undertaken precisely because the contrast between the two East Asian countries (with similar cultural backgrounds) and the U.S., combined with differences in the timing and pace of economic development, is of central theoretical importance. It was also for this reason that we undertook the large-scale national data collections in Japan and Korea that permit comparisons with the major data source on American family life. With only three countries, we are clearly unable to analyze statistically the relationship between economic and cultural transformations and family change. Instead, the volume offers descriptive accounts of similarities and differences in aspects of family life that have been changing rapidly but remain underexplored. Our examination of the three countries illustrates the potential effects cultural and industrial-structural factors may have on family processes, as well as gender differences in the impacts of these factors.

Based on the value principles of familism, Japan and Korea have two of the most patriarchal family and gender role systems found in modern history (Lee 1978; Smith 1987; Tsuya and Choe 1991). This is not to say that family culture is identical in Japan and Korea—it clearly is not. Nonetheless, this distinctive cultural tradition in the two East Asian countries poses a clear contrast to the more individualistic and egalitarian cultural heritage in the U.S. (Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986; Steinhoff 1994). On the other hand, viewed from the economic-structural perspective, the U.S. and Japan—the world’s largest and second largest economies—share a number of features of advanced industrial development. By contrast, much of the economic growth in Korea has occurred over the last two decades.

The timing and rapidity of demographic changes that have accompanied industrial development have both reflected and influenced family life and relationships. The demographic transition from high fertility and mortality was completed earlier in the U.S. and Japan than in Korea. Further, these declines were much faster in the two East Asian countries than in the U.S. The Total
Fertility Rates (TFR) declined from more than four to two children per woman in one decade in Japan from the late 1940s and in Korea from the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{1} By contrast, the U.S. was one of the first countries of the world to begin the demographic transition—in the early nineteenth century—and its fertility and mortality declined gradually over a period of more than a century (Oppenheimer 1994; Preston 1976).

Three major domains of family life are examined in this volume. We first compare the three countries with respect to attitudes toward marriage and the family. Although the causal relationship between attitude and behavior is complex and reciprocal, accumulating evidence suggests the importance of ideational change that accompanies industrial development as a factor in changing family relations and demographic behavior (e.g., Lesthaeghe 1983; Oppenheimer 1994; Pagnini and Rindfuss 1993; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996).

We then look at the intergenerational aspects of family life from the perspective of the middle generation’s relationships with its parents and its children. Comparing differences in intergenerational relations in the three countries, we seek to sort out the relative importance of cultural, socioeconomic, and demographic influences on family relations across generations.

Finally, we examine the “work-family interface.” The relationship between work and family reflects the joint influences of economic structure and family culture. In this context, we compare the relationship between employment and housework among married men and women. Based on these comparisons of views on marriage and family, intergenerational relations, and relationship between work and family, the concluding chapter synthesizes findings and presents an assessment of changes in the nature and stability of family relations in the three countries.

**Cultural Backgrounds in the Three Societies**

To better establish the context of the comparisons explored in this volume, we briefly review relevant aspects of historical and cultural backgrounds in Japan, Korea, and the U.S. Alternative pairs of these three countries provide contrasts with respect to traditional family value orientations and levels and pace of industrial development and demographic transition.

The traditional family systems and values in Japan and Korea resemble each other, reflecting their common roots in the culture of Confucian China. The traditional family system in the two countries—called the “ie” in Japan and the “jib” in Korea—is the patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal stem family (Taeuber 1958: 100–104; Tsuya and Choe 1991).\textsuperscript{2} Under this system, in principle, the eldest son, who was the heir presumptive, brought his bride into his parental home and lived with his parents while other offspring formed their own households upon marriage or shortly afterward. Upon the father’s death, the eldest son inherited a major portion (or almost all) of the family property...
and succeeded to the family headship. While the Korean *jib* system placed an almost absolute primacy on the paternal bloodline, the adoption of a son or son-in-law as heir presumptive was easily accomplished under the Japanese *ie* system when the usual process of biological reproduction failed. Thus, the *ie* and the *jib* were consanguineous or pseudo-consanguineous systems whose primary purpose was to preserve biological and cultural continuity of the family based on patrilineal rules of descent.

