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Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard Shek/Heterodoxy in Late Imperial China

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Introduction

Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard Shek

Dissent and rebelliousness are the concern of many historical works, on China and other lands; yet the nature and goals of the protests are not always systematically explored. Dissent and rebelliousness could, of course, represent opposition merely to a political regime or to a certain policy, but could also be the reaction to an entire system of central values. The study of heterodoxy, which means views that vary or depart from orthodoxy, therefore entails the quest for doctrines that offer an alternative—in the Chinese context an alternative worldview and social ethics. Heterodoxy is not identical with religious practices proscribed by law, although government in late imperial China sometimes identified *xiejiao* (heterodox or heretical teaching) with such practices. In the historian's view, heterodoxy is dissent that challenges certain premises of culture—the beliefs and meanings of the established norm.

Such cultural, indeed, socioreligious, protests frequently incurred government suppression. The usage of such terms as *"xie," "zuodao"* (deviance), and *"yiduan"* (alien principles) was established in imperial pronouncements and in law codes in the Ming-Qing period.[1] The animus of the government toward heterodoxy was important because it affected the views of at least some of the literati and gentry who dominated cultural expression. Yet to adopt the concept of *xie* held by the state or the ruling class is to leave out of consideration the value content of the ideas and practices inherent in certain strains of Daoism and Buddhism, in Manichaeism, and in the Eternal Mother Religion of later imperial China. It seems obvious to a student of modern China that one simply cannot interpret the Taiping Rebellion in terms of the Qing government's denunciations.

Studies of dissent and rebellion must be grounded in material life. Belief and interest are closely associated, and a vast literature has

been produced, especially in the People's Republic of China (PRC), identifying the class background of the rebellions.[2] This literature is extremely valuable in pointing to protests that stemmed immediately from the reaction to injustice and exploitation. Yet after every effort has been made to relate class consciousness to the history of culture, historians in the PRC have found themselves returning to such categories as religion and kinship.[3] One needs to confront the fact that among people of similar class background, different and dissenting ideas may arise. While it is important to have more refined studies of the social contexts of various heterodox rebellions, it is also essential to place them in the perspective of beliefs and values.

Orthodoxy and heterodoxy are often represented as the beliefs, respectively, of the elite and of the common people. Max Weber was perhaps the originator of this rigid division, suggesting in the early twentieth century that orthodoxy in China was embodied in the sober and agnostic literati, while the opposing Daoist heterodoxy was upheld by the masses, oriented to magic and ecstasy.[4] C. K. Yang, who defined Confucian ethics as the "moral orthodoxy" of imperial China, offered a more realistic analysis of the religious beliefs that coexisted with Confucian ethics:

> The Confucians did not constitute a group separate from the general current of religious life of traditional Chinese society. They shared with the rest of the population a basic system of religious belief in Heaven, fate, and other supernatural concepts. More important was the steady interflow of religious ideas between the Confucians and the general population. . . . The Confucians, therefore, cannot be regarded as a distinctively different group on religious grounds, but must be regarded as part of the general pattern of Chinese religious life with only relative differences due to their social and economic position.[5]

In his article of 1974, Maurice Freedman has stated that "the elite as a group was bound to the masses indissolubly by its religious beliefs and practices." For "elite and peasant religion rest on a common base, representing two versions of one religion."[6] Freedman undoubtedly had in mind such matters as ancestor worship and geomancy, belief which was indeed shared by the Chinese elite and the populace.

Analyzing Chinese rebel ideology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Muramatsu Yuji wrote that "Some Chinese rebels

were strongly influenced by Taoism [Daoism] and Taoicized [Daoicized] Buddhism. At the same time, they seem to have shared with the emperor and literati a reliance upon the benevolence of Heaven, and in this way they were drawn into the historical constellation of Confucian ideas." Muramatsu thus warned that "one cannot associate Confucian orthodoxy solely with Confucian rulers, and rebel ideologies solely with non-Confucian heterodoxy."[7] This observation is apt and will serve as a point of departure for our ensuing discussion.

