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**Gregory Schopen/Buddhist Monks and Business Matters**

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## CHAPTER I

# The Good Monk and His Money in a Buddhist Monasticism of “the Mahāyāna Period”

IT IS PROBABLY FAIR to say that, because of the way they have been studied, neither Indian Buddhist monasticism nor the Buddhist monastery in India has been allowed to have anything like a real history. Whether implicitly or explicitly, conscious or not, most modern scholars have either unquestioningly assumed, or worked hard to show, that extant monastic or *vinaya* sources, for example, must be early, some even asserting—or again assuming—that they must go back to the Buddha himself. But the necessary consequences of this assumption have rarely been examined: if the extant *vinaya* sources are early, if they go back anywhere near the time of the Buddha, then Buddhist monasticism could not have any real institutional history—it could only have sprung all but fully formed from the head of the Buddha. Moreover, since these extant *vinaya* sources already know and are meant to govern fully developed, well-organized, walled monasteries that had infirmaries, refectories, bathrooms, steam rooms, locks, and keys, the Buddhist monastery too could have had no real development and, consequently, no actual history. It would have been architecturally finished from its very start.

Such pictures—one is tempted to say fantasies—fit, of course, not at all well with what is known about monasticisms elsewhere. More importantly, and in specific regard to the Indian Buddhist monastery for which we have some independent, nonliterary sources as well, it does not fit at all with what is found in the archaeological record of Buddhist monastic sites in India. The earliest Buddhist “monasteries” that are known in India—and none of these are pre-Aśókan—are not “monasteries” at all. They are either [86]\* only barely improved, unorganized, natural caverns or caves, or poorly constructed and ill-organized shelters built of

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\*To allow for easy cross-reference, the page numbers of the original publications have been inserted into the text in square brackets.

rubble or other cheap materials.<sup>1</sup> Communities living in these environments could not have produced our elaborate *vinayas*, nor would they have had any use for them. Since such communities had no steam rooms (*jentāka*), for example, how could they possibly have generated elaborate rules governing their construction and use?

Clearly there is something curiously wrong here, and the early history of Buddhist monasticism and Buddhist monasteries in India must be fundamentally rethought and reexamined. But there are other equally interesting projects that also must be undertaken. Once it is allowed that, yes, both Buddhist monasticism and Buddhist monasteries had histories, that both developed and changed over time, then “early” Buddhist monasticisms—and we should probably begin to use the plural seriously here—and the “early” Buddhist monastery, become only one, and certainly not the only important, object of investigation. We need no longer be implicitly or explicitly concerned primarily with the question of what Buddhist monasticisms originally were. We might be equally—and probably more fruitfully—concerned with what at given places at given points in time they had become. We might begin to meaningfully talk about “early” and “early medieval” and “medieval” and “late” Buddhist monasticisms and to study each of these in their own right and not, for example, as mere exemplifications of the decline and degeneration of some “early” and largely assumed single “ideal.” Each of these monasticisms will need to be understood and evaluated on its own terms, and this, of course, will not be easy.

If, for example, we want to know what Buddhist monasticism had become in North India in the period between the mature Kuṣān and the fifth through sixth centuries—the period that for lack of a better term might be called “the early medieval,” and the period that is generally taken to be that of “the Mahāyāna”—then the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* becomes a primary source. There is an almost general agreement that this *Vinaya* is “late” and was redacted and used during this period. There is the same sort of agreement that during this period this *vinaya* had clear connections with North India, [87] with Gandhāra, Mathurā, and perhaps Kashmir.<sup>2</sup> This is the good part. The bad part follows almost immediately: the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* is enormous. Sylvain Lévi has described it as “a vast compilation,” as “nearly epic,” as an “immense pot-pourri of the Buddhist discipline,” as “monstrous” and “in itself an already complete canon.” Huber, too, refers to it as “this enormous compilation,” and Lalou as “this enormous *vinaya*”—here too there is general agreement and it is not difficult to see why.<sup>3</sup> The Tibetan version of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* in, for example, the Derge edition is almost four thousand folios long and takes up thirteen volumes, and even it may not be complete. It seems to lack two texts often quoted by Guṇaprabha entitled the *Māṭṛkā* and the *Nidāna*, although both may now be represented in the Tibetan traditions by what is there called the *Uttaragrantha(s)*.<sup>4</sup> Large portions of its *Vinayavastu* have

also been preserved in Sanskrit in the manuscripts from Gilgit,<sup>5</sup> and significant portions of its *Vibhaṅga* are also available—usually in truncated or crudely condensed form—in the *Divyāvadāna*.<sup>6</sup> There is as well a Chinese translation, although it is incom[88]plete, “full of gaps,” and “much less exact than the Tibetan one.” Lamotte, in fact, characterizes it as “mediocre.”<sup>7</sup>

The bulk of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* is, however, only a part of the bad news. Not only is this *Vinaya* huge, but it has also been little studied, and only a tiny portion of it has been critically edited in any language. This means—at the very least—that anything said about it at this stage can be only tentative and provisional.

These are all serious problems, but an equally serious obstacle to any understanding of this “monster” is the fact that much of what it seems to contain does not correspond to what we thought we knew about the character and defining characteristics of monastic Buddhism. It has, for example, been commonly assumed or asserted that becoming a Buddhist monk involved—or even required—renouncing all personal property. But the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* seems to assume, or even require, something quite different. According, for example, to the *Mūlasarvāstivādin* ordination formulary that has come down to us in a Sanskrit manuscript from Tibet, the candidate for ordination must be asked: “Do you have any debt (*deya, bu lon*), either large or small, to anyone?” If he says yes, then he must be asked: “Will you be able to repay this *after* you have entered the order (*śakṣyasi pravrajyāyaṃ dātum*)?” If he says no, the text says he must be sent away and he cannot be admitted into the order. Only if he says that he will be able to pay can the ordination proceed.<sup>8</sup> Here, in other words, the expectation—indeed the rule—is that a successful candidate for *Mūlasarvāstivādin* ordination would not renounce private wealth but would retain it and be responsible for and able to pay any debt that was contracted prior to ordination.