Since the ultimate goal of the two systems was the biological and social continuation of the family line, the most important obligation for men and women was to marry and produce an heir (Tsuya and Choe 1991). Marriage and procreation were especially important for women because they were excluded both from opportunities of paid employment outside the home and from their natal family upon marriage, so their only viable option was to marry and provide an heir to their family of marriage. From the viewpoint of the extended family (i.e., for the continuity of the family as a whole), it was also important and necessary that decisions pertaining to marriage and divorce not be left to individual men and women; rather, such decisions were the prerogative of the family head (Taeuber 1958: 101; Tsuya and Choe 1991).

In summary, the traditional family systems in the two East Asian countries involved a complex set of well-defined hierarchical relations among family members according to the ascribed supremacy regarding gender (males over females), generation (parents over children), and birth order (first-born over later-born). The idealized principles of the systems provided the bases for cultural and social stability. At the same time, the systems constrained the lives of individuals, especially those of women, leaving few opportunities for life outside the matrix of family relationships. Though many aspects of the traditional family system have been drastically altered or disappeared altogether in the postwar years, its influences still persist both in intergenerational relationships and in inequality between men and women in Japanese and Korean homes (see chapters 4 and 7; also see Lee 1972; Smith 1987; Steinhoff 1994; Tsuya and Bumpass 1998; Tsuya and Choe 1991).

In contrast to the patrilineal stem family systems in Japan and Korea, the bilateral system in the U.S. advantages neither paternal nor maternal lines. Each generation is expected to establish and maintain an independent household, and intergenerational coresidence of adult children and their parents is expected only during times of special need (Bumpass 1994). In clear contrast to the tradition in Japan and Korea, the family is seen in the U.S. as an institution for the protection and support of individual family members, rather than as an enduring entity above and beyond those individuals (Gecas 1987). By the same token, a strong cultural emphasis is also placed, in principle, on equality among family members, with an obligation to justify differences in power by gender, generation, or birth order (Bernard 1973; Steinhoff 1994). Nevertheless, women continue to bear a greater burden in child care and
household tasks, while their options are more constrained in the labor market compared to those of men.

To be sure, individuals do not always behave according to culturally prescribed expectations. Some actively resist those expectations or ignore them altogether. Further, both cultural expectations and patterns of interaction are changing in response to changing economic and social environments, including both internal economic development and expanding contact with other societies through the growth of market economies and the mass media. Nonetheless, cultural ideals and expectations are important for our understanding of variations in family-related attitudes and behaviors in what appear to be objectively similar circumstances.

**Fertility and Marriage**

It is also important for our comparisons with respect to attitudes, intergenerational relations, and work and family that they be set in the context of changes in fertility and marriage patterns.

**Fertility Decline**

Both Japan and Korea experienced a dramatic downturn in fertility after World War II (see figure 1.1). In Japan the TFR declined from 4.5 per woman in 1947 to 2.0 in 1957 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2002: 50–51). After this rapid decline, fertility stabilized until it started to decline again in the mid-1970s and reached an all-time low of 1.3 per woman in 1999. High fertility persisted in Korea until rapid economic development began in the early 1960s. The TFR dropped by almost three-fourths in twenty-four years—from 5.9 per woman in 1963 to 1.6 in 1987 (Choe and Park 1989; Tsuya and Choe 1991). This remarkable decline was followed by a modest upturn in the early 1990s and then by a resumption of decline in the late 1990s, resulting in a TFR of 1.4 per woman in 1999 (National Statistical Office 2000: 106).

In clear contrast to the two East Asian countries, the U.S. started its gradual fertility transition before the twentieth century. After a substantial “baby boom,” beginning in the late 1940s, fertility began to decline around 1960 and then increased modestly in the 1970s to reach its current level of around 2.0 children per woman (Ventura et al. 1998). These differences in the onset and pace of fertility decline (charted in figure 1.1) are related to the pace and type of socioeconomic development in each country and in turn have influenced attitudes and behaviors relating to family and gender relations. Declines in fertility are ipso facto an aspect of changing family orientations, and at the same time they alter the context of interactions across generations and between husbands and wives.
Delayed Marriage and Nonmarriage