Religious Pluralism and Moral Orthodoxy

If one defines the heterodox, as the dictionary does, as "not in accordance with established doctrines or opinions, or those generally recognized as right or 'orthodox,'"[8] then one could say that by the Eastern Han dynasty (A.D. 25–220), with Confucian classics being especially honored and with official histories becoming Confucian in tone, orthodoxy had been officially defined and Daoism and Buddhism had thereafter to take heed of its core values. Confucian polemics against Buddhism and Daoism were not lacking, especially in the middle period of Chinese history, from the breakup of the Han empire through the fall of the Tang dynasty—roughly from the third to the early tenth centuries. But once Buddhism and Daoism came under the bureaucratic control of the state, they were no longer condemned seriously as heterodoxy.[9] A major characteristic of late imperial China of the Ming-Qing period was that different religions could be tolerated—by the state and by the society at large—if they did not conflict with the interests of the state and with what had been regarded as essential, namely, social ethics and certain accompanying rituals. In *Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China,* edited by Kwang-Ching Liu, it has been argued that the core of orthodoxy in imperial China was *lijiao,* literally "ritual and teaching." More interpretively, *lijiao* may be translated either as "institutionally- and ritually-based ethics," or as "socioreligious ethics." The concept has been discussed at length, and here it suffices to provide a brief summary of the argument as counterpoint to the theme of heterodoxy in the Chinese tradition.

Originating in the Han dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 220), *lijiao* was reaffirmed by the neo-Confucians of the Song dynasty and thereafter. It actually constituted a belief system accepted by the major religions of China, the famous Three Teachings—Confucianism, Daoism, and

Buddhism. The focus of *lijiao* was ethics and ritual, yet it had firm roots in a worldview more or less accepted by all the Three Teachings. Specifically this worldview included such assumptions as yinyang dualism and the *Yijing* (Book of changes) principles regarding life and fate. *Lijiao* was not only ortho*praxis,* but ortho*doxy,* because of its cosmological and indeed religious underpinnings.

The ethics of *lijiao* centered on the doctrine of Three Bonds—the obligations of child to parents, wife to husband, and official to monarch—which was expressed ritualistically in ancestor worship, marriage ceremonies, and the complex rites at the imperial court, including the sacerdotal exercises of the emperor himself. Not only did the imperial court find it necessary (and advantageous) to endorse the socioethical orthodoxy, the leading Confucian scholars provided philosophic and scholastic justification for its prevalence. Leaders of the Buddhist and Daoist establishment, too, found it desirable to render their unreserved support to this moral orthodoxy, even arguing that subscription to filial piety and other cardinal virtues was a precondition for salvation and immortality. For many, the Three Bonds, alternatively known as *gangchang lunli* (ethical principles of the [Three] Bonds and [Five] Constant Virtues) and *zhongxiao zhi dao* (way of filiality and loyalty to the monarch), had become the ultimate concern from which the meaning in life was derived and for which lives would be sacrificed.[10] To be sure, these ethical obligations were not always binding, and individual or communal practices often failed to measure up to the rigorous standards. Nevertheless, it remains true that these values were consistently and unequivocally upheld as self-evident and immutable. Here was a norm that guided the behavior of men and women, emperors and officials, wealthy landowners and impoverished peasants, even Buddhist monks and Daoist priests, cutting across socioeconomic and religious lines.

Controversy and Unity

Different schools within the Confucian tradition continued to emerge. Scholars disagreed on the authenticity of texts, the centrality of certain metaphysical concepts, or the effectiveness and legitimacy of certain policies, making claims of orthodoxy for themselves and hurling charges of heterodoxy against their rivals along the way. Nonetheless, all but the rarest exceptions agreed on the sanctity of

gangchang lunli. Thus Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529) might differ fundamentally over philosophic issues, yet their common adherence to the principles of *zhong* and *xiao* made them both advocates of this moral orthodoxy. Similarly, despite their personal idiosyncrasies and eccentric tendencies, mavericks such as Wang Gen (ca. 1483–1540) and Lin Zhao'en (1517–1598) did not seem to have stepped beyond the bounds of *zhongxiao zhi dao.* As Hao Chang has so ably pointed out, neo-Confucianism may have contained numerous critical impulses that at times created tremendous tensions with this orthodoxy; yet in the end it failed to offer an alternative worldview and system of values.[11] Notwithstanding the glorification by He Xinyin (1517–1579) of friendship as the essential human relationship, and the oblique denial by Huang Zongxi (1610–1695) of any ultimate sanctity in the emperor's status, there was no real breaking away from the *lijiao* orthodoxy among the Confucian literati of the late imperial period.