These sorts of expectations are moreover found elsewhere in this *Vinaya* in a startling variety of contexts. The *Vinayavibhaṅga*, for example, repeat[89]edly assumes that monks will be subject to tolls and road taxes and gives rules that require monks to pay them (Derge Ca 72b.6ff). This must mean that the redactors of this *Vinaya* also assumed two other things: that monks while traveling would be transporting taxable goods, and that monks would have the means to pay the taxes. That it was assumed that these were their own personal goods, and that the payments were to be made from their own resources, is made virtually certain by the fact that the *Vibhaṅga* has a separate set of rules dealing with the payment of tolls on goods that are for ritual purposes and are corporately owned, that is, that belong to the Buddha or the Dharma or the Saṅgha—in such cases it is explicitly stated that the tolls must be paid from corporate funds (Derge Ca 76b.4–78a.4). In the *Kṣudrakavastu* there is a rule explicitly stating that when a monk borrows

(*brnyas pa*) a mat from another monk, and that mat is damaged by him, the borrowing monk must compensate the owner: “He must either give him the price of its full value or what will satisfy him” (*ri ba'i rin sbyin par bya ba 'am / de'i sems mgu bar bya'o*—Derge Tha 49a.1). In the same *Vastu*, monks are explicitly told that when their property is stolen, they must not take the thieves to court but must buy back from them what they stole, even if they have to give the full price (*rgyal po'i pho brang du sbron par mi bya'i 'on kyang sngar chos bshad nas bslang bar bya'o / gal te mi ster na rin phyed kyis blang bar bya'o / gal te de ltar yang mi ster na rin tshang bar byin la blang bar bya ste*—Derge Tha 233b.2). And the *Kṣudrakavastu* also explicitly declares that monks must carry seals (*rgya bcang bar bya'o*). Such seals were meant to mark property, and the text, again, explicitly says there are two sorts of seals—seals of the community and seals of individuals (*rgya ni gnyis te / dge 'dun gyi dang gang zag gi'o*—Derge Tha 7b.6–8a.7; cf. *Vinayavibhaṅga*, Derge Ca 79b). The distinction here is particularly interesting as one of numerous instances where this *Vinaya* formally acknowledges the existence of individual private property (*paudgalika*) and distinguishes it from corporate or communal property (*sāṃghika*). Yet another example occurs in the *Cīvaravastu*. Here the problem is that terminally ill monks were dying on bedding belonging to the community (*glānāḥ asanviditā eva sāṃghike śayanāsane kālam kurvanti*). As a consequence, the Buddha himself is made to order the attending monk to watch closely for the signs of imminent death and, when they occurred, to move the dying monk on some pretext onto his personal bedding (*śarīrāvasthām jñātvā paudgalike śayanāsane vyājenāvātārya śāyitavya iti*—GMs iii 2, 123.16). And this same distinction also comes into play elsewhere in the *Cīvaravastu* in regard to dying monks. [90] In one passage, for example, it is clearly assumed that monks normally owned or were expected to pay for any medicines they required or for any rituals that were performed on their behalf. This seems at least to follow from the fact that only in the case of very poor monks (*alpa-jñāta*) could these be paid for out of corporate funds (*sāṃghika*), and even then those corporate funds were to be repaid if at all possible (GMs iii 2, 124.11–125.9; cf. 128.1–131.15). The acknowledgement of *paudgalika*, of a monk's private property, occurs even in the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Prātimokṣa*.<sup>9</sup>

The mere existence of the distinction between *sāṃghika* and *paudgalika*, and the formal acknowledgment of the latter in Mūlasarvāstivādin monastic law, should in themselves put to rest any doubts about whether Mūlasarvāstivādin monks were expected to have personal property. But to well and truly bury them we probably need only glance again at the last part of the *Cīvaravastu*. There are there more than thirty-five pages detailing what can only be called Mūlasarvāstivādin monastic inheritance law. There are rules detailing what should happen to the property of a monk from one “residence” (*āvāsa*) who dies in another (GMs iii 2, 113.14–117.4); rules dealing with the disposition of the estate of a monk some of whose

property was held in trust (*prativastu*) by other monks or even laymen (143.15–145.13); rules laying down the formal procedures (*karman*) required when the community takes formal possession (*adbītiṣṭhātī*) of a deceased monk’s estate in order to distribute it (117.8–121.5 and 145.2–.9); rules establishing the proper times for distributing a dead monk’s estate and for determining who can participate in that distribution (120.3–.20); and so on. Rules dealing with monastic estates are, moreover, not found only in the *Cīvaravastu*. There are, for example, rules in the *Kṣudrakavastu* stipulating that property that a monk “designates” (*bsngo ba*) for another monk while he is alive reverts to his estate upon his death (Derge Tha 254a.1–.6) and, conversely, that property that was “designated by one monk for another does not belong to the latter’s estate when he dies, but continues to belong to the former” (Derge Tha 254a.6–b.2). There is as well a large number of rules governing monastic estates and inheritance law in the *Uttaragrantha(s)*, rules—for example—governing what must happen [91] when a monk borrows money from a layman (*dge slong gzhan zbig gis khyim bdag cig las kār sbā pa ṅa zbig bskyes pa . . .*) but dies without repaying the loan (Derge Pa 132b.7–133a.3; see also Derge Pa 85a.3–86a.2, 86a.2–.6, 86a.6–b.4, 86b.4–.7, 86b.7–87a.4, etc.).<sup>10</sup> The size, finally, of some of the monastic estates that are mentioned is also impressive, and it seems clear that the redactors of this *Vinaya* assumed that some monastic estates would be very large indeed. One such estate is described as worth or consisting of “a great deal of gold, three hundred thousand of gold” (*prabhūtaṃ suvarṇaṃ tisraḥ suvarṇalakṣāḥ*—GMs iii 2, 118.11), and this elicits no comment in the text and appears to pass as completely acceptable. In fact, the *Cīvaravastu* even has a set of rules specifically framed to deal with large estates left by monks who were “rich and famous” (*jñātamahāpūṇya*—GMs iii 2, 123.10–15), and here again there is not the slightest indication that such estates were considered irregular or undesirable.