The increasing delay of marriage is one of the most prominent features of family change in all three countries after World War II (Bumpass 1990; Tsuya and Choe 1994). Because out-of-wedlock childbearing has been minimal in the two East Asian countries, the delay of women’s first marriage has been a major factor in the fertility decline to very low levels in recent decades. In Japan, the proportion never-married among women in their twenties and thirties has increased precipitously since the mid-1970s. For example, from 1975 to 1995, it more than doubled: from 21 to 48 percent for women aged 25–29 and from 8 to 20 percent for women aged 30–34 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2002: 113). The proportion single also increased dramatically among men in their late twenties and thirties in the same period. This phenomenal delay of marriage suggests a possible future increase in permanent nonmarriage. By 2010, it is estimated that the proportion single at ages 45–49 will reach 10 percent for women and 20 percent for men (Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001). This is remarkable in light of the East Asian tradition of universal marriage and the normative expectation that women should marry “on schedule” in their early to mid-twenties (e.g., Brinton 1992). 7

Korean women are also marrying later, though almost all marry by their mid-
thirties. The proportion of never-married women aged 20–24 has increased phenomenally: from 21 percent in 1955 to 83 percent in 1995 (National Statistical Office 1997a: 582; Tsuya and Choe 1991). The percent of single women aged 25–29 also rose from a mere 3 percent to 29 percent between 1955 and 1995. Although almost all Korean men still marry by age 40, the proportions single among men in their late twenties and early thirties have also been increasing rapidly in the last few decades. American women and men are marrying later as well, even though they still marry at younger ages than Japanese or Koreans. For example, the proportion single among women aged 20–24 rose from 40 to 67 percent between 1975 and 1995 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1980, 1998). Men have experienced similar (or even more rapid) increases in the proportion single.

In sum, young women and men are marrying later in all three countries. The magnitude of the delay is especially notable in Japan, where there also is a sign of increases in permanent nonmarriage. In addition to delayed marriage, the most profound changes in American marriage have been in the declining stability and viability of marital relations, as characterized by high levels of divorce, increased cohabitation, and out-of-wedlock childbearing. We next turn to these issues.

**Divorce, Cohabitation, and Nonmarital Childbearing**

Although we cannot estimate the probability of divorce equally well in the three countries, it seems clear that divorce has been rising rapidly in all of them. With periodic fluctuations around the trend line, the divorce rate in the U.S. has increased exponentially since the early 1800s (Cherlin 1981). There was a particularly large increase between the mid-1960s and around 1980, after which the rate stabilized at a level at which about one-half of all first marriages end in divorce (Bumpass and Raley 1999).

Though lower than in the U.S., divorce has also increased in both of the East Asian countries. In Japan, the rate of divorce per 1,000 persons rose from around 0.8 in the mid-1960s to 1.6 in 1995 and to 2.3 in 2001 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2002: 100). Period life-table estimates suggest that the proportion of couples expected to divorce within twenty years of marriage rose from 9 percent in 1965 to 19 percent two decades later (Institute of Population Problems 1989a). Though a comparable estimate of the likelihood of divorce is not available for Korea, evidence indicates a similar, or even more rapid, increase in recent years. The crude divorce rate tripled from 0.5 per 1,000 in 1975 to 1.5 in 1995 (National Statistical Office 1998: 121).

Mass changes in family behavior are occurring not only within marriage, but also outside marriage in all three countries. Premarital sex has become nearly universal in the U.S. as the proportion sexually active among American teenagers doubled in just two decades from the late 1960s (Bumpass 1998; Forrest and Singh 1992), and the proportion of first marriages preceded by cohabita-
tion reached about one-half in the late 1980s (Bumpass 1990). Related to these changes in sexual behavior and union formation is a phenomenal increase in nonmarital childbearing in the U.S. The proportion of American babies born to an unwed mother increased from 8 percent in 1965 to 33 percent in 1994 (Ventura 1995; Ventura et al. 1998). While levels are higher among minority women, nonmarital childbearing has become more common among American women of all racial and ethnic groups (DaVanzo and Rahman 1993; Ventura 1995).

By contrast, in both Japan and Korea, out-of-wedlock childbearing has remained extremely low, at about 1–2 percent of all births (S.-K. Kim 1992; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2002:69). Cohabitation among young single persons has also remained extremely rare in the two East Asian countries; for example, less than 3 percent of unmarried Japanese under age 35 have ever lived in a cohabiting relationship (Institute of Population Problems 1989b: 71; Kong et al. 1992; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 1999: 184; Tsuya 1993).