The hold of *lijiao* orthodoxy on the non-Confucian traditions of Buddhism and Daoism was surprisingly strong. Although Chinese Buddhism long held to the teaching that "leaving the home" *(chujia)* was a solution to life's endless suffering, this ideal very early had to come to terms with the requirements of filial piety, and Buddhist rituals were adapted to the needs of Confucian funerary and graveside memorial services. The sangha eventually accepted the control of the state. From the Northern and Southern dynasties through the Tang, the principle of the monk not paying homage to the temporal ruler was actually circumvented by some monarchs assuming the mantle of chakravartin king and being accorded obeisance on that basis. Whalen W. Lai, in an important essay here, analyzes afresh the fact that the Buddhist establishment had by and large accommodated itself to the ethical orthodoxy of *lijiao* by the Ming-Qing period, if not long before.[12] The late-Ming Buddhist divine Zhuhong (1535–1615), in his popular morality book, the *Zizhi lu* (Record of self-knowledge), assigned *zhong* and *xiao* to the very first category of meritorious deeds that ultimately would lead to rebirth in the Pure Land. Zhuhong singled out filial piety as the foremost virtue that would enable one not only to attain personal salvation but also to bring about deliverance of other sentient beings.[13] Deqing (1546–1623), another eminent Buddhist of the late Ming, continued to fulfill his obligation as a filial son even after he had entered the sangha and achieved some fame as a prominent monk; and he showed his

ardent support for the Ming imperial house by organizing a grandiose assembly to pray for the birth of an heir to the reigning Wanli emperor.[14]

Although no prominent spokesman like Zhuhong or Deqing existed for the Daoist establishment in the Ming-Qing period, the Celestial Master recognized by the throne continued to play the role of obedient minister and submissive subject. He served as a chief administrator and helped the state to control, supervise, and regulate all the activities of the certified members of the Daoist "church"—indeed the church was only a branch of the state.[15] Among Daoist texts there was, for example, the *Taishang ganying pian* (Treatise of the Exalted One on retribution and punishment), which was conceived under Confucian and Buddhist influences during the Song dynasty and published in an ever greater number of copies and circulated widely throughout the empire in the Ming-Qing period, exhorting people to adhere to their obligations to the family and the state as well as to exhibit good faith and compassion in order to reap rewards and to avoid disasters.[16]

In late Ming there was also the growing influence of a Daoist sect named Jingming zhongxiao dao (The Loyal and Filial Way of the Pure and Perspicacious), studied here by Richard Shek.[17] Its origins going back to the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–419) during the lifetime of the adept Xu Sun, this sect developed under local auspices in the Tang period and enjoyed the patronage of emperors in the Song and Yuan periods. It produced the first *Ledger of Merits and Demerits (Gongguo ge)*, in 1171, that served later as the prototype for many others, including the aforementioned *Zizhi lu*, by the Buddhist Zhuhong. According to the sect's teachings, the virtues of filial piety and loyalty to the monarch were not only ethically desirable but also religiously valuable, enabling one to attain the Daoist goal of life everlasting.

Their own religious characteristics notwithstanding, Buddhism and Daoism seem to have generally accommodated themselves to the orthodox ethics of Confucianism. The result was a blurring of distinctions and an increasing tendency toward harmonious coexistence among the Three Teachings of China. Some Confucian purists would continue to rail against Buddhist and Daoist unorthodoxy. Indeed, there were enough Confucian purists to create an entire movement in classical scholarship to purge Buddhist influences on Confucianism itself and to renew the proper focus on unquestioned

obligations in the daily conduct of life.[18] The purists continued to regard Buddhism as heterodoxy—witness the essay entitled *On Refuting Heresies (Poxie lun)* written by the famed enlightened scholar Huang Zongxi late in his life.[19]

Nonetheless, there were many Confucians who would not denounce either Buddhism or Daoism as outright heterodoxy. Quite apart from the Unity-of-Three-Teachings movement of Lin Zhao'en,[20] who was considered heterodox on account of his pro-Daoist orientation and his appeal to the masses, there was actually a broad syncretic trend built on the basis of moral orthodoxy. That is, religious pluralism was allowed to exist on the basis of a unifying socioethics. The primacy of either Mind or Principle could be endlessly debated, the Buddha's Pure Land could be longed for, Daoist immortality could be sought, even ghosts and fox-spirits could be believed in, as long as the basic precepts of *zhong* and *xiao* were abided by and remained unchallenged. For women, there was the precept of *jie* (firm integrity, in this case devotion to one husband, dead or alive), which most Buddhists and Daoists, like most Confucian scholars, complacently approved.