At least two things, it seems, are then already reasonably clear from the material quickly summarized to this point. A great deal of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* takes for granted that the monks it was meant to govern had and were expected—even required—to have personal property and private wealth. If Buddhist monks were ever required to renounce private property—and there are good reasons for doubting this—they certainly were not by the time the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* was redacted. Some *Mūlasarvāstivādin* monks, those who were “well known and of great merit,” were even expected to be quite wealthy. Rather than suggest that such wealth should be renounced or avoided, this *Vinaya* redacted detailed rules to transmit that wealth to other monks and to shelter it from the state. The estates of men who died *aputra*, “sonless”—and monks at least normally did—otherwise went to the king, and this issue of law is twice directly addressed in the *Cīvaravastu* (GMs iii 2, 118.11ff, 140.14ff).

In fact, a preoccupation with specifically legal issues is the second seemingly characteristic feature of Mūlasarvāstivādin monasticism to emerge. The redactors of this *Vinaya* appear to have been just as much jurists [92] as they were monks. They appear to apply to the questions of ownership and inheritance, for example, the same sort of care and precision that their colleagues working on the *Abhidharma* applied to the classification and definition of *dharmas*. Indeed, how much the “style” of thinking that dominates the *Abhidharma* owes to these monastic jurists is an open and emerging question.<sup>11</sup> It may be that many of the techniques and styles of exposition were first employed in constructing the *vinayas*. The two bodies of material at the very least have many methods in common, and Vasubandhu, for example, deals not infrequently with what are issues of monastic law. One of the best examples, perhaps, is his treatment of the rights and status of a monk who violated one of the *pārājika* rules but who had no intention of concealing it (Shastri, ii 646)—the same topic is treated as well in the *Kṣudrakavastu* (Derge Tha 102a.5–104b.2). But even putting these considerations aside, what we have seen so far would seem to suggest that in regard to legal questions the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* has a degree of sophistication that is certainly notable, and it appears that the redactors of this *Vinaya* were certainly concerned with legal precision. But this same legal sophistication and concern is also found elsewhere in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*.

The redactors of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* either adapted or invented a significant number of sophisticated financial instruments and economic devices—they knew and made rules governing the use of both oral and written wills, written loan contracts, permanent endowments, monetary deposits, interest-bearing loans, negotiable securities, and even what might be called a form of health insurance. The *Cīvaravastu*, for example, disallows the use of nuncupative, or oral, wills by monks to dispose of their property in favor of other monks (GMs iii 2, 124.1–10). But this rule is also amended and clarified in both the *Kṣudrakavastu* and the *Uttaragrantha(s)*, where it is explicitly established that Buddhist monastic law does not apply to laymen and that, therefore, a nuncupative will made by a layman in favor of monks is both allowable and valid (Derge Tha 252b.3–254a.1 and Pa 130a.4–131a.3).<sup>12</sup> The oral disposition of property prior to death was, of course, a subject of discussion in *dharmasāstric* law as well. More striking [93] still is the sanctioned use of a written will (*patrābhilekhyā*, *patrābhilikhita*) by a layman of sorts to leave all of a considerable fortune to the Community (GMs iii 2, 140.14ff). This is most certainly the earliest reference to a written will in all of Indian literature and—apart from a possible second reference in the *Divyāvadāna*’s account of the death of Aśoka—virtually unique.<sup>13</sup> Not quite so unusual are the detailed rules in both the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Uttaragrantha(s)* requiring monks to accept permanent endowments of cash (*akṣayanīvī*) and to lend that cash out on

interest (Derge Ca 154b.3–155b.2 and Pa 265a.6–b.2)—both the rate of interest and the instructions to be followed in writing up the loan contract here are very close to what is found in *dharmasāstric* sources, especially in *Yājñavalkya*.<sup>14</sup> And although in the *Vibhaṅga*, but not in the *Uttaragrantha(s)*, it is the monks themselves who are to lend out the money, draw up the contract, and service the loan, the *Kṣudrakavastu* contains a passage describing an arrangement, sanctioned by the Buddha, whereby a monetary deposit for the benefit of the monks is made by a layperson with a merchant, who in turn uses it as venture capital, the profit from which—how much is not specified—is to be distributed to the monks (Derge Tha 258a.3–259a.3). There is good inscriptional evidence for just such arrangements, especially from the Western Caves.<sup>15</sup> There are also references in our *Vinaya* to both monks and nuns making use of what might be called negotiable securities or promissory notes (*patralekhyā*, *chags rgya*). Our *Vinaya* even distinguishes between two sorts of such notes and gives separate rules for dealing with each. The *Cīvaravastu* rules that when promissory notes come to the Community as a part of an estate, whatever is realized from those that can be quickly liquidated (*yacchīghraṃ śakyaṭe sādhaṃyitum*) must be distributed among the monks, [94] whereas those that cannot be so liquidated must be deposited in the strong room as property in common for the Community of the Four Directions (GMs iii 2, 143.7–9). In the *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga* the nun Sthūlanandā all but forces a layman to give her a promissory note (*chags rgya*), which he is holding, as a “gift” for reciting the Dharma for him. Neither the practice nor the note is presented as problematic. The problem arises only when Sthūlanandā tries to collect on it. She goes to the debtor and demands quick payment. The debtor, apparently a little surprised, asks, “Do you, Noble One, own this (i.e., the note—‘*pbags ma khyod mnga’ am*)?” Her answer— from the point of view of monks, nuns, and private property—is both interesting and unequivocal: She says, “I am the owner (*bdag dbang ngo*).” And this too is not problematic. The only problem is that the nun then threatens to take the man to court to collect on the debt—this, and this alone, is an offense against monastic rule, and even it is allowed, or at least involves no offense, if the nun is “one who earns with some difficulty” (*tsbegs chung ngus kbugs pa*—Derge Ta 123a.5–124a.2).

The final example of a financial instrument that we might note here is not formally contractual and requires a short excursus. Although the whole topic has received little attention, it appears that Buddhist monasteries in India, and Buddhist monastic communities of the sort envisioned in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, were ideally suited to provide care to the old and infirm and to the sick and dying. There was, moreover, a distinct social need for such services, or at least the redactors of our *Vinaya* seem to have thought so. They seem to have thought that because of taboos concerning purity and pollution, brahmanical groups at least were not willing to provide services of this sort, even for their own. This much it

seems can be deduced, for example, from texts like one that is found in the *Śayanāsanavastu* (Gnoli) 13.24–.33. Here it is said that a young brahmin was staying in a hostel for young brahmins (*mānavakaśālā*),<sup>16</sup> but he fell ill with vomiting and diarrhea. Rather than attend to him, however, the other brahmins, “from fear of pollution” (*aśucibbhayād*), threw him out and abandoned him. It is only the Buddhist monks Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana who, when they chanced upon him, “cleaned him with a bamboo brush, rubbed him with [95] white earth and bathed him.” Because they also “taught” the Dharma for him—and here this almost certainly can refer only to a kind of deathbed recitation—he died in a good state of mind and was reborn in heaven. The function of Buddhist monks here is hard to miss—they, not one’s fellow brahmins, care for the sick and dying.