Despite the virtual absence of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock childbearing, however, premarital sex has become increasingly common among young women and men in both East Asian countries. According to national surveys in Japan, 32 percent of single women aged 20–24 in 1987 reported having had sexual intercourse; the percentage had increased to 52 percent by 1997 (Institute of Population Problems 1989b: 70; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 1999: 184). The prevalence of premarital sex is lower, but clearly increasing, in Korea. According to national surveys of high school students, 3 percent of girls and 12 percent of boys reported having had sexual intercourse in 1988; the corresponding figures in 1998 were 8 and 18 percent respectively (Han et al. 2001).

Thus, we see similar signs of retreat from marriage in the forms of marriage postponement and increasing divorce in all three countries. There are also signs of increasing erosion of the social significance of marriage as an institution, as illustrated by the increases in sex among the unmarried, as well as, in the U.S., the prevalence of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock childbearing. Because childbearing remains almost exclusively within marriage in the two East Asian countries, the increasing retreat from marriage is associated with very low fertility in recent years. This association may reflect the indirect consequence of marriage delay/avoidance on fertility, but it may also reflect desires to delay or forgo childbearing that in turn have resulted in later marriage and increasing nonmarriage.

**Economy, Employment, and Education**

There have been dramatic changes since World War II in the social and economic structures of all three countries, and these changes have been important factors in the changes in fertility and marriage described above. We briefly
review some of the key aspects of macro social-structural changes—economic growth, urbanization, and industrial structural transformations—as well as two very important changes in women’s status—employment and educational attainment.

**Economic Growth, Urbanization, and Industrial Transformation**

Though the timing is different, Japan and Korea both had extremely rapid economic growth after World War II. Starting in the mid-1950s, Japan’s per capita Gross National Product (GNP) grew at a phenomenal pace, quadrupling in constant prices every 10–15 years (Tsuya and Choe 1991; World Bank 1991: 2–5, 1997: 6–9). Korea’s rapid economic development began in the mid-1960s, with its per capita GNP quadrupling in constant prices every 10–15 years until the mid-1990s. Consequently, the country has been transformed from one of the poorest in the world to one of the newly industrialized economies. In contrast to the two East Asian countries, the U.S. was already the wealthiest country in the world at the end of the war, and its pace of subsequent economic growth has been much slower.

In the course of rapid economic growth, the two East Asian countries also experienced rapid urbanization. In Japan, the proportion living in urban areas increased from 37 to 63 percent from 1950 to 1960, reaching 78 percent in 1995 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2002: 168). Korea experienced even more rapid and continuous urbanization throughout the postwar years, with the proportion urban rising from 21 percent in 1950 to 81 percent in 1995 (World Bank 1997: 114–116; Tsuya and Choe 1991). By contrast, the U.S. was already an urbanized society in the early postwar years, and the pace of urbanization since then has been very gradual: from 64 percent urban in 1950 to 76 percent in 1995 (United Nations 1996).

The rapid economic growth and urbanization in Japan and Korea were concurrent with dramatic changes in industrial structure. In Japan the proportion of the employed population in primary industries shrank from 49 percent in 1950 to 19 percent in 1970 to 6 percent in 1995 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2002, 143). In Korea the proportion of the employed population engaged in agriculture decreased phenomenally from 66 percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 1995 (National Statistical Office 1998: 161; Tsuya and Choe 1991). By contrast, the U.S. had completed much of its transformation from agriculture to a modern industrialized economy before the war. The proportion of employment in agriculture was 12 percent in 1950 and dwindled to 3 percent in 1995 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975: 127, 1998: 421).

**Women’s Employment**

With industrial structures shifting rapidly from primary to secondary and then to tertiary industries, employment, especially female employment, also underwent notable changes in all three countries. In Japan, although the overall
labor force participation rate of women changed little in the postwar years (remaining at roughly 50 percent, with some fluctuations), the type of female employment changed dramatically. The proportion of employed women who were family workers (worked on a family farm or in family businesses) declined steadily from 43 percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 1995, while the proportion in paid employment increased rapidly from 41 percent to 78 percent during the same period (Rodosho Joseikyoku 1999: appendix 16). Further, although the M-shaped pattern of female labor force participation by age still remains, the drop at the peak ages of women’s marriage and childbearing (ages 25–34) has become much less distinctive in recent decades. Especially notable are the increases in the labor force participation rate for women aged 25–29—from 43 percent in 1975 to 66 percent in 1995—suggesting an association with the increasing delay of marriage among women in this age group. The rate for women aged 30–34 also increased steadily—from 44 percent in 1975 to 56 percent in 1995. This in turn suggests that employment of mothers with small children has been on the rise in the country in recent years (nearly one-third of mothers of preschoolers were employed in 1994; see chapter 6 of this volume).