It is important to realize that this moral orthodoxy was not merely decreed by the state but was based on a cultural norm, as reflected in primers and axioms and in the literature of exhortation often distributed by religious societies and philanthropists. So pervasive was this socioethics in society at large that Ming and Qing monarchs could declare, "Under Heaven there is no alternative way; among the sages there is no divergent mind."[21] Among officials there were many men of rectitude who protested against the abuses of imperial or bureaucratic power. A rich literature of social commentary was, moreover, available in the Ming-Qing period in the form of essays or in the tales of popular storytellers. The behavior of local officials and yamen underlings, the arbitrariness of the family patriarch, the discriminatory treatment received by women—all were the subjects of criticism and satire.[22] Chinese life was never so monolithic as to preclude unconventional or critical expression in word or deed. Yet criticism or protest does not always amount to the advocacy of alternate beliefs or values—views not in accordance with and, moreover, maintained in competition with the established ones. It is the beliefs and values that challenged or seemed to challenge those prevalent in late imperial China that we look for when the focus shifts to popular culture.

Popular Religion and Shamanism

Religious pluralism is especially evident in the vast domain of popular religion, honoring a variety of protective deities. To the ubiquitous Lord Guan (Guan Gong), Guanyin (Avalokitesvara), and Tudi (local earth god) are added noble and heroic deities such as Marshal Wen, the god of epidemics, here studied by Paul R. Katz.[23] In his lifetime under the Tang dynasty, Wen was a rebellious youth who died young as a result of his reckless exploits. In some hagiographic treatments, he is described as a demon god fed on bloody raw meat, but he then reforms and accepts only incense and tea. He is ordered by the Jade Emperor to poison the wells of a village as punishment for the misdeeds of its inhabitants. But he decides to take the thousand plague pills himself and, of course, instantly dies. The altruistic deed is recognized by the Jade Emperor, and Wen is appointed to be the Loyal and Pacifying King (Zhongjing wang) in charge of prevention of epidemics. As Katz explains, "Unregulated cults featuring spirit mediums and bloody sacrifices represented disorder and chaos, and due to the fact that they resisted Daoist norms, came to be labeled heterodox and licentious." To conform to Daoist norms is to be orthodox.

What these norms were can be seen in Donald S. Sutton's essay on the late imperial Chinese elite's attitude toward shamanism.[24] Shamanism is defined as the capacity to become possessed by gods who can speak of past, present, and future. A shaman (he or she) is employed for purposes of exorcism, witchcraft, or clairvoyance. The practice has been common among villagers and some city-dwellers and reflects the religious life of many Chinese living in comparatively obscure areas.

In the late imperial period of the Ming-Qing dynasties, the neo-Confucian elites were hostile to the shamans and their practice. One of Sutton's themes is that magico-religion as such was not only prevalent among the common people but was shared by the elite as well. For filial sons among the elite who believed they could cure a sick parent by dissolving in the medicinal soup a piece of the son's own flesh, the notion was based on filial impulse, to be sure, yet also on supernatural assumptions. The elite reformers—at any rate, the ideologically prim neo-Confucians—were hostile to shamanism, not simply because the shamans claimed to invoke heterogeneous deities but because the shamans' manner and demeanor offended the Con-

fucian sense of propriety. Sutton cites Cooper and Sivin's remark about "an element of snobbery or social prejudice in Chinese judgements about heterodoxy."[25] Sutton believes this is true of the elite attitude toward the shamans, with their uncouth manners and violations of Confucian *li* (propriety and ritual)—heteropraxis indeed.

Both Katz and Sutton employ the term *heteropraxis* (as opposed to *orthopraxis*). The sacrifice of raw meat to "heterodox deities" not named in imperial registers and the employment of shamans in appealing to even less known deities are described by Katz as well as Sutton as heteropraxis—wrong practice, or action without the backing of a system of correct belief. Yet as Sutton puts it: "Actually the dualistic separation of action from belief is a Western notion that would have been incomprehensible to the writers I have quoted. *Li* as a practice was supposed to reflect a universal moral order. Appropriate behavior, therefore, was not a matter of pure decorum, but an effort to approximate that ideal state of affairs. . . . Just as to be orthoprax was to be orthodox, so heteroprax violators of the principles of *li* were subsumed to the heterodox and tarred with the same brush."

Historical Roots of Heterodoxy

Just as *lijiao* orthodoxy was predicated on certain cosmological assumptions, heterodoxy, too, was based on principles—principles that either rejected those assumptions or offered entirely different ones. In a jointly written article by Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard Shek, the inherent radical nature of Daoism is explored through the historical background.[26] Daoist values of equality may be found in *Laozi* itself. Although the text is subject to different interpretations, it can be read to signify a moral ambiguity that challenges what was to become conventional ethics:

> There is a thing undifferentiatedly formed,
> Born before heaven and earth,
> Silent and void
> It stands alone and does not change.
> Goes around and does not weary.[27]

How else are we to read this definition of *dao* except as affirmation of a nonhierarchical, primitivist ideal of no high and low, no debased

and superior, in short, no differentiations? In what appear to be antecedents of heterodoxy in late imperial China, Liu and Shek argue, even as Daoism developed into a religious tradition, some of its adherents adopted antiestablishment postures and espoused egalitarian and even eschatological hopes that challenged views then deemed orthodox.

