Introduction

Manchuria, Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan were once important as the lands in which the “northern barbarians” of China’s frontier maneuvered in war and migration, working out among their own tribes their destinies of conquest in China or migration toward the West. They are now becoming a field of contest between three types of civilization—the Chinese, the Russian and the Western. In our generation the most acute rivalry is in Manchuria, and the chief protagonist of the Western civilization is Japan—whose interpretation and application of a borrowed culture is of acute interest to the Western world, as on it turns to a great extent the choice which other nations have yet to make between their own indigenous cultures and the rival conquering cultures of Russia and the West. (Lattimore 1935, ix)

The colonial powers involved in Manchuria are China, Russia and Japan, each of which has nourished recurrent ambitions of gaining a political hegemony over the whole physical region. Even under the current surface of peaceful coexistence and internationally fixed state borders, these ambitions are very much alive, and neither the Sino-Russian nor the Russo-Japanese border may be regarded as geopolitically stabilized. (Janhunen 1996, 31)

Manchuria today is unmistakably part of the sovereign territory of the People’s Republic of China, and one of the thriving centers of industrialization. Yet the above two passages, written respectively in the 1930s and the 1990s, amply suggest that “Manchuria” was and still is a contested area between and among several national and ethnic groups. Owen Lattimore, a British journalist who traveled and resided in Manchuria in 1929–1930, is the author of Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict. In this book published in 1935, Lattimore presented “Manchuria” as a field of contest between the Chinese, the Russian, and the Western civilizations. The major representative of the Western civilization, however, was Japan, which was then applying “a borrowed culture.” These three civilizations, according to Lattimore, concealed the presence of the “northern tribes,” particu-
larly the Manchus and the Mongols, who maneuvered in times of war and migration in Manchuria for many centuries. Juha Janhunen, the author of *Manchuria: An Ethnic History*, is a contemporary scholar of geography and history from Finland. In the passage above, Janhunen presents the postcolonial reality of “Manchuria,” in which the interests of China, Russia, and Japan are still very much present. He thus underscores that the colonial era in “Manchuria” has not yet ended, nor will it end soon. Taken together, these two passages suggest that, metaphorically speaking, “Manchuria” has been “an empty space” since the seventeenth century, for any group of people who was (or is) interested in colonizing the area. This is most explicitly expressed in the *Ten Year History of the Construction of Manchukuo*, written by a group of Japanese bureaucrats around 1942. In this book the authors claim that Manchuria did not belong to any particular group of people but was a land open to all, including the Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and Mongols. Even the ethnic Manchus, they argue, are not entitled to claim themselves as the legitimate occupants of Manchuria because they once left the area to the south of the Great Wall to govern China. In this respect, they too are the “return migrants” to Manchuria (Takigawa and Etō 1969: 3–7).

It is not only the Japanese who “emptied” Manchuria: there were many other groups of people. This volume highlights some of these groups as well as the individuals belonging to them, and examines how they imagined “Manchuria” in the age of empire (from the late nineteenth century to 1945) and how they have remembered it since then. Hence, “Manchuria” in this volume is less about a geopolitical term than about an effect of geopolitical imaginaries of various individuals and groups shaped by imperialism, colonialism, Pan-Asianism, postcoloniality, and the present globalization. The quotation marks around “Manchuria” are therefore “to remind us that the very name is not only a contested site but also an allegory of a much larger and ominous phenomenon: that of the survival, until today, of the old imperial and colonial desires for expansion and ‘living space’” (Lahusen, this volume). Today, such a contention over “Manchuria” most clearly emerges between China and Japan. The government of the People’s Republic of China refuses to use “Manzhou” and calls the region “Dongbei” or “Weiman” (false Manchuria) for an obvious reason: “Manchuria” is a product of Japanese imperialism, and to call the area Manzhou is to accept uncritically a Japanese colonial legacy. In contrast, in postwar Japan, sev-
eral names for “Manchuria” coexist: Manshū (Manchuria), Manshū-koku (Manchukuo), Man-mō (Manchuria-Mongolia), and its reverse, Mō-man (Mongolia-Manchuria). The Japanese, particularly those who had emigrated to Manchuria in the age of empire but were subsequently repatriated to Japan after 1945, use these terms almost interchangeably, as if they were still in possession of “Manchuria.” Since 1945, “Manchuria” has been actively remembered, commented on, and studied in both China and Japan. In this respect, “Manchuria” belongs to the past as well as the present. While, for these reasons, “Manchuria” should always be enclosed in quotation marks, we use the term without them in the rest of this volume.

Thus, Rana Mitter examines Manchuria in the imaginations of Du Zhongyuan, an entrepreneur, journalist, and nationalist political activist from Northeast China in the 1930s, and of his reader, the Chinese petty urbanites in Shanghai living outside Manchuria. David Tucker examines Manchuria in the imaginations of the leading Japanese city planners and architects of the 1930s. Dan Shao examines Manchuria in the imagination of Aisin Gioro Xianyu, a Manchu princess who was executed by the Chinese Nationalist government in 1948, and of the Chinese, Japanese, and Americans who tried to represent her for their own interests. Michael Baskett examines Manchuria in the imaginations of the Japanese and Chinese audiences of the “goodwill films” (shinzen eiga), the movies produced in the 1930s and 1940s by Manei, the Japanese-managed Manchuria Motion Picture Company. Thomas Lahusen examines Manchuria in the imaginations of about seven thousand Poles who immigrated to Harbin in northern Manchuria in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Suk-Jung Han examines Manchuria in the imaginations of the state makers of Manchukuo (who included both Japanese and Chinese leaders) and of the state makers of North and South Korea during the Cold War era. And I examine Manchuria in the imaginations of Morisaki Minato, a student of Manchuria Nation-Building University between 1942 and 1944.

In the rest of this introduction, I aim to accomplish two tasks. First, I offer an overview of the history of Manchuria, anticipating that the readers of this volume are not necessarily familiar with the subject. The overview will emphasize the demographic aspect of the history of Manchuria. Fortunately, numerous books in English on the subject of Manchuria have been published since the 1970s.¹ I also note that, as a scholar
of Japan, I could not give sufficient attention to the documents on the subject of Manchuria written in Chinese, Korean, Russian, and other languages. In this respect, I hope all remaining chapters in this volume complement this introduction. Second, I discuss the three major common themes that emerged in the process of our collaboration: Pan-Asianism, nationalism, and memory.

**An Overview of the History of Manchuria**

Recent scholarship suggests that Manchuria was present in the minds of the Manchu and Chinese people since the seventeenth century. Pamela Crossley (1997, 6) writes that traditional “Manchu” culture and identity came into being in the early seventeenth century, when the Manchu emperors established the Qing empire in China. Similarly, Mark Elliott (2000) states that the Manchu rulers claimed Manchuria as their homeland and gradually transformed the undifferentiated frontier space into a place, designating all the place names north of the Great Wall in the Manchu language. Restated, since the early seventeenth century, the Manchu emperors tried to “turn their own homeland into a preserve of Manchu heritage unspoiled by Chinese or other foreign immigration” (Duara 2003, 41). Nevertheless, their efforts could not effectively stop the migration of the Han Chinese, coming from south of the Great Wall, from migrating to Manchuria. By the time Lattimore arrived in Manchuria, their presence was sufficient enough for him to say, “Historically, Manchuria was the great migration-ground of the Han Chinese for centuries” (1935, 3). In addition, by the late nineteenth century, Russia, Britain, the United States, and Japan began to openly claim their interests in the region. This made Robert Lee (1970, 60) claim that the term “Manchuria” is “a modern creation used mainly by Westerners and Japanese for their imperialistic ambitions.” It is not that Lee was unaware of the scholarship of Manchu studies. Rather, he looked at Manchuria from the perspectives of the major imperial powers that exerted tremendous influence in the region.

By the early twentieth century, Manchuria became “the imperial melting pot,” a multinational, multiethnic place (Mitter, this volume). This fact is well reflected in the population census of one of the major cities in northern Manchuria, Harbin, compiled by the Manchukuo government in 1933. This census includes the following categories: Chinese, Tai-
wanese, Soviets, Russian, Japanese (from Japan proper), Korean, British, American, German, French, Italian, Pole, Jew, Greek, Dutch, Turk, Austrian, Hungarian, Dane, Latvian, Portuguese, Czech, Armenian, Belgian, Serb, Swede, Latin, Romanian, Swiss, Indian, and other (Dai Harubin An’nai-sha 1933, 4–6). The populations of such large cities as Harbin may have been more ethnically diverse than Manchuria’s countryside.

Still, this census does not include such categories as Manchus, Mongols, and the Tungusic tribes. Nor does it include the approximately two thousand nikkei, the Japanese who had first emigrated to the United States and Hawai’i and then emigrated again from there to Manchuria after 1932. John Stephan states that, having left behind their relatives in the United States, most of whom were later sent to relocation camps, these nikkei became part of “the Japanese” in Manchuria (1997; see also Sano 1997). Whether all these groups of people assimilated in Manchuria is a question that we should ask separately. Yet the existence of such a bewildering array of national and ethnic categories is sufficient to claim that Manchuria in the age of empire was indeed the imperial melting pot.

Nevertheless, the following bears remembering: the majority population of Manchuria was and is the Han Chinese. Since the late nineteenth century, the Chinese have emigrated to Manchuria in large waves. Often described as the world’s largest population movement, the average annual flow of Chinese from south of the Great Wall into Manchuria in the early twentieth century was estimated at five hundred thousand to two million. Thus, in 1930, W. J. Hinton wrote, “Like a deep bass refrain, in the varied discords of historical events during the years since the Revolution, is the roar of this human Niagara pouring into empty Chinese lands dominated by alien powers” (quoted in Chang 1936, 1). Similar views were expressed by several other Western journalists, politicians, and scholars, including V. A. Lytton, A. J. Toynbee, and J. E. Orchard (see also Gottschang 1987; Gottschang and Lary 2000). With this demographic condition of Manchuria in mind, let me now turn to the making of “Japanese Manchuria” from the late nineteenth century to 1945.

Japan’s move toward Greater Japan began with the domination of its well-populated neighboring areas (Peattie 1984, 7). It was also an incremental process (Matsusaka 2001, 1). The victory over China in 1895 allowed Japan to acquire its first colony, Taiwan. With another victory over Russia in 1905, Japan gained control of the southern tip of the
Liaodong peninsula in southern Manchuria—the Guandong Leased Territory. These victories effectively eliminated both the Chinese and the Russian powers from Korea. Next, Japan occupied Korea (first as a protectorate in 1905 and then as a colony in 1910), turning it into "a gateway to colonize Manchuria." The Korean rice-cultivating farmers who had earlier migrated to Jiandao, the area of Manchuria bordering Korea, thus served as "molecules" in the diffusion of Japan’s power from Korea to Manchuria (Park 2000, 195).

Meanwhile, since the late nineteenth century, China had lived under the unequal treaty system forced upon it by Europe and the United States. It was a system first created by the British, who imposed it on a weaker state—China—in the name of the treaty of free trade (Duus 1989, xiv–xix). While creating this "empire without colonies," the Western powers honored China’s territorial integrity. This is why, to join the Western imperial powers, the Japanese state originally took a cautious and realistic approach, relying on skillful diplomatic tactics within the framework of international cooperation (Hata 1988, 277–278). But as the military began to function as an increasingly independent and powerful group, Japan became enmeshed in aggressive military operations in Manchuria, and eventually China proper.

In 1905 and 1906, the Japanese state created three institutions in the Guandong Leased Territory—the office of the governor-general, the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR), and the Guandong Army—to "concentrate political power in their own hands, extract financial profits, and suppress any resistance to the Japanese-imposed political and economic order." The office of the governor-general administered the Guandong Leased Territory with executive, judicial, and legislative powers (Young 1998, 27, 29). The SMR eventually became much more than Japan’s colonial railway company. It owned and operated extensive lines of railways and managed the so-called attached areas of land to these railway lines. The SMR also owned and managed numerous properties within these areas, launched various new industries, and set up its own research department to carry out extensive economic and scientific research relevant to the government of Manchuria (see Itô 1964, 1988; Myers 1989). The Guandong Army originated in the Japanese army’s defense of the railway zones of the SMR at the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Over time, this military grew into a massive institution with the important mission of protecting Manchuria from the Chinese.
nationalist movement spreading throughout China and from the threat posed by the Soviet Union after 1917 (Young 1998, 30; see also Yamaguchi 1967, 8; Shimada 1965; Coox 1989).

The history of Japan’s expansion onto the continent between 1905 and 1931 is now the topic of several well-researched books (McCormack 1977; Young 1998; Matsusaka 2001). Here, I introduce only the major events that took place during this time period. First is the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911. The internal turmoil in China gave more opportunities to foreign powers to further encroach into Manchuria and China. Russia, for example, succeeded in making Outer Mongolia independent. In turn, the negotiations with Russia gave Japan “a sphere of influence in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia” (Hata 1988, 279). Second is the Japanese military’s participation in the joint Allied intervention in the Russian Revolution in 1918. Although this intervention failed, the prolonged stay of the Japanese military in Siberia “enabled the Japanese troops to move freely throughout almost all of China” (281). Third is the growing challenge of Chinese nationalism to Japan’s expansion. The establishment of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in 1912, its expansion under Chiang Kai-shek in the 1920s, the growing Chinese nationalism particularly after the infamous Twenty-One Demands, and the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 all pointed to the growing power of Chinese nationalism. When the regional warlords of Manchuria began to join the Chinese nationalist movement, the Guangdong Army took decisive action, assassinating the most powerful warlord, Zhang Zuolin (see McCormack 1977, 124–126). Nevertheless, several months after the death of Zhang, his son, Zhang Xueliang, merged his troops with the Nationalist army. Japan’s reaction to the growing nationalism in China reached its peak in 1931. Having missed the opportunity to occupy southern Manchuria in 1928, the Guandong Army seized Liutiaogou on 18 September 1931. By May of 1933, the army brought the railway zone and the four provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Rehe under its control. The army also expelled “the estimated 330,000 troops in Zhang Xueliang’s army” from Manchuria (Young 1998, 40). In 1932, claiming that Manchuria was separate from China, Japan established Manchukuo and presented it to the international community as a modern independent nation-state.

The characterization of Manchukuo—first as a republic and later as an empire—is by no means easy. In the words of Peter Duus, it was “a sepa-
rate state under Chinese leaders who took their orders from Japanese officers and civilian officials” (1989, xxiix). In this respect, Manchukuo was a puppet state of Japan and its de facto colony. Yet Manchukuo was born with all the symbolic formalities of an independent nation: a declaration of independence (kenkoku sengen), a head of the state (the last Qing emperor, Puyi), a national flag, an anthem (which later changed twice), and a capital (Xinjing, which literally means “new capital”). In other words, the Japanese “labored mightily to convince themselves and others of the truth of Manchurian independence” (Young 1998, 40–41).

How large was the Japanese population in Manchuria on the eve of the establishment of Manchukuo? How many more Japanese emigrated to Manchuria between 1932 and 1945? The prewar statistics on Japanese emigration are scant and unreliable. Information is particularly meager when the destinations of emigrants were within the areas under Japan’s influence. The government seems to have paid little attention to the Japanese who left for those regions regarded as a part or extension of “Japan proper” (which the Japanese called naichi, “inner land”). A more compelling reason for the lack of information, however, is that Japan was a late-comer in colonial politics: the migration of Japanese laborers began only in the late 1880s (Ichihashi 1931, 618); the Japanese migration to Manchuria began but a few decades before the Russo-Japanese War.3 From then on, however, Japanese policy makers encouraged their people to emigrate to Manchuria, partly because of the worsening relationship between Japan and the United States over the Japanese emigration to California. By the early 1930s, about two hundred forty thousand Japanese had moved to the cities in southern Manchuria, the region opened up by the SMR (Iriye 1981, 457).

The presence of the Japanese population, however, was insignificant in Manchuria for several reasons. First, Japanese occupied less than one percent of the total population of Manchuria, which was estimated to be thirty million. Second, except for the soldiers of the Guandong Army and other employees of the Japanese state, most Japanese migrants in Manchuria before 1931 were the so-called tairiku rōnin or “continental drifters,” not settlers in the strict sense of the term. Lattimore observes, “The average [Japanese] peasant would far rather move to a town [within Japan] and become a factory worker than go abroad to take up land” (1935, 237). Before 1931, then, the Japanese in Manchuria who were not on official duties were largely small-scale entrepreneurs and the women
who catered to them. The number of Japanese agrarian settlers barely surpassed one thousand (Araragi 1994, 277; see also Wilson 1995). Hence, when Japan created Manchukuo, the majority of its thirty million population was Han Chinese. The ethnic Manchu, the term from which Manchukuo was derived, were few, or had already been greatly “sinified,” that is, assimilated to the lifestyle of the majority Han Chinese.

During the Manchukuo era (1932–1945), the Japanese population in Manchuria rose by approximately three-quarters of a million. The expanding colonial state apparatus, namely the Manchukuo government, the SMR, and the Guandong Army, needed more personnel from Japan. The railway and urban construction boom attracted many fortune seekers from Japan, mostly the disadvantaged younger sons of poor families (Young 1998, 250–259). In addition, an increasing number of farmers crossed the Sea of Japan to settle in Manchuria. Assisted by the metropolitan government to acquire land, these farmers eventually numbered about 322,000 by 1945 (Young 1998, 328). The Japanese population in Manchuria at the end of the Japanese empire is thus estimated to be 1.5 million (Kōsei-shō 1997, 32). How does the postwar historiography of Manchuria present this contested region that has many names?

The postwar collaboration of the nation-centered historians in China, Japan, Russia, and Korea seems to have produced a dichotomous picture of either an “exploitative” or a “glorious” Manchukuo or, worse still, a picture without Manchuria (McCormack 1991, 106). Such collaboration, then, has not produced “crossed” histories but “divisive” histories of Manchuria. For example, Joshua Fogel noted to me that in 2002 he attended an international conference devoted to the topic of the Sino-Japanese War and World War II in East Asia. Needless to say, the topic of the Manchukuo regime played a major role in the papers presented there. The mainland Chinese participants made frequent use in their papers of the term Wei-Man to characterize that regime. Although Fogel has long heard and read such language in Chinese-language publications, he questioned a presenter from China early in the meeting about the use of what continues to strike him as a moralistic term. His aim was not to soften the realities of life under Japanese authority in Manchuria, but to try to move the discussion beyond the moralistic simplicities, and to understand Manchuria from within. Yet he was received by the speaker, an accomplished and well-published author, with a civility barely masking antipathy (personal communication).
The nationalist historiography of Manchuria also forced the organizers to change the site of one international conference on the theme of Manchuria. In 1998, the Beijing government denied Heilongjiang University, situated in the suburbs of Harbin, the right to hold a conference devoted to the history of the city of Harbin. For the Russians, particularly those who used to live in Harbin but returned to the former Soviet Union after 1945, Harbin was a city founded by their ancestors: in 1898, the Russians began the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, linking the Russian empire across Manchuria to Vladivostok. For their post-colonial descendants, it seemed natural to hold a conference celebrating the centennial of the city of Harbin with the Chinese and other international scholars. For the officials of the Beijing government, however, the birth of Harbin was by no means “related to the day when the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway started” on 9 June 1898 (Lahusen 1998). Prasenjit Duara has stated that the black-and-white understanding of Manchukuo is itself shaped by nationalist politics, which channel histories into very narrow passages (2003, 59). In examining Manchuria in the imaginations of various national and ethnic groups and the individuals belonging to them, our goal is to critically examine the dominant historiography of Manchukuo without losing the larger picture—the harsh reality of life imposed upon the Chinese people by the Japanese imperial apparatus—hence the title of this volume: Crossed Histories.

Common Themes

This volume complements several other edited volumes published in English on the theme of Manchuria. They include The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937 (Duus, Myers, and Peattie 1989), The Making of a Chinese City (Clausen and Thøgersen 1995), The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Duus, Myers, and Peattie 1996), and Harbin and Manchuria: Place, Space, and Identity (Lahusen 2000b). Yet the following common themes, we believe, make this volume unique among them, as I will elaborate below.

PAN-ASIANISM

By the time Japan created Manchukuo, the Japanese empire had already incorporated Taiwan, Korea, and Karafuto. It had also incorpo-
rated the equatorial Pacific islands known as Nan’yō, the former German colonies that Japan acquired at the end of World War I, together with China’s Shandong Peninsula. To expand the Japanese empire, the Japanese state makers actively used such slogans as どぶんどしゅ (same script, same race) and いしほうじん (impartiality and equal favor under the Japanese emperor) (Peattie 1984, 97). These slogans implied the cultural proximity between the colonizer and the colonized (particularly the Chinese and the Koreans), as well as the “equality” between them under the sovereign power of the Japanese emperor. Note, however, that Manchukuo was not, in the eyes of the Japanese state makers, a Japanese colony. Hence, Japan could not make use of slogans to subordinate the colonized; instead, Japan needed other slogans to make Manchukuo appear to be an independent nation-state.

The scholars of Manchuria seem to agree that the Manchurian Youth League (Manshū seiner ren’mei), founded in 1928, was a major force behind the creation of the ideology of りんぞくきょうわ or “racial harmony.” It was a group of educated Japanese youth and small merchants who perceived Manchuria as the place where “Japan and China (にっか)” should coexist peacefully and together elevate the Chinese economy and culture (Hirano 1972, 238–239; Yamamuro 1993, 92–95; Yamaguchi 1967). Indeed, the ideology of racial harmony was also derived from the discourse of Chinese nationalism, or more specifically, Sun Yat-sen’s proclamation of China’s five races in 1912. While racism, assimilation, and autonomy (of each race) seem to have complicated Sun’s idea, the notion of a unified Han nationality incorporating the other four races—Man (Manchu), Meng (Mongol), Zang (Tibetan), and Hui (Moslem)—constituted an important element in the Chinese nationalism (Duara 1995, 142–144). Yet we should not ignore the political environment in which the Manchurian Youth League was formed—a rising sentiment of Chinese nationalism against the Japanese in China. Thus, the members of the league utilized Sun’s idea for the purpose of securing their leadership in the Pan-Asian space of Manchuria for protecting Japan’s special interests and competing with the intensifying anti-Japanese atmosphere in Manchuria. Together with the members of another association of the Japanese youth, the Majestic Peak Society (Yūhō-kai), they tried to secure autonomy for Manchuria, paving the path to the creation of Manchukuo. For this goal, they required the ideology of racial harmony, but they emphasized the leadership of the Japanese in the name of Japanese-
Manchurian unity (Itō 1988, 141). Manchukuo, then, seems to have heavily relied on this slogan to create not so much Japan’s colony as the Pan-Asian space where the Japanese were still able to exert imperial power.

In this volume, Suk-Jung Han demonstrates that the Manchukuo government tried to mobilize the maximum number of people into their state making by daily inviting them to participate in mourning ceremonies for Confucius, the Meiji emperor, Nurgaci, and Chinese and Japanese war heroes. After the onset of the Japan-China war in 1937, Japanese state makers tried to give the Japanese Shintoism a more prominent role. Yet they also patronized Confucianism to a great extent. For example, the name for “reign” for the first two years of Manchukuo, datung (J: daidō), means “Confucian unity.” In this respect, Manchukuo was a land where both Confucian and Shinto shrines existed side by side. Han also argues that several years before the outbreak of the Pacific War, which capitalized on yet another slogan of the Japanese state—the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere—numerous rituals, rallies, and pageants on “Asian prosperity” (xingya) had already swept the major cities of Manchukuo. Anticommunism further strengthened the idea of the Pan-Asianism of Manchukuo. State makers tried to incorporate minorities, such as Muslims and White Russians, in anticommunist rallies. The White Russians, who fled the Russian Revolution of 1917, were “stateless people” in the official documents of Manchukuo. Thus, Manchukuo, which was acknowledged as an independent nation at least by Germany, Italy, and Spain, gave the state’s protection to stateless people such as the White Russians, Poles (who did not regain the Republic of Poland until 1918), and Jews.

Some individual characters who appear in this volume “embody” Pan-Asianism. Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Kawashima Yoshiko, who appeared in the burgeoning popular culture of Manchuria in the 1930s, are such examples. Yamaguchi Yoshiko (known also as Li Xianglan and Ri Kōran, the Japanese pronunciation of her Chinese name) (Baskett, this volume), spoke Japanese, Chinese, and Russian. And in songs, dance, and the performing arts, she wore Chinese, Manchu, Korean, Taiwanese, Russian, and Japanese costumes. Kawashima Yoshiko had three other names and identities—Jin Bihui (Chinese), Aisin Gioro Xianyu (Manchu), and Chuandao Fangzi (the Chinese pronunciation of her Japanese name). In addition, she was a cross-dresser (which she claimed to be “of the Man-
Both Yoshikos moved freely between Japan and Manchuria. Or rather, both needed and profited from Japan, China, and Manchuria.

Morisaki Minato is another such Pan-Asian figure. Having attended the Manchuria Nation-Building University, an institution that embodied the idea of Pan-Asianism, he desperately tried to integrate the interests of the Japanese and the Chinese (Tamanoi, this volume). In addition, the postwar publication of the history of the Manchuria Nation-Building University suggests that university authorities tried to hire both Owen Lattimore and Pearl Buck to its faculty (Yuji 1981)—meaning that Pan-Asianism in Manchuria was wide open to the West. Of course, the definition of “the West” may vary depending on who interprets it. For the Japanese leaders of Manchukuo, Russia represented the West: they actively incorporated Russians into a state-sponsored mass organization called Kyōwakai or the Concordia Association in order to make Manchukuo more credible for the Western imperial powers. For Lattimore, however, Japan was “the chief protagonist of the Western civilization” (1935, ix). These differing interpretations of the West notwithstanding, the presence of the Russians, Poles (Lahusen, this volume), Jews (Lahusen, 2000a), and many other international groups of people made Manchuria exotic and cosmopolitan. And this is an important reason why Manchuria attracted not only Japanese and Chinese living outside the region, but also many other national and ethnic groups. In this respect, the Pan-Asianism of Manchuria in the early twentieth century was indeed “transnational,” or even “global.”

Yet genuine Pan-Asianism, in which people of all nationalities would have lived in harmony, never existed in Manchuria. In the age of empire, the Pan-Asianism was always a Japan-centered collective Asian consciousness (Baskett, this volume). This fact is reflected in another slogan that the Japanese state embraced, minzoku shidō, and its obverse, shidō minzoku. As a “leading race” (shidō minzoku), the Japanese were to guide the members of all the other races in Asia to its prosperous future (minzoku shidō). These slogans appear in the writings of many Japanese intellectuals who lived in Manchukuo. For example, Tachibana Shiraki stated in 1939 that the Japanese people, as members of a leading race, were obligated to understand the wishes of everyone else belonging to other races and that everyone else in turn was obligated to cooperate with the Japa-
Tanaka Takeo, an officer of the Japanese Ministry of Colonization, stated that racial harmony meant “constructing Manchukuo where Japanese play the central role with the members of each race helping the Japanese in proportion to their respective members” (quoted in Sugiyama 1966, 33–34). Likewise, Hirano Yoshitarō, a Marxist scholar of law, wrote in 1942 that the Japanese race was obligated to guide all the other races in Greater East Asia in order to liberate them from the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands (Hirano et al. 1966, 644). It is clear from these quotations that a leading race refers not only to the Japanese elites but to every Japanese. People who are to be guided by the Japanese also have their obligation: to obey the Japanese and cooperate with them. The following episode, then, is extremely interesting in that it reveals the gap between Japanese imperial power and the slogan of racial harmony in the supposedly Pan-Asian space of Manchuria.

Sometime in the late 1930s, several key members of the Guandong Army were engaged in a heated argument as to which deity was to be enshrined in the Grand State Foundation Shrine for Manchukuo that was then under construction. One member suggested the combination of “the God of Heaven, the Meiji emperor, Nurgaci, and the spirits of dead soldiers of Japan and Manchukuo.” Another member suggested “all the gods that have been worshiped by the Han Chinese except for those that are also worshiped by the Japanese.” Yet another member suggested “all the gods worshiped by all the people in Manchukuo,” while another recommended “Amaterasu Omikami,” the mythological founding goddess of Japan. In the end, the Manchukuo government accepted the last recommendation and enshrined Amaterasu Omikami in the Grand State Foundation Shrine (Sakai 1994). The people of Manchukuo were thus forced to worship the mythological founder of Japan as the founder of “their” nation.

Duara has recently argued that, from 1911 to 1945, “the discourse of Eastern civilization, whether as superior to Western civilization or as necessary to redeem the latter, actually flourished in China as an intellectual, cultural, and social movement” and that this movement was closely connected to the similar movement in Japan (2003, 99–100). In other words, the discourse of Chinese nationalism (in the name of Chinese civilization) and the discourse of Japanese nationalism (in the name of Japanese civilization) were both connected to the discourse of Eastern or Pan-Asian civilization.
It is for this reason that Manchukuo provides us “a site to examine the workings of an ever opening history that refuses to be finally framed by the spatiotemporal vectors of the national histories of either China or Japan” (Duara 1998, 116). Nevertheless, Manchukuo did not, and could not, generate its own nationalism. Despite the claim of the Japanese leaders, the ever widening gap between Chinese anti-imperialist nationalism and Japanese imperialist nationalism kept Manchukuo from becoming an independent nation-state.

NATIONALISM

The two destructive wars of the twentieth century, Partha Chatterjee argues, are largely the results of “Europe’s failure to manage its own ethnic nationalisms.” Yet he also argues that the same wars gave the colonized people of Asia and Africa one of Europe’s most magnificent gifts—nationalism (1993, 4). Chatterjee’s thesis reveals some of the most important characteristics of nationalism at the end of the age of empire. First, nationalism can be both orderly and disorderly. While nationalism caused the two destructive wars of the twentieth century, it also liberated colonized people from both Western and Japanese imperialism and gave their nation-states independence. Second, the unit that exercises nationalism may vary greatly, from a single, small ethnic group to a large unit of multiple ethnic groups. Thus, it is always possible for a larger unit to challenge the nationalism of a smaller unit. Third, nationalism is like a living organism. An old nationalism that was a cause for imperial expansion might decay as a result of its confrontation with a young, anti-imperialist nationalism. In this volume, both Mitter and Shao speak to this complexity of nationalism in China in the age of empire.

Du Zhongyuan, who was born in a small village in Fengtian province in Northeast China, was a northeastern man and a Chinese nationalist. Naturally, what the northeastern provinces of China mean to the Chinese public outside the region itself became an important question for him. For Du’s main readership, the petty urbanites in Shanghai, he was a leader against Japanese imperialism and a person who came from the hotbed of Chinese nationalism—Manchuria. These petty urbanites, however, held an exceedingly uncomplicated view of Chinese nationalism based on the idea of undifferentiated Japanese imperialism. In contrast, Du’s idea of Chinese nationalism was considerably more complicated. Du
criticized the Chinese Republican bureaucrats for their corruption. He tried to separate the poor, hard-working, and ordinary Chinese from the elite. He also attacked the tendency of the Chinese public to celebrate only a few nationalist individuals such as Ma Zhanshan. Finally, Du also occasionally demonstrated his ambivalence toward the widespread collaboration between the Chinese and the Japanese in Northeast China.

Nevertheless, a simple Chinese nationalism was a powerful force to reckon with. Thus, Shao presents Aisin Gioro Xianyu as a Chinese woman whose Manchu identity was finally defeated by Chinese nationalism after the liberation of Manchuria. Xianyu was part of a generation that refused to identify themselves with China when the formation of the Chinese state was not yet completed. It is therefore possible to relate her Pan-Asian identity to her desperate resistance against not only the Japanese imperial power (which destroyed her Qing royal family) but also the Chinese Nationalist power (which eventually executed her). The Chinese Nationalist government did not interpret her crime as that of a Manchu against the Han Chinese. Instead, it interpreted her crime as treason, as that of a Chinese citizen against the Chinese government. This uncomplicated nationalism of the Chinese Nationalist government defeated Xianyu as a Manchu individual and challenged “the Manchus” as an ethnic minority.

Both Mitter and Shao, then, seriously question a dichotomous view of the anti-imperialist nationalism of China and the imperialist nationalism of Japan. They endorse the need for a methodology that is “capable of joining the history of modern nationalism with the understanding of nationalism as the producer of history” (Duara 2003, 9).

With regard to nationalism, David Tucker in this volume argues that some Japanese planners and architects tried to use the idea of imperialist nationalism to create a Japanese Manchuria. They designed a village suitable for a small settlement of farmers in Japan and extrapolated it for a population greater than three hundred thousand in Manchuria. Toward this goal, they toured Manchuria in military planes. Then, having returned home, they drew on a blank sheet a network of identical hamlets and fields. The only sign of an existing population in their plan was a small room in an outbuilding to house temporary Chinese agricultural laborers. In the end, such an inordinately abstract plan by these modern city planners was unrealized, and not one idealized village was built in Manchuria.
This very fact reveals the problem of an equally abstract notion of the imperialist nationalism of Japan. That is, while it is important to view the Japanese as colonizers, it is also important to understand that the Japanese settlers in Manchuria did not constitute a homogeneous group of people. Furthermore, the architects who planned a village for the Japanese agrarian colonists represented the elite. In contrast, most of the agrarian settlers were impoverished farmers who tried to flee rural Japan in the postdepression era. For them, Manchuria represented neither modernity nor the glory of an empire.

MEMORY

“The massive production and reproduction of memories of the last military conflict to have been named a world war” characterize the politics of East Asia today (Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama 2001, 1). Since Manchuria was and is still a highly contested area, it has currently become one of the most “remembered” geopolitical regions of East Asia, causing at times a war of memories among China, Japan, and Russia. Furthermore, since the people who lived in Manchuria in the age of empire have now moved to various other regions of the world, the remembrance of Manchuria is a phenomenon seen on a world scale. In this volume, Shao, Baskett, Han, and I speak of the memories of Manchuria and Manchukuo in postwar East Asia. While Han and I discuss such memories in the context of the 1970s, at the height of the Cold War system, Shao and Baskett discuss them in the context of the 1990s.

“Memory” in itself is a vast subject. Memory is infinite because all consciousness is mediated through memory. It is also social as one talks or writes about one’s memory to share it with others. Memory is also complex, for it never exists in isolation from social context (Fentress and Wickham 1992, ix–xii). Thus, we must approach memory with due caution, and in this respect, the four approaches to memory that Ann Stoler and Karen Strassler have recently proposed are useful for anyone who is interested in the production and reproduction of memories of the two world wars. The first approach—a storage model—envisions memory as a storehouse of knowledge that contains the information about particular events in the past. The second—a hydraulic model—is a variant of the first: it interprets memory as a repository of alternative histories and subaltern truth. The third—an identity model—views memory as construc-
tions of and for the present. Stoler and Strassler then argue that each of these three models has its strength and weakness. For example, while it is impossible to transparently equate memory to (the narrator’s experience of) a particular event, the first model is still valuable for empirical research. Anyone who relies on this model, however, must be aware of the interpretive problem that it elides: both memory and experience come to us only through mediation. The second model can be credited or discredited for the same reasons. Yet this model is useful when we think of the (lack of) power of those who remember the subaltern truth. Under this model, remembering may be an act of resistance by a marginal group of people. The identity model, which places more emphasis on what remembering does for the present than on what can be known about the past, best points to the nature of memory. This model leads us to critically examine the nature of memory as constructions of and for the present. Yet in using this model, we should keep in mind that memory is not a mere construct, nor is it a functional response to the need of and for the present. The need to integrate all these approaches thus calls for yet another model. Stoler and Strassler call this “memory-work”: to treat memory as an interpretative labor, one should examine “not only what is remembered but how” (Stoler and Strassler 2000, 9; emphasis original).

In Manchukuo, the SMR built the Dahua Porcelain Company, where both Japanese and Chinese worked. Du “grudgingly” admired the Japanese effort to build this company. Still, for Du, “Sino-Japanese goodwill” meant the Japanese imperialists’ plan to destroy the will of the Chinese masses to resist (Mitter, this volume). In 1995, Japanese film historian Yamaguchi Takeshi planned to present a set of “goodwill films,” now reformatted into videos, to the Chinese government as an act of “goodwill” for the people of China. These films had been produced by the Manchuria Motion Picture Company in the 1930s and 1940s to mitigate Chinese misunderstanding of Japanese goodwill. The Chinese government refused to accept the videos, “for doing so would have appeared to be an official recognition of Japan’s former Manchukuo regime” (Baskett, this volume). The same films were not remembered in the same way. In Japan in the 1990s, they attracted a fairly large audience who was nostalgic for Manchuria in the age of empire. In contrast, Ri Koran, the Musical was well attended in both Japan and China. In China it was performed in a successful four-city tour in 1992 at the invitation of the Chinese gov-
Introduction: 19

The memory of such a flexible rhetoric as "goodwill," then, should be approached in terms of not only what is remembered but also how it is remembered. In this way, we can further reveal the complex nature of Manchuria in the past as well as in the present.

The idea of Pan-Asianism, however, seems to have been completely forgotten in postwar Japan. Here, the work of Oguma Eiji (1995, 2002) is insightful. In a lengthy work on "the boundary of the Japanese race," Oguma discusses the two major theories on the origin of the Japanese race, called respectively fukugō minzoku-ron and tan'itsu minzoku-ron. While the former was dominant before Japan's capitulation, the latter has become more popular since then. Each theory, according to Oguma, has two components. According to fukugō minzoku-ron a long and complicated process of intermarriage among the people of different races in Asia gave birth to the Japanese, and these people inhabited the Japanese empire. In contrast, tan'itsu minzoku-ron has the following two components: the Japanese constitute a single, pure race and share uniformity in language and culture; and the Japanese have inhabited the Japanese archipelago since ancient times. Fukugō minzoku-ron supports the creation and maintenance of the Japanese empire, while tan'itsu minzoku-ron endorses the postwar Japanese nationalism. Both theories are based on a considerable degree of distortion, and the contradiction between them is undeniable.

The ideology of racial harmony in Manchukuo evidently represents fukugō minzoku-ron. And yet, as I have already discussed, the contradiction between this ideology and "the Japanese as a leading race" eventually led Manchukuo to a path of destruction. In this volume, I demonstrate that the idea of fukugō minzoku-ron was quickly forgotten in Japan in the 1970s. The suicide in 1945 of Morisaki Minato, who embraced the cause of Pan-Asianism, was reinterpreted in the 1970s as the death of a young Japanese patriot for the Japanese emperor, in parallel with the suicide of Mishima Yukio, who died in 1970. Similarly, Han demonstrates the Manchurian origin of a variety of national ceremonies of North and South Korea in the Cold War era. Nevertheless, scholars of East Asia tend to see the origin of these national rituals and pageants solely in Japan simply because Korea was Japan's colony between 1910 and 1945. One of the goals of this volume, then, is to question the popular memories of the age of
empire, not in the system of nation-states but in Pan-Asian and transnational space.

Throughout the volume, I have left some inconsistencies in the spelling of the same terms intact. Such inconsistencies reflect the fact that Manchuria in the age of empire was indeed a Pan-Asian, transnational space where different languages were spoken. The Japanese leaders of Manchukuo ultimately imposed their own language upon all the other languages. Yet as scholars of Manchuria, our mission is to keep those languages alive through the examination of historical archives, written and visual documents, and people’s memories, and to produce crossed histories of Manchuria.

NOTES
2. The Korean people, while in the ranks of the colonized in their own society from 1910 to 1945, fell into impermanent categories when displaced to other realms of the Japanese empire such as Manchuria (Brooks 1998, 26). Before 1932, the Japanese colonial government in Korea encouraged the Koreans to emigrate to Manchuria and to become naturalized Chinese. After 1932, the "Koreans" were often included in the category of the "Japanese" in the official documents of the Manchukuo government. Restated, in Manchukuo, the "Japanese" versus the "Koreans" (i.e., the colonizer versus the colonized) was often shifted onto another binary: the "Japanese and Koreans" versus the rest of the population in Manchukuo (Tamanoi 2000).
3. It is believed that the first Japanese person who emigrated to Manchuria was a woman named Miyamoto Chiyo. She emigrated to Siberia in 1886 and then to Harbin in northern Manchuria accompanying a Russian medical doctor. Women such as Miyamoto Chiyo were part of jōshi-gun or "the troop of young women." They were so called because of their contribution to the making of the Japanese empire: they worked on the frontier of the empire as maids, waitresses, and prostitutes and sent remittance in large amounts back home. For a detailed history of the Japanese migration to Manchuria, see Iriye Toraji 1981. This two-volume book was originally published in 1936 and 1942. The chapters on Japanese migration to Manchuria can be found in its second volume (chaps. 20–23). For a biography of Miyamoto Chiyo see Harubin Nichi-nichi Shinbun-sha 1933.
4. The Concordia Association tried to organize the entire population of Manchuria regardless of ethnicity. However, despite this original goal, the association became over time an instrument for the Guandong Army, which used it to mobilize the people and resources of Manchuria for Japan’s war efforts (see Hirano 1972; Duara 2003, 60, 73–76).
5. Hirano Yoshitarō expressed this opinion at a panel discussion held in 1942 in which Tachibana Shiraki, Kiyono Kenji, Itakagi Yōichi, and Oiwa Makoto participated.

REFERENCES