In Korea, the overall female labor force participation rate increased from one-quarter in 1960 to about one-half in 1995; however, the M-shaped age pattern of women’s employment remains clear and intact. Whereas the labor force participation rate of women in their early twenties has increased considerably in recent decades, the rates for women at the peak marriage and childbearing ages of 25–34 have been essentially stable. Moreover, the proportion of employed women who are in agriculture is still sizable at older ages—roughly 60 percent of women aged 50 and above in 1995 (National Statistical Office 1997b: 198). All together, these suggest that while employment of young (mostly single) women has been on the rise, opportunities for married women to enter paid employment have remained limited.

While the industrial transformation in the postwar U.S. was not as dramatic as that in Korea and Japan, there have been profound changes in the employment of mothers with small children. The labor force participation rate for all women increased from 38 percent in 1960 to 59 percent in 1995; the corresponding rate for women with children under age six increased even more rapidly: from 31 to 64 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975: 134, 1998: 408–409). The normative and social “barriers” to the employment of mothers of small children appear to have been overridden by the economic and social needs of women and their families.

Education

Education has a major impact on women’s status in society—directly, as well as through associated employment and earnings. Education also affects a number of aspects of family life, including intergenerational relationships and gender relations at home. In Japan, where primary and lower secondary education
had already been prevalent in the prewar years, the most notable educational change was a rapid and continuous increase in the proportion of women with higher education. The percentage of female high school graduates advancing to higher education increased phenomenally from 6 percent in 1960 to 48 percent in 1995, while the corresponding figures for males rose from 15 to 43 percent (Monbusho 1998: 38). It is especially notable that whereas the advancement rate for male high school students has remained around 43 percent during the last two decades, the rate for females has continued to increase, closing the once large gender gap. The proportion with higher education among women aged 25–29 increased from 10 to 49 percent between 1970 and 2000, surpassing that of men in the same age group during the 1990s (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2002: 151).

The level of women’s educational attainment was much lower in Korea in the early postwar years. Indeed, a sizable proportion of older women had no formal education at all (Tsuya and Choe 1991). Thereafter, however, the education of Korean women (and, to a lesser extent, men) increased remarkably. Only 3 percent of women born in 1936–1940 obtained higher education, compared to 32 percent among women born in 1966–1970 (National Statistical Office 1995: 64–66). The corresponding figures for men increased from 17 to 44 percent; thus, in Korea as well, the once vast gender gap has almost disappeared when we consider postsecondary school attendance. However, the gender gap remains with respect to the completion of college, even though there were very large increases for both men and women: from 14 to 33 percent among men and from 3 to 23 percent among women.

If not as dramatic as in the two East Asian countries, educational attainment also increased substantially in the U.S. after World War II, with a large majority of Americans today having at least a high school education. From 1950 to 1995, the proportion of the population aged 25 and over who had completed at least four years of high school increased from about one-third to 82 percent for both women and men (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975: 380, 1998: 167). The attainment of higher education in the U.S. is also characterized by a closing gender gap, especially among younger cohorts. For example, from 1970 to 2000, the percentage of the population aged 25–29 with four years of college or more increased from 13 to 30 percent for women and from 19 to 28 percent for men (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973: 627, 2000: table 1).

**Data**

All the chapters in this book use data from at least two of these three countries; the data are based on national surveys conducted in the late 1980s and mid-1990s: the National Survey on Work and Family Life (NSWFL) in Japan, the National Survey on the Quality of Life (NSQL) in Korea, and the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) in the U.S. As noted above, we
included questions in the national surveys in Japan and Korea that could be compared directly with the NSFH. Table 1.1 summarizes the basic characteristics of the surveys.

**Japan: NSWFL**

The NSWFL is a national probability sample of men and women aged 20–59 and of all marital statuses. The survey was intended to parallel the U.S. NSFH, as well as to collect information on marriage, work, and family life specific to Japanese families. Conducted in January–February 1994, the survey was designed by a research team from Nihon University in Tokyo assisted by researchers from the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, the East-West Center, and several U.S. universities, including the University of Wisconsin–Madison and the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill. Funding and logistical support were given by the University Research Center of Nihon University.