Similarly, Buddhism was not to abandon entirely its salvational ideals and their cosmological basis, despite the compromise its spokesmen had been making with the Chinese society. In a remarkable essay, Whalen Lai discusses such compromises between Buddhism and the Confucian concept of filial piety.[28] Going beyond earlier views of this topic held by Michihata Ryōshū and Kenneth Ch'en, Lai analyzes the problem in an original contribution. Lai accepts that the historic Buddhist of the Sui and Tang periods had high praise for the virtue of filiality, as witness the remarks of Zhiyi (538–597), Shandao (d. 681), Zongmi (786–841), and others. Yet despite their endorsement of *xiao,* they were good Buddhists–and would still follow the nibbanic, not the kammatic path. They put filiality in the Buddhistic perspective; however, this was no longer true with Zhuhong. The most prominent Buddhist monk of the Ming dynasty, Zhuhong believed that without being filial, no one, no matter how pious and how virtuous otherwise, could enter the Western paradise. Lai shows how Zhuhong actually tampered with Buddhist texts to reconcile them with Confucian ethics; Zhuhong genuinely believed that *xiao* was a Buddhist virtue, and that his editing was faithful to Buddhism and Confucianism as well.

Looking at the other side of the coin, Lai finds that the much-maligned White Lotus sect actually preserved elements of authentic Buddhism. Harking back to early Buddhist experience, Lai invokes the sixth-century *Xiangfa jueyi jing* (Sutra to resolve doubts in the age of the Semblance Dharma), which describes a sangha-organized peasant community:

> Sons of Good Families, in the future age, when myriad ills rise, monks and laymen alike should cultivate great friendliness and compassion, bear all kinds of derision and think only of how all human beings are from before the beginning of time one's father, mother, brother, sister, wife and relative. Because of that, one should show all human beings compassion, helping all according to one's ability, risking one's life if necessary in exercising such means to aid the needy.[29]

With such Buddhist groups as the Maitreyans and the later, metamorphosed White Lotus, the Buddhist goal of salvation was maintained through an ardent eschatology. Richard Shek here traces the historical unfolding of the Buddhist chiliasm, which posed a great threat to the existing order. Shek also identifies Manichaeism as an important element in sectarian heterodoxy.[30]

As late as the sixteenth century, the sectarian movement still retained the social as well as the spiritual values inherent in early Buddhism and Daoism and had, moreover, combined them with a consciousness that emphasized the in-group community of the elect. The Eternal Mother was equated with heaven yet was more intimate than heaven. The assemblies and networks of men and women as individuals honored charismatic leaders as religious masters. Furthermore, the inherent millenarian faith periodically called for action "in response to the kalpa." From the standpoint of Confucian-Buddhist-Daoist orthodoxy, this constituted a contrary and outrageous belief system, quite apart from its potential threat to the state. Thanks to the works of Daniel Overmyer and Susan Naquin, in North America, and to scholars in Japan under the leadership of the late Suzuki Chūsei, the doctrines, practices, and organizational techniques of the Eternal Mother tradition have been meticulously documented.[31] The contribution of this volume is to offer a major case study and to put this sectarian tradition in a historical context in reference to certain themes that seem to require special emphasis.

The Eternal Mother Religion

In the sectarian scriptures (*baojuan,* lit. "precious volumes") studied by Overmyer for the period up through the mid-nineteenth century, he has found teachings representing "explicit values" that were predominantly Confucian or lay Buddhist, sometimes combined with elements of Daoism.[32] While the earliest *baojuan* texts focused mainly on religious deliverance, "beside which conventional ethical injunctions are of secondary importance or even without validity," in such texts from late Ming to the mid-nineteenth century he has found a curious duality: "the split is between the explicit values and implicit dissenting ones."[33] According to Richard Shek and Noguchi Tetsurō's study on sectarian values and ethics, the "implicit" values of the *baojuan* actually predominated. What was especially significant in this mature form of sectarian belief was the appearance in the