This story, however, concerns a chance encounter. Buddhist monasteries, on the other hand, at least those envisioned by the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, were—unlike brahmanical hostels—ideologically, organizationally, and even architecturally suited to provide such services. Such monasteries not only would have had “infirmaries” but also would have had the manpower and organization to provide nurses and care to those who would otherwise not have them. The *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, moreover, put a great deal of emphasis on just such services. We have already seen a rule that was designed to provide funding for such services for poor monks who could not themselves afford it, and this is not the only rule of this kind. Elsewhere (GMs iii 2, 128.1–131.15), when the Buddha himself finds another poor monk sick and “lying in his own urine and excrement,” he does exactly what Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana had done for the young brahmin—with his own hands he cleans and bathes the sick monk. He then gives orders to the monks:

“Monks, apart from you, their fellow-monks, those who are sick have no mother, nor father, nor other relative. As a consequence, fellow-monks must attend to one another (*tasmāt sabrahmacāribhiḥ paraṣparam upasthānaṃ karaṇīyam*)! A preceptor (*upādhyāya*) must do so for his co-residential pupil (*sārdhaṃvihārin*); a co-residential pupil for his preceptor; a teacher (*ācārya*) for his disciple (*antevāsin*); a disciple for his teacher . . . etc., etc. One who is bereft of an assembly and little known (*alpajñāta*), to him the community must give an attendant monk after determining the state of his illness—one or two or many, even to the extent that the entire community must attend to him!”

This is a remarkable passage. If, for example, the roles of preceptor (*upādhyāya*) and teacher (*ācārya*) were ever conceived of primarily in terms of teaching functions, they certainly are not here. Here both roles are defined exclusively in terms of caregiving functions, and they are also so defined elsewhere in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*. Entering into the relationship of “preceptor/co-

residential pupil” or “teacher/disciple” is known as “entering [96] into dependence” (*gnas bcas pa*), and this is the one essential and indispensable relationship that every Mūlasarvāstivādin monk must enter into. The *Kṣudrakavastu*, for example, says that a monk can be without a recitation teacher (*klog pa'i slob dpon*), but not without a monk on whom he is dependent (Derge Tha 214a.6); in the same *Vastu*, monks are forbidden to travel without a monk in regard to whom they have entered into dependence; and numerous monasteries were said to have passed ordinances denying traveling monks who lacked such a supporting monk the right to accommodations for even one night (Derge Tha 71b.7–72b.4). And it is repeatedly said: “The Blessed One has ordered entering into dependence for the sake of assisting one another, and for the purpose of attending to the sickness of those who are ill” (*bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang . . . gcig gis gcig bstang zhing na ba'i nad g-yog bya ba'i pbyir gnas bca' bar gnangs ba*—Derge Tha 213a.1)—not, be it noted, for the purposes of instruction.

These rules make, of course, for a very attractive arrangement, which if implemented would have provided for Mūlasarvāstivādin monks unparalleled security for long-term care. Given that this arrangement would have been embedded in a “permanent” enduring institution, there would have been nothing like it in early medieval India—these monks would have been very well looked after in their final days, and this, in turn, may have been a powerful motivating factor in an individual’s decision to enter the order. It is at least notable that in the overwhelming majority of cases in our *Vinaya* in which a motive is given for individuals’ becoming monks, that motive is connected with the fact that the individual concerned is either old or poor or without living relatives or sonless, and usually it is a combination of all four. Examples of this may be found throughout the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, in the *Vibhaṅga* (Derge Ca 90b.6, 61a.4), in the *Pravrajyāvastu* (Eimer ii 193), in the *Kṣudraka* (Derge Tha 100a.4, 114b.6; Da 138b.5), and so on.

There are, of course, parallels for some of the arrangements and facilities at least envisioned by the redactors of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*. David Knowles, for example, has said in regard to medieval England that “in the fully developed monastery of the twelfth century facilities for care of the sick were probably greater than in any other place in the kingdom.”<sup>17</sup> But in the English case—indeed in much of medieval European monasticism—we know that such “facilities” came to be an important part of monastic [97] economies and important sources of revenue, by being made available, on a limited basis, not to the poor but to the rich laity. By a series of arrangements—none of which were precisely defined—“confraternity,” “corrodies,” entry “*ad succurrendum*,” the old, the sick, and the almost certainly terminally ill were allowed the benefits of a monk and of the monastic facilities while they were alive, with the expectation, and sometimes formal

promise, that when they died, some, all, or a good share of their estates would go to the monastery.<sup>18</sup> Although the bald “exchange” or “purchase” nature of these arrangements was often muted in the documents that recorded them, the effect was not, and both the basic arrangement and the verbal vagueness seem to have a parallel in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*.