The NSWFL is based on a national, stratified, two-stage probability sampling of individuals, in which 175 locales were randomly selected based on the 1990 census tract distribution; then twenty individuals aged 20–59 were randomly selected within each locale (potential N=3,500). Information was collected through self-administered questionnaires that were distributed by field workers and then subsequently picked up. A total of 2,447 usable questionnaires was obtained—a response rate of 70 percent. Sample distributions on basic characteristics such as age and sex compositions closely match those of the 1990 population census of Japan. Further information on the survey can be found in Nihon Daigaku Sogo Kagaku Kenkyusho (1994).

**Korea: NSQL**

The NSQL was conducted in August 1994. Unlike the Japanese and U.S. surveys, however, the NSQL sample was limited to household heads and spouses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Japan (NSWFL)</th>
<th>Korea (NSQL)</th>
<th>U.S. a (NSFH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>2,666</td>
<td>13,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age range</td>
<td>20–59</td>
<td>n.a. b</td>
<td>19+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All c</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexes</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


b No age constraint was imposed on the sample.

c Restricted to heads of household and spouses of heads. Though there are some unmarried heads, this sample restriction results in a high proportion (87 percent) who are currently married.
of heads, and no age limit was imposed. The NSQL thus represents household heads and spouses of heads living in Korea in 1994 rather than the country’s general adult population. Given the nature of this sample, although basic characteristics of the subsample of currently married men and women aged 20–59 closely match those found in the 1990 population census of the Republic of Korea, individuals of other marital statuses are acutely underrepresented. The NSQL questionnaire was based on the questionnaire of the Japanese NSWFL. The NSQL was designed and conducted by researchers from the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA), with funding provided by KIHASA.

The NSQL is based on a stratified, two-stage probability sampling in which a national probability sample of ninety-nine locales was selected and then thirty household heads or spouses of heads were randomly selected within each locale. Rural areas were selected at twice the rate of urban areas; thus, sample weights are used to produce estimates that are nationally representative. Data were collected by face-to-face interviews in most cases. If a selected respondent could not be interviewed after several visits, however, a questionnaire was left for the respondent and then picked up by the interviewer at a later date. A total of 2,666 usable questionnaires was returned, representing a response rate of 90 percent. Further information on the survey can be found in Chang, Kim, and Bae (1994).

**U.S.: NSFH**

The NSFH is a large-scale, nationally representative survey of the noninstitutionalized population of the U.S., designed to collect information on a variety of issues pertaining to American family life. The first wave of the NSFH was conducted in 1987–1988 (NSFH1); a followup of the same respondents was conducted in 1992–1994 (NSFH2). The surveys were designed by a team of researchers from a variety of U.S. universities and research institutions directed by the Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin–Madison. Funding for NSFH1 was provided by the Center for Population Research of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD); NSFH2 was funded by the NICHD and the National Institute on Aging (NIA).

NSFH1 is based on interviews with 13,007 respondents from a stratified, clustered national probability sample. The sample includes a main cross-section of 9,637 households from which one adult (person aged 19 or older) per household was randomly selected as the primary respondent. This main cross-section was supplemented by an oversampling of a number of important subpopulations, and national estimates are obtained by using appropriate sample weights. Most of the information collected from the primary respondents was obtained through face-to-face interviews, which lasted on the average 100 minutes. Information was also collected from the spouse or cohabiting partner of
the primary respondent by a shorter, self-administered questionnaire. Further technical details of NSFH\textsubscript{1} can be found in Sweet, Bumpass, and Call (1988).

NSFH\textsubscript{2} is the five-year followup of NSFH\textsubscript{1}, based on reinterviews with 10,007 of the original primary respondents. In addition, interviews were conducted with a number of other family members, including spouses and a selected child and parent. Specifics on NSFH\textsubscript{2} can be obtained in Sweet and Bumpass (1996) through the NSFH home page (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/ nsfh/home.htm).