early sixteenth century of a female supreme deity, the Venerable Mother of Unborn Eternality (Wusheng laomu), or Eternal Mother. Allegiance to the Eternal Mother actually challenged Buddhism with a heretical Daoist deity. Moreover, such worship recognized men and women of different generational status to be all children of the progenitor that transcended time—children whose return to her womb, or salvation, she tearfully awaited.[34] Sectarian scriptures or mantras could teach filial devotion as well as respect for the socially superior; they could also subscribe to elements of Pure Land Buddhism. But such admixture of values and beliefs was just that—not syncretism that involved conscious reconciliation. Sectarian practitioners are known to have performed mortuary rites on behalf of other families for pay. But as Naquin has written of the "meditation sects" in what she called the "White Lotus religion," the members generally did not focus their attention on the transition of the soul at death: "We seldom find funeral rituals performed by these sects. Believers relied instead upon announcements to the Eternal Mother of their membership to establish their place among the elect."[35] Compare this mode of soteriology with the Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist rituals regarding the dead, and one can understand how under certain circumstances the "explicit values" in the *baojuan* could be relegated to the background.

Shek and Noguchi probe into the psychology as well as the politics of Eternal Mother millenarianism. Relying on their charismatic authority, many sect masters of the Ming and Qing periods would predict the date for the "turning" of the kalpa believed to be the final one, typically during severe natural or man-made disasters. Despite the sectarians' comparatively universalistic soteriology, once the consciousness of cosmic crisis was brought to the fore, in-group self-righteousness would take over—the saved would set themselves apart from the damned by successful violence.[36]

Rebellious eschatology was not free of political considerations. The sect master's course of action could reflect his impatience with a wicked society in disarray, or merely his dilemma as to how to maintain an organization's cohesiveness and solvency while forestalling government arrest. Naquin has emphasized that for networks of spatially scattered members, the desire for an "encompassing" community justified the risk of daring action. Rebellion was one of the outcomes of the impulse to compete with the elite, born of resent-

ment of the powerful who monopolized the symbols of legitimacy.[37] But did the sectarians really believe that they would succeed?

According to Shek and Noguchi, millenarian rebellion that honored the Eternal Mother was not so much a matter of desperation as a return to one's "true original home." The degenerate world, which human endeavor could no longer redeem, was to be thoroughly cleaned by the Maitreya Buddha, and the brothers and sisters were to return to the Eternal Mother's embrace. Success was not a question, for although the elect's total commitment must be shown by violent action, what was assured was Maitreya's supernatural intervention. This was a matter of faith. "Return to the origins" was the Daoist inspiration behind sectarian piety in the first place. One can understand such a psychology in the context of a hierarchical, ritual-ridden society, which left many human aspirations unfulfilled. But the stress that was being relieved was further ameliorated by the sectarians' own rituals and practices—the daily prayer to heaven where the Eternal Mother dwells, magical curing, martial arts, and shamanistic ecstasy.

A historic case of religion-inspired rebellion in late imperial China is the White Lotus uprising of the mid-Qing period (1796–1804), the subject of Kwang-Ching Liu's chapter 8.[38] Relying on published archival materials that contain depositions of the rebels, Liu explores the socioreligious dimensions of this movement that centered in Hubei, one which came close to shaking the foundations of the Manchu dynasty. Liu contends that in addition to economic deprivation and official malfeasance, sectarian eschatology was the principal factor among the causes of the rebellion. He argues that the chiliastic hopes of the rebels must be taken seriously in order to understand the zeal and fanaticism with which they fought the government forces. The belief in the Eternal Mother and her promise of salvation was a powerful motivating force that drove many sect leaders, including a major woman leader, into taking armed action against the state and all the injustices it represented. Liu's essay also highlights the intricate network of relationships that existed among separate but doctrinally similar sects, which facilitated massive mobilization of sectarian forces in times of crisis. Ironically, by the same token, sectarian division and the teacher-disciple relationship also set the limits of greater coordination in war as in peace among the friendly sects.[39]

The Triads

Do we find a parallel between the sectarians' in-group consciousness and the in-group comradeship extolled and practiced by the late Qing Triads? Sworn brotherhoods that developed into secret societies, the Triads were characterized by complex initiation and other rituals believed to be transformative processes.[40] Their "unquestioning comradeship" *(yi)* could transcend the concerns of kinship on which the organization was modeled. The chapters by Wen-hsiung Hsu and by David Faure in this volume present a critical overview of the early history of the Triads.[41] Both papers suggest that the worship of Lord Guan, the bodhisattva Guanyin, and other popular deities was merely instrumental with the Triads. These sworn brotherhoods were not possessed by any millenarian consciousness, while their ties with the conventional kinship morality appeared to remain rather strong. Hsu points out, for example, that members pledged aid to the society brothers' families, including womenfolk. On the other hand, Faure observes that the anti-Manchu Ming loyalism of the Triads did not become a prominent part of their ideology until the early nineteenth century. He finds that sedition, in the sense of wanting to overthrow the government, was not really the Triads' goal.

These two chapters on the Triads hold a view rather different from that advanced by Barend ter Haar, who in a recent work suggests that the Triads, at least at one time, possessed a "demonological and messianic paradigm."[42] He argues that the Triads, somewhat akin to the sectarians, had their roots in a paradigm that included: "the restoration of the Ming dynasty and its young ruler, the most important Triad ancestors, the City of Willows as a safe haven, the use of special dates, and some other, minor elements."[43] We do not feel, however, that this list qualifies the Triads to belong to a fully developed heterodox tradition. Their reference to the Ming regime, summarized in the slogan "Oppose the Qing and restore the Ming," was intended to gain legitimacy for their existence. They did not, according to presently available evidence, visualize any change in organization for the restored dynasty. Insofar as they defied the law and, moreover, placed the pseudo-family above their natural kin and shared the classic novel *Water Margin*'s value of *yi* (unquestioning comradeship, not Confucian "righteousness" or "appropriate duty"), they must be viewed as unorthodox, as well as illegal. In view of their many unusual rituals with political implications, they should perhaps

be described as "politically subversive," but not heterodox in the sense of espousing socioethical values contrary to the orthodox.

Pseudo-Christian Heterodoxy

There was, however, a major religiously iconoclastic movement in nineteenth-century China, more than half a century before imperial rule came to an end. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), which again threatened the foundations of the Manchu dynasty, may be viewed as the world's greatest millenarian movement, unless one counts Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution of 1966–1969 as also chiliastic. P. Richard Bohr's essay for this volume not only delineates in chronological order the development of Hong Xiuquan's theology, but includes a wide-ranging comparison between Taiping and traditional sectarian theory and practice.[44] The vengeful Old Testament God inspired among the early Taipings an even more fervent egalitarian ethic than did the Eternal Mother of the Ming-Qing sects. Despite the elite personal background of a few of the Taiping leaders, the pauperized Hakka peasants in the Guangxi hill country harbored not only a degree of class consciousness but also utter resentment of the old settlers who treated them as outcasts and feuded with them.

Hong never seems to have preached an apocalypse in cosmic terms: soteriology to him was at first on a personal level only.[45] But the "doomsday omens of man-made and natural calamity," together with Yang Xiuqing's shamanistic performance, uttering the inspired words of the Heavenly Father himself in addition to his magic healing and exorcism, precipitated collective hopes and fears. Desperation among the growing membership of the Society of God Worshipers generated visions of an earthly order of divinely sanctioned happiness and paved the way for the creation of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace in 1851. Hong Xiuquan subsequently made the claim that he was Melchizedek, the messianic hero of Genesis, thus retrospectively putting the movement in the Old Testament framework.

When compared with other millenarian movements of the Ming-Qing period, the Taipings were the most successful. Their claim to a new and alternative orthodoxy is demonstrated by their declaration that all women were literally "sisters" and all men "brothers," and by their denunciation of the ancestral cult and iconoclastic destruction of the Buddha, Laozi, and other idols of popular

Chinese religion. Their well-organized forces occupied Nanjing for eleven years, even as their shamanistic theocracy thoroughly denied the very principle behind Confucian monarchy. The Taiping Land System of 1853 not only envisaged equal division of farmland among the tillers, male and female alike, but also aimed at strict control over them by grassroot officials supervising all aspects of life.

It is not surprising that the Taipings would soon revert to Confucian positions on filial piety and gender relations, as well as loyalty to the Heavenly King and to a bureaucratic hierarchy. The orthodoxy of the Chinese tradition was simply too deeply rooted to disappear in the course of a decade. What is not usually stressed by historians is that the Taipings, at least in the post-1853 phase, came to rely on the *Water Margin,* or Triad-type of unquestioning comradeship *(yi),* as well as old-style loyalty to the monarch and his commanders as their operating ethics.[46] In the Taipings, we may perhaps see a form of Maitreyan faith in combination with strong shamanism as well as vestiges of Confucianism. Despite the "moral universalism" of the Christian influence on the Taipings, in the last analysis it was their particularly strong in-group solidarity, Hakka self-identity combined with the self-consciousness of a chosen people, that forged the powerful army that fought so effectively—even after the internecine struggle of 1856 the Hakka identity was still a factor for solidarity.

Elite Heterodoxy

It should not be expected that the beliefs of the plebeian Eternal Mother sectarians and the Taipings had exerted an important influence on the young literati elite who challenged the orthodoxy of their own heritage during the last two decades of the imperial era. However, one can nonetheless draw a rough analogy between elite and popular heterodoxy. The radical intellectuals who precipitated the Reform of 1898 and the revolutionaries whose ideas helped create the Republic in 1912 were, perhaps even more than the folk sectarians, egalitarian in their ethics. Although as individuals they continued to cherish familistic sentiments and were to enjoy the patronage of Emperor Guangxu, both Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Tan Sitong (1865–1898) bitterly inveighed against the hierarchical interpersonal obligations in favor of a newly defined human-heartedness *(ren)* that would recognize the individual's "right of autonomy" *(zizhu zhi quan)*.

In Tan's philosophical treatise written in 1896, the constraining Three Bonds as well as the "doctrine of name" *(mingjiao)* were vigorously attacked—the bond between monarch and subject being to him particularly dark, stultifying, and oppressive of humanity. Behind this iconoclasm lay a profound change of worldview. Kang and Tan both had intense interest in Buddhist ideas of equality, so long submerged under the orthodox ethics. But the latent values took on new force when they were merged with the implications of Western science. The stars visible through a telescope changed the heaven of ancient Chinese cosmology. Knowledge of elementary physics made "ether" *(yitai)* more real than yin and yang. The concept of evolution introduced through social Darwinism came close to becoming a faith for the new heterodox elite, to whom the Western peoples, by virtue of their emphasis on citizenship qualities and on progressive change, seemed the fittest to survive. As they worked for China's survival as a nation, the reformers and revolutionaries looked to a Golden Age in the future, not the past, and they sought inspiration from abroad, not just from the Chinese classics or from their own intuition.[47] The obscure classical theory of three-stage development toward the "great peace" was given a new interpretation, and the classical utopian ideal of the "grand unity" *(datong)* was reconciled to parliamentarianism and women's rights.

The Twentieth-Century Perspectives

The complex history of elite iconoclasm in post-imperial China is beyond the scope of our inquiry. It is hoped, however, that the last paper in this volume will provide some early twentieth-century perspective on the volume's main theme. How did the Chinese elite, awakened to science and democracy, view popular heterodoxy and the rural peasants at large?

Harking back, in a sense, to Donald Sutton's perspective on popular shamanism, Don C. Price has documented how the reformers and revolutionaries toward the end of the Qing dynasty saw the Taipings, the Boxers, the sects, and the Triads.[48] By the early twentieth century, science and the evolutionary cosmology had won the minds of the elite activists. The rational outlook of the literati was strengthened. The reformers and revolutionaries alike considered the sectarian groups and Triad-type societies "atavistic," even though they needed the latter's help, especially in attempted uprisings. The

Triads and the Taipings were commended for their anti-Manchu stand. But they, as well as the folk religious sects, to say nothing of the Boxers, were criticized for ignorance and irrationality. The heroic "knight-errantry" of the Triads was especially appreciated. Song Jiaoren (1882–1913), who in his youth had admired "the heroes of the forest" (i.e., hero bandits), had quite subjectively read into the *Water Margin* Robin Hood–style chivalry and sense of justice. But he gave up this fancy after he had acquired some knowledge of Western science and institutions. By 1907, Song's nationalism and anti-Manchu sentiments were accompanied by his new faith in the Western democratic process. Like so many other patriots of that decade, Song (on a trip from Japan to Manchuria) sought out popular dissidents to join in the common cause of overthrowing the Manchus. However, as the revolutionaries found more effective comrades among the patriots within the Qing dynasty's new provincial armies, their need for alliance with popular associations declined.

Yet Price also finds in the writings of the revolutionaries continued appreciation of the "people's spirit" *(minqi)* as reflected in popular heterodoxy. This image accorded with the elite radicals' self-image of the stalwart young hero capable even of martial exploits—itself not necessarily incompatible with Confucian orthodoxy. However, some among the radicals, including the small group of early Chinese intellectual anarchists, soon combined the heroic ideal with a strong voluntarism emphasizing the efficacy of human will and with a populist faith in the virtue and power of the people going beyond merely appreciation of *minqi.*[49] It is a central question of twentieth-century Chinese history whether voluntarism and populism could be reconciled with the equally new Marxist-Leninist historical determinism.

In the extraordinary career of Mao Zedong, Marxism was combined with voluntarism and peasant populism. Mao did not believe in the turning of the kalpa except one willed by himself, his unique version of historical dialectics allowing the exercise of his will, generalized as the aspiration of the masses. Although Mao, too, censured the Triads and the Red Spears as backward, his mystique