The parallel occurs again in the *Cīvaravastu* in a passage already referred to—it is the text that makes explicit reference to the use of a written will. It concerns a wealthy layman who, in spite of repeated attempts and repeated invocations of various gods, remains childless. As a consequence, the text says, he repudiates all the gods and comes to have faith in the Blessed One (*sarvadevatāḥ pratyākhyāya bbagavaty abhiprasannaḥ*—GMs iii 2, 139.20), though the transition here is rather abrupt. He approaches a monk and asks for admission into the order. The initial motivating factor is that the man is “sonless”; the implications are that he is also old; and—as we shall see—he is about to become seriously ill. The monk shaves the man’s head and begins to give him the rules of training (*śikṣāpada*), but the rich man becomes ill, which creates an obstacle to his admission into the order (*pravrajyāntarāyakaṛeṇa ca mabatā jvareṇābbhibhūtaḥ*). Here it is hard to miss the hand of the monastic lawyer: whoever wrote this little narrative must have been fully aware that there were rules against admitting the sick into the order and deftly avoided that difficulty by having the man’s illness become manifest only after the initial and most visible aspects of his admission—the shaving of his head—had occurred. The result, of course, was a thoroughly ambiguous situation from the point of view of monastic law, which involved the status of the “shaven-headed householder”—visibly a monk—who had not been fully admitted into the order. What obligations did the monastic community have in regard to such individuals? The monks, as was their usual practice in such ambiguous [98] situations, ask the Buddha—that is to say, our text would have been seen as providing a definitive solution. The Buddha rules that monastic care must be provided for the sick man (*upasthānam asya karaṇīyam*); he rules in other words that, in this regard at least, such an individual must be treated as a member of the community—Guṇaprabha, incidentally, makes this interpretation explicit.<sup>19</sup> But the Buddha then specifically adds that such an individual must not be given the rules of training until he recovers (*na tāvac chikṣāpadāni deyaṇi yāvat svasthaḥ samvṛttaḥ*—140.5), and the Buddha specifically rules that the monks themselves must attend to him. The Buddha’s rulings in effect create a new category: a sick layman who has undergone the most visible act of admission to the order but who cannot, because of his illness, be fully admitted. The text goes on to indicate that the monks are obligated to attend to such individuals even if they are taken back to their own homes. This seems to clearly indicate that the redactor was fully conscious of the fact that he was inventing a new category. He says: “In regard to him [the sick householder]

the designation ‘shaven-headed householder’ arose” (*tasya muṇḍo gr̥hapatir iti samjñā samvṛttā*—140.13).

The obligations of the monks to “shaven-headed householders” were then made matters of explicit monastic rules, but what of the obligations of the “shaven-headed householders” to the monks: what did they owe the monks? As in the case of medieval European monasticism, the language used in regard to this question is careful and ambiguous, avoiding any direct reference to sale or purchase. We move from a language of rule and obligation to a situation of unexpressed—but probably nonetheless definite—expectation. We are simply told that when the “shaven-headed householder” knew he was on the point of death, he drew up a will leaving all of his enormous estate to the monastic community, and we are explicitly told that the state itself (i.e., the king) confirmed the monastic community’s rightful ownership of such an estate. The arrangement here was, then, not a formally contractual one; it was rather a matter of unstated but understood practice. A wealthy layman without heirs could undergo the initial and most visible aspects of the ritual of admission into the Mūlasarvāstivādin order. As a result, the monks [99] would be obliged to care for him, especially in his final days, even if he remained at home. He in turn was *expected*, though not contractually obligated, to leave his entire estate to the Community, and the state formally acknowledged the legitimacy of such an arrangement.

It is also worth noting that the redactors of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* seem to have anticipated that such an arrangement would or could have resulted in considerable amounts of cash or precious materials going directly to individual monks. This, again, would seem to follow from the provisions they put in place for dealing with specific forms of property or wealth that might form a part of such an estate. They stipulated, for example, that any *maṇi* gems, lapis lazuli, or conch shells included in the estate must be divided into two lots, one for the Dharma and one for the Community, and that, further, the Community’s share must then be divided among the monks (GMs iii 2, 143.1). They stipulated that if the estate included any books or manuscripts containing non-Buddhist *śāstras* (*bahiḥ-śāstrapustaka*), those books must be sold (*vikrīya*) and the profit, again, divided among the monks (143.7). They stipulated too that any gold, money, or other precious metals, either worked or unworked (*suvarṇam ca hiranyaṃ cānyac ca kṛtākṛtaṃ*), must be divided into three shares, and the share for the Community must again be divided among the monks themselves.<sup>20</sup> These provisions are completely in line, moreover, with a host of rules and practices throughout the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*. In the passage already mentioned from the *Kṣudrakavastu* that deals with monetary deposits made by donors with merchants, the Buddha himself explicitly orders the monks to accept money (*kāraṣāpaṇas*) from the merchants (Derge Th 258a.3–259a.3).<sup>21</sup> In yet another passage from the *Kṣudrakavastu*, the Buddha him-

self also orders monks not to divide certain kinds of expensive cloth that is given to them, but he insists that the monks must first sell the cloth for money and then divide the money among themselves (*de lta bas na dge 'dun la gos kyi rnyed pa de lta bu grub pa gang yin pa de kār sbā pa na dag tu bsgyur la / kār sbā pa na dag bgo bar bya'o*—Derge Tha 263a.6). In the *Cīvaravastu*, again monks are told that they must divide the profits among themselves after they have sold (*vikrīya*) property that makes up part of the [100] estate of a deceased monk (GMs iii 2, 121.2; see also 119.14). In the *Kṣudraka*, the *Vibhaṅga*, and the *Uttaragrantha(s)*, finally, monks volunteer to act as “assistants for merit” (both the terms *puṇya-sabhāya* and *dharmasabhāya* are used) on construction projects paid for by laymen and meant for the monks. In this role the monk receives the money (*kārṣāpanas*)—usually a substantial amount—from the laymen; hires, oversees, and pays the laborers; buys the necessary tools; and is told, for example, to use the construction funds for his food, that is to say, to buy it (*mkhar len byed pas mkhar len gyi nor kbo na las bsod snyoms yongs su spyad par bya'o*—Derge Tha 193b.7; see also Derge Ca 146a.2–148a.6 and Pa 123a.7–124a.6; cf. GMs iii 4, 139.9).

There are, of course, rules in the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Prātimokṣa* that have been understood at least by modern scholars to forbid monks from engaging in almost all of these activities—handling “money,” buying and selling, and so forth. And here we have a particularly interesting problem. It is almost certainly not safe to assume that the *Vinayadharas*, the monastic lawyers who compiled, shaped, and probably wrote the *Vinayavastus* and the *Vinayavibhaṅga*, were unfamiliar with their own *Prātimokṣa*, especially given that the *Vibhaṅga* is at least structurally based on it. But if the *Vinayadharas* knew their *Prātimokṣa*, then there would seem to be at least two possible explanations for what we have seen here. It is possible that the *Vinayadharas* chose to ignore the *Prātimokṣa*—and could so choose—indicating that it was much less binding and authoritative than has been assumed. At the very least we may have to look much, much more carefully at the differences and divergencies between the *prātimokṣas* and the other expository parts of the *vinaya*. Those differences may be much broader and more significant than even Schlingloff has said.<sup>22</sup> Certainly the differences between the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Bhikṣuṅṅī-prātimokṣa* and *Bhikṣuṅṅī-vibhaṅga*, for example, are so great that Bu-ston at least thought that the *Vibhaṅga* was not Mūlasarvāstivādin at all.<sup>23</sup> We may also have much to learn about the force and construction of monastic rules from medievalists working on Western monastic codes. Louis Lekai, for example, in discussing early Cistercian [101] monastic legislation has said: “The founders of Cîteaux assumed a peculiarly ambivalent attitude toward the Rule of Saint Benedict. They declared their utter devotion to it, but in fact they used that venerable document with remarkable liberality. They invoked and applied it when it suited their purpose, ignored or even contradicted it when they thought that they had better

ideas.”<sup>24</sup> Even more helpful perhaps is what he says about the form of early Cistercian legislation:

A further proof of both the tentative nature of new regulations and the broad-minded, always compromising disposition of the chapter fathers is the wording of virtually countless statutes before as well as after 1180. The beginning of such a paragraph is always a firm command or rigid prohibition, but the end lists the exceptions, often enfeebling the text to such an extent that it can hardly qualify for more than a fatherly advice.<sup>25</sup>

The last sentence in particular here could do good service as a description of the *Prātimokṣa* rules as they occur in the *Vibhaṅga*: they almost all begin with a “firm command or rigid prohibition” but end with a list of “exceptions” (*anāpatti*) which—in the Buddhist case as well—can render them little more than “fatherly advice.” An example of this sort of thing has already been cited above, where the rule stated unequivocally that it is an offense if a nun goes to court to collect on a promissory note, but the exception, which immediately follows, says there is, however, no offense if the nun is “one who earns with some difficulty.” In the Buddhist case it has been assumed or argued that these “exception” clauses represent a later chronological stratum,<sup>26</sup> but this need not necessarily be the case. In the case of the Cistercian texts, it is known that such exemption clauses were a part of the original legislation—they were there from the beginning—and their presence has been taken at least by Lekai as evidence for “a tolerant and flexible attitude” and, he says, should be taken not as “a sign of decay” but as “evidence of health and vitality.”<sup>27</sup> In fact, we do not know for sure if in the early days the [102] *Prātimokṣas* were ever—apart from liturgical contexts—used without their *Vibhaṅgas*. It is at least hard to imagine that their rulings were ever actually applied without interpretation or discussion. But even if the *anāpattis*—the exemptions, exclusions, extenuations—turn out to be later additions, that will make them not less but even more important for tracking the development and gradual maturation of Buddhist monastic rules.

A second possible explanation for what we have seen—although this is rarely the explanation of our first choice—is that Mūlasarvāstivādin *Vinayadharas* may have known their texts far better than we do and applied to them a far more sophisticated exegesis than we can. The *Prātimokṣa* rule that has been taken to forbid the “handling” of “money” by monks may be a case in point. We do not actually know what activity is forbidden. The verb in the Sanskrit text of the Mūlasarvāstivādin *Prātimokṣa* is *udgr̥bhñīyād*, but this has a wide range of possible meanings, none of which are very close to “accept” or “have” (this would be rather *pari* or *prati* √*grab*), and it has been translated in an equally wide range of ways.<sup>28</sup>

Worse still, we do not actually know what was intended or understood by *jātarū-paraḥajata*, the object of the action that was forbidden, which is conventionally translated as “gold and silver.” What, however, is clear to even us—and we must therefore assume was far clearer to Mūlasarvāstivādin monastic lawyers—is that the rule does not refer to *suvarṇa* or *hiraṇya* or *kārṣāpaṇas* (“gold,” “silver,” “money”), and it is these things that monks own, accept, handle, and inherit in the *Vibbaṅga*, the *Vinayavastus*, and the *Uttaragrantha(s)*. This can hardly be an accident and must point again to the fact that *Vinaya* texts, like *Abhidharma* texts, represent a sophisticated system of thought that works from a particular and precise definition of terms. It, again, can hardly be an accident that what is called the “old commentary” that is embedded in the *Vibbaṅga* is—as Norman says of the Pāli *Vinaya*—“really an analysis of words (*pada-bhājanīya*).”<sup>29</sup> And conversely—even perversely—a part of [103] this sophistication may be an element of intentional ambiguity. Here too an observation by Lekai in regard to Cistercian texts may not be inappropriate: “In other cases the careful reader of the records may come under the impression that the wording of important statutes was made deliberately so vague or complicated that it left open a number of possible interpretations.”<sup>30</sup> Unless I am much mistaken, this too will have numerous parallels in Buddhist *vinayas*. The Mūlasarvāstivādin rule that has been understood to mean that monks are forbidden to engage in “buying and selling” may be another case in point.<sup>31</sup> It does not refer to unqualified “buying and selling”; nor does it refer—which it could easily have—to “all” (*sarva*) “buying and selling.” It refers to *nānā-prakāraṃ kraya-vikrayam*, which, of course, could mean “buying and selling of various sorts” or “buying and selling of many sorts.” Neither interpretation precludes “all,” but neither requires it either. Mūlasarvāstivādin exegesis, moreover, clearly did not take it to have absolute application. The *Vibbaṅga*, for example, says that there is no fault in engaging in both unqualified buying and selling if a monk is not seeking to gain (*dge slong gis rnyed pa mi 'dod pas nyo bar byed cing rnyed pa mi 'dod pas 'tshong bar byed na gnyis ka la ltung ba med do*; Derge Cha 156b.3).