**Approach to Differences across the Surveys**

By design, the three surveys share a considerable number of identical or similar questions. Nonetheless, differences in the sampling designs across the three surveys require some restrictions to increase comparability. First, all the analyses of the NSFH reported in this volume use data only from non-Hispanic whites in order to avoid compounding cross-cultural comparisons with internal differences in familial cultural backgrounds of various racial and ethnic groups within the U.S. population. Not only do levels of family behavior (such as nonmarital childbearing) differ markedly between minorities and majority whites, but also a large body of research on family issues in the U.S. has found different relationships among variables for minority populations compared to majority whites (e.g., Bumpass and Sweet 1992; Carter 1993). As a consequence, it is often necessary to conduct analyses separately for majority whites and for minority groups, and this would be an unnecessary diversion from our major comparative objective.

Second, all analyses presented here are limited to persons aged 20–59, primarily because the Japanese survey was limited to this age range, and some of the analyses impose a narrower age range as appropriate to the topics being analyzed.

Finally, while many of the comparative analyses presented in this book focus on married couples, information on spouses is collected differently across the surveys. In the NSWFL and NSQL, respondents were asked to provide proxy reports for their spouses on objective information. On the other hand, in the NSFH, information on respondents and on their spouses was collected by self-reports. Thus we have controlled sex of respondent in our multivariate analyses.

**Organization of the Book**

After this introductory chapter, there are six comparative chapters on marriage, work, and family life in Japan, Korea, and the U.S. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on attitudes toward marriage and family, first from the perspective of the general adult population and then from that of young, never-married persons. The next two chapters focus on intergenerational relations, again from different per-
spectives: chapter 4 examines the relationship up the generational ladder—that is, between married adults and their parents; the other looks at the relationship downward—that is, between married women and their children. The final two comparative chapters examine work and the family from the perspective of married couples in midlife. The volume concludes with a chapter that discusses the advantages and difficulties of cross-national studies, summarizes major findings of the six comparative chapters, and speculates on the future of the family.

In chapter 2, Bumpass and Choe look at key attitudes relating to the importance of marriage and parenthood, nonmarital sex, gender roles, and intergenerational relations in Japan, Korea, and the U.S. It is important to examine differences in attitudes across these three societies because attitudes, while deeply imbedded in cultural heritage, also change in response to socioeconomic conditions. Paying attention to age and gender differences within each country, as well as to intercountry differences, the authors find many similarities in changes in attitude. In all three countries, traditional orientations toward marriage appear to be eroding rapidly, with the younger cohorts holding less traditional views. These differences may well foreshadow continuing changes in the normative climate with respect to the necessity and importance of marriage and childbearing. Attitudes toward traditional gender roles are also clearly related to age and gender in all three countries, with women holding much less traditional views than men. The authors suggest that these gender differences may, in turn, reinforce the delay as well as the instability of marriage that we have witnessed in all three countries, as men and women bring to marital unions vastly different expectations.

Chapter 3, by Tsuya, Mason, and Bumpass, takes a closer look at views on marriage and the desire to marry among young unmarried adults in Japan and the U.S. Comparing the perceived costs and benefits of marriage among single men and women aged 20–27, the authors find that Japanese women are most skeptical about the benefits of marriage. Although almost everybody thinks his or her personal freedom will not improve by marrying, the sense of loss of freedom associated with marriage is most widespread among Japanese women. In contrast to perceptions in the U.S., a large majority of Japanese women and men also feel that marriage would not improve their living standards. However, the majority of young people in both countries think that marriage will improve their emotional security and overall happiness. Nonetheless, Japanese women are the least optimistic about the psychological benefits of marriage: almost one-half of them do not feel that their happiness would increase were they to marry. While most young adults in both countries say they want to eventually marry, many more persons in Japan than in the U.S. are uncertain about this. These lukewarm views toward the benefits of marriage among young unmarried women (and, to a lesser extent, men) may be an important factor in the delay of marriage in Japan, especially in the con-
text of continuing gender inequality in the home and the increasing employment of wives.

The next two chapters address family relations across generations. In chapter 4, Rindfuss, Choe, Bumpass, and Byun examine relationships between parents and married men and women in midlife (ages 30–59). In particular, they explore patterns of intergenerational coresidence and contact across the three societies. Intergenerational relations are a vital part of family life, especially among East Asian families. As expected, levels of paternal coresidence are similar in Korea and Japan, in clear contrast to the U.S. An analysis of personal and telephone contact also suggests that both structural and cultural factors affect patterns of intergenerational interactions. In the two Asian countries, as culturally prescribed, factors such as urban origin and the husband’s being the eldest son have expected effects on the patterns of contact, whereas the effects of sociodemographic factors such as age and education are limited at best. By contrast, in the U.S. socioeconomic and demographic factors affect patterns of contact. Further, evidence suggests that the patriloclal stem family tradition is accommodating to the reality of rapid demographic and socioeconomic changes. In Japan maternal coresidence may be increasing, implying that the values placed on coresidence may be leading to a new solution in the face of constraints driven by low fertility and the exigencies of the modern market economy.

Chapter 5, by Tsuya and Choe, examines how investments in children’s after-school academic programs in Japan and Korea may be related to fertility desires and mothers’ employment. The level of desired fertility among married women at reproductive ages is low in Japan and even lower in Korea, and it is lower among women than among men in both countries. The authors argue that the low level of desired fertility may result, at least in part, from the high costs and pressures felt by parents, especially mothers, to educate their children, requiring heavy investments in children’s education in the form of cram schools and private tutoring. Enrollment in after-school programs is especially high in large metropolitan areas, and it increases with parents’ socioeconomic status, especially mothers’ education. In Japan, children’s enrollment in after-school programs is associated with mothers’ employment, as the number of hours worked increases with the number of school-aged children a mother has. In Korea, enrollment in after-school programs is not associated with mothers’ employment, probably because of the lack of suitable employment opportunities (such as part-time employment, as noted in chapter 6) that enable mothers to combine work and family responsibilities.

The next two chapters look at employment and family life. Chapter 6, by Choe, Bumpass, and Tsuya, examines patterns of employment among married women and men, as well as the preferences of both spouses about whether the wife should be employed. Much of the discussion is focused on wives because of the major changes in gender roles associated with their employ-
ment. Levels of employment among husbands and wives both reflect and contribute to gender roles across societies (see also chapters 2 and 7). Men work the most hours in Korea, followed by Japan and then the U.S. These inter-country differences are compounded by similar differences in the amount of commuting time required to get to and from work. Men’s time away from home for employment-related reasons is much greater in the East Asian countries than in the U.S. On the other hand, the proportion employed among married women is very similar in Japan and the U.S., but Korean wives are less than half as likely to be employed. Among employed wives, however, Korean wives work the longest hours, followed by Japanese and then U.S. wives. Family factors such as age of children and living with or near parents strongly influence wives’ employment status and hours but have little effect on husbands’ work hours in all three countries. Therefore, despite the marked differences in cultural backgrounds, the assignment of the breadwinning role primarily to men and domestic obligations primarily to women results in married women’s employment being affected by family situations in a way that men’s is not. Somewhat surprisingly, in Japan as well as in the U.S., both husbands and wives overwhelmingly prefer wives to work, and this is so even among mothers of small children.

In chapter 7, Tsuya and Bumpass examine the gender division of labor in Japan and the U.S. Recognizing employment and household tasks as joint components of “household production,” they begin by examining the combined workload of spouses by including both employment time and time spent on household tasks. When viewed from this perspective, the contributions of husbands and wives are approximately even in both countries. (The available measures, however, exclude the demands of child care on mothers of young children, hence substantially understate the contribution of these mothers.) The apparent gender equality in the average combined workload masks large differences in wives’ combined workload by their employment hours. Wives who are employed full-time indeed work a full “second shift” of household chores. The other side of this coin, however, is that housewives without young children carry considerably less of the total household production load than do their husbands.

Both husbands and wives in both countries spend less time on household tasks as their hours of employment increase. However, the contributions of husbands to household tasks in response to wives’ employment hours are different in the two countries. This relationship is more linear in the U.S., whereas Japanese husbands contribute more to housework only when wives are employed full-time and earn considerable income. This persistence of traditional gender inequality in the Japanese home very likely contributes to Japanese women’s ambivalence about the benefits of marriage.

Marriage, family, and work constitute central aspects of life in modernized economies. As the growth of the market economy creates ever more common
economic opportunities and constraints, Japan, Korea, and the U.S. exhibit similar patterns of change in family behavior and attitudes despite their dramatically different cultural heritages. At the same time, however, culture leaves unique imprints in the tempo and timing of family change in the face of economic transformation, structuring the way that economic change affects family relationships. The incongruity between women's employment, on the one hand, and the gender role expectations within the home, on the other, may well have played a major role in behavioral and attitudinal changes toward marriage and family in all three countries, but probably more so in the two East Asian countries, where transitions in men's views and behavior are slowed by the strength of the patriarchal cultural heritage.