But what can be learned specifically about the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* from our larger discussion? We now know that the Buddhist monks who wrote or redacted it in early medieval North India did not share our assumptions about Buddhist monks and the renunciation of private wealth or property, and we—under the enormous influence of St. Benedict—think that this is an important element of any monastic ideal.<sup>32</sup> Those same monks also apparently did not have the same attitude that we do in regard to monks’ involvement with money. They either knew monks who did, or wanted monks to do, all sorts of things that do not fit our assumptions: Pay debts and tolls and transport taxable goods; own their own furniture and have the means to pay for any damage they might do to that of other

monks; carry personal seals; pay for their own medicine and healing rituals; leave estates, sometimes huge; borrow money from laymen; inherit property [104] from both other monks and laymen; accept and service permanent endowments; make loans and charge interest; accept and use negotiable securities; provide care for sick and dying laymen, with the understanding that, when the layman died, his estate would go to the monastery; and receive precious and semiprecious materials, sell books, receive gold in various forms, accept money (*kāṛṣāpanas*), sell the property of deceased monks, hire and oversee laborers, and buy food. And this, of course, is only a provisional list of the sorts of things that Mūlasarvāstivādin monks were—in most cases—not only expected but also *required* to do by their own monastic rule. If they did not, then—at least in terms of monastic discipline—they would not be “good” monks. Exactly how many such “good” monks there were we obviously do not know, although it is at least certain that Indian monks accepted permanent endowments and monetary deposits made with merchants; it is also certain that some Indian monks had personal seals.<sup>33</sup> But whether all the things described in our *Vinaya* actually happened matters far less than the fact that Buddhist monks who were, presumably, the acknowledged authorities on monastic discipline spent a great deal of time thinking about them in North India in the early medieval period. These were—again presumably—monks who were in a position to influence actual communities, literate monks who were concerned with things other than asceticism, meditation, and doctrinal study, monks who, again in their own terms, were the “good” monks. That they had a different perspective from ours is confirmed by at least one further observation: Unlike modern scholars, these “good” monks did not have much good to say about monks who did engage in asceticism, meditation, and doctrinal learning. If they mention them at all—and they do so infrequently—it is almost always with a tone of marked ambivalence, if not actual ridicule. Ascetic monks, meditating monks, and learned monks appear in our *Vinaya* by and large only as slightly ridiculous characters in unedifying, sardonic, and funny stories or as nasty customers that “good” monks do not want to spend much time around.<sup>34</sup> [105]

The monks that the redactors of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* envisioned, and the monks that modern scholarship has imagined, are then radically different, and this difference is extremely important for the historian of Buddhism in India. The monastic ideal found in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, for example, is almost certainly one of the most prominent monastic ideals that the authors of the Mahāyāna *sūtras* encountered, and much of what these Mahāyāna authors said is probably fully intelligible only as a reaction against this ideal. If we are ever to understand more about the Mahāyāna, we obviously are going to have to know, then, much, much more about what they were reacting to. This is our future task.

## Notes

1. For some brief remarks on the “early” archaeological and inscriptional evidence for *viḥāras*, see G. Schopen, “Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and Written Loan Contracts in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*,” *JAOS* 114 (1994) 527–554, esp. 547–552 [= Ch. III below].

2. See the discussion and sources cited in G. Schopen, “The Bones of a Buddha and the Business of a Monk: Conservative Monastic Values in an Early Mahāyāna Polemical Tract,” *JIP* 27 (1999) 279–324, esp. 292ff [= *FFMB* Ch. III]. That in fact *all* “les Vinayas parvenus à nous ont été rédigés à une époque tardive” was suggested already long ago by Wassilieff (W. Wassilieff, “Le bouddhisme dans son plein développement d’après les vinayas,” *RHR* 34 [1896] 318–325), and this suggestion came as well to be seconded by S. Lévi (“Les éléments de formation du divyāvādāna,” *TP* 8 [1907] 116–117).

3. S. Lévi, “Les saintes écritures du bouddhisme. Comment s’est constitué le canon sacré,” in *Mémorial Sylvain Lévi* (Paris: 1937) 78, 80, 84; Ed. Huber, “Études bouddhiques. III—Le roi kaniṣka dans le vinaya des mūlasarvāstivādins,” *BEFEO* 14 (1914) 18; M. Lalou, “Notes sur la décoration des monastères bouddhiques,” *RAA* 5.3 (1930) 183. According to a notice published by L. de la Vallée Poussin in 1929, Lalou “travaille à l’*Analyse et Bibliographie du Vinaya des Mūlasarvāstivādins*, vaste compilation pleine de documents indispensables” (*Académie royale de Belgique. Bulletin de la classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques* 5 série—T. 15 [1929] 366).

4. G. Schopen, “Marking Time in Buddhist Monasteries. On Calendars, Clocks, and Some Liturgical Practices,” in *Sūryacandrāya. Essays in Honour of Akira Yuyama on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday* (Indica et Tibetica 35), ed. P. Harrison and G. Schopen (Swisttal-Obendorf: 1998) 157–179, esp. 171–172 and nn. 51–54 [= Ch. IX below].

5. K. Wille, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādin* (Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Suppl. Bd. 30) (Stuttgart: 1990).

6. See most recently S. Hiraoka, “The Relation between the *Divyāvādāna* and the *Mūlasarvāstivādivinaya*,” *JIP* 26 (1998) 419–434 and the sources cited.

7. E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature* (Serie Orientale Roma 8) (Rome: 1956) 194–195; Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* 187.

8. B. Jinananda, *Upasampadājñaptiḥ* (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series VI) (Patna: 1961) 15.5; *Pravrajyāvastu* (Eimer) ii 142.13. The Tibetan version of this entire *vastu* is in part translated and in part closely—if not always correctly—paraphrased in A. C. Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature* (Calcutta: 1957) 100–186; see esp. 120.

9. A. C. Banerjee, *Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sanskrit* (Calcutta: 1977) 32.17: *yah punar bhikṣuḥ pūrvam samanujño bhūtvā tataḥ paścād evaṃ vaded [yathā] samstutikayāyuṣmantah sāṃghikam lābham pariṇatam ātmanah paudgalikam pariṇāmayantīti pāyantikā* ।

10. Almost all the provisions of Mūlasarvāstivādin monastic inheritance law have been collected together and digested by Guṇaprabha at *Vinayasūtra* (Sankrityayana) 85.3–86.5 (= ‘dul ba’i mdo, Derge, bstan ’gyur, ‘dul ba Wu 68a.2–69a.5—for the commentaries, see *Svavyākhyāna* Zu 126b.1–132b.7; *Ṭikā* Yu 178a.6–185a.3; *Vyākhyāna* Ru 197b.7–200b.3;

*Vṛtti* Lu 250b.5–254a.4); also Bu-ston in his '*Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo* (Collected Works, L. Chandra ed. Part 23) 'A 290a.2–295a.3, and now G. Schopen "Dead Monks and Bad Debts: Some Provisions of a Buddhist Monastic Inheritance Law," *IJ* 44 (2001) 99–148 [= Ch. V below].

11. Cf. O. von Hinüber, "Vinaya und Abhidhamma," *StII* 19 (1994) 109–122.

12. The *Kṣudraka* text is discussed in some detail in G. Schopen, "Monastic Law Meets the Real World: A Monk's Continuing Right to Inherit Family Property in Classical India," *HR* 35 (1995) 101–123 [= Ch. VI below]—when this was written, I was not aware of the text in the *Uttaragrantha(s)*.

13. The *Cīvaravastu* text is translated—without notes—in G. Schopen, "Deaths, Funerals, and the Division of Property in a Monastic Code," in *Buddhism in Practice*, ed. D. S. Lopez Jr. (Princeton, N.J.: 1995) 498–500 [= Ch. IV below]. For the possible reference to a written will in the *Divyāvadāna*, see Schopen, "If You Can't Remember, How to Make It Up: Some Monastic Rules for Redacting Canonical Texts," in *Bauddhavidyā-sudbhākarah*, 580 n. 27 [= Ch. XIV below].

14. On the *Vibhaṅga* text, see Schopen, "Doing Business for the Lord," 527ff—here again, when this was written, I did not know of the *Uttaragrantha(s)* text.

15. See, for example, E. Senart, "The Inscriptions in the Caves at Nasik," *EI* 8 (1905–1906) nos. 12 and 15, but see also no. 17, where an endowment of 100 *kārṣāpaṇas* is given *samghasa hathe*.

16. Gnoli prints *mānavakah śālām*, but the facsimile clearly has *māṇavakaśālām* (GBMs vi 948.2), and the Tibetan (Derge Ga 195a.3) *bram ze'i khye'u zbig gi khyim du*.

17. D. Knowles, *The Monastic Order in England. A History of Its Development from the Times of St. Dunstan to the Fourth Lateran Council 943–1216* (Cambridge, England: 1949) 477.

18. Knowles, *The Monastic Order in England*, 475ff; J. H. Lynch, *Simoniacal Entry into Religious Life from 1000 to 1260. A Social, Economic and Legal Study* (Columbus, Ohio: 1976) 26–36.

19. For the passage in question, we have a Sanskrit text for both the *Sūtra* and Guṇaprabha's auto-commentary, *pravrajitavat atra prārabdha-talliṅgaḥ* | . . . *yaḥ pravrajyārtham muṇḍanādīnā veṣamātreṇa yojitaḥ nādyāpi pravrajitaḥ sa pravrajitavat draṣṭavyaḥ* | *Vinayasūtra* (Bapat and Gokhale) 46.19. A few lines later Guṇaprabha actually uses the term *muṇḍagrhapati*, and Bu-ston ('*Dul ba pha'i gleng 'bum chen mo* 'A 55b.5) gives our *Cīvara* text as Guṇaprabha's source.

20. In all three cases the wording is similar and explicit: *yaḥ samghasya sa bbikṣubhir vikrīya bhājayitavyaḥ* in the first and third cases; *bbikṣubhir vikrīya bhājayitavyaḥ* in the second.

21. In this case it is also made explicit that the money then belongs absolutely to the monks: *kār shā pa na dag blangs nas ci 'dod par yongs su spyad par bya ste* |.

22. D. Schlingloff, "Zur Interpretation des *Prātimokṣasūtra*," *ZDMG* 113 (1964) 536–551.

23. C. Vogel, "Bu-ston on the Schism of the Buddhist Church and on the Doctrinal Tendencies of Buddhist Scriptures," in *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*, Erster Teil, Hrsg. H. Bechert (Göttingen: 1985) 110; and Bu-ston, '*Dul ba dge slong ma'i gleng 'bum* (Ma'i) 'A 58b.5.

24. L. J. Lekai, "Ideals and Reality in Early Cistercian Life and Legislation," in *Cistercian Ideals and Reality* (Cistercian Studies Series 60), ed. J. R. Sommerfeldt (Kalamazoo, Mich.: 1978) 4–29, esp. 5.

25. *Ibid.*, 17.

26. Schlingloff, "Zur Interpretation des *Prātimokṣasūtra*," 538 n. 22: "Diese 'Kasuistik' ist wohl der jüngste Teil des Vibhaṅga"; O. von Hinüber, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature* (Indian Philology and South Asian Studies 2) (Berlin: 1996) 14.

27. Lekai, "Ideals and Reality," 24.

28. The same verb occurs in a closely related rule, *Pāyantikā* 59: *yaḥ pumar bhikṣu ratnaṃ vā [ratna] sammatam vā svabastam udgrbhñiyād udgrāhayed vā* (L. Chandra, "Unpublished Gilgit Fragment of the *Prātimokṣa-sūtra*," *WZKS* 4 [1960] 8.6), and here can, it seems, mean only—and is almost always taken to mean—something like "pick up." See also the discussion in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* dealing with *jāta-rūpa-rajata* where *prati*\grab and *ud*\grab are explicitly and clearly distinguished: *tasmāt śrāmaṇerakenodgrabītavyam / no tu pratigrabaḥ svīkartavyaḥ* / (GMs iii 1, 248.6–16).

29. K. R. Norman, *Pāli Literature* (A History of Indian Literature Vol. VII, fasc. 2) (Wiesbaden: 1983) 19.

30. Lekai, "Ideals and Reality," 22.

31. For the Gilgit text of the rule, see Banerjee, *Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sanskrit*, 29.20.

32. On Benedict's enormous influence on the study of monasticism and the conception of a monk, see S. Elm, "Virgins of God." *The Making of Asceticism in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: 1994) vii–viii, 1ff.

33. See, for example—and this seems to be the earliest example so far—R. Salomon, "Five Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions," *Bulletin of the Asia Institute* (Studies in Honor of Vladimir A. Livshits) n.s., 10 (1996) 233–246, esp. 244–245. Salomon says: "These archaic features suggest an early date for this seal, possibly as early as the second century B.C."

34. As a sampling of such texts, see GMs iii 1, 79.3–84.2; Derge Ja 154b.2–156b.7; Tha 222b.2–224b.1; GMs iii 4, 71.6ff; GMs iii 1, 56.2ff; Derge Da 35b.2–36a.2; Tha 39a.6–39b.5; GMs iii 1, 56.20–57.18; Derge Ja 79b.7–80b.3; Tha 180b.1–181a.4, 71b.7–72b.4; GMs iii 2, 173.5–178.1; GMs iii 1, 55.8–56.19; and so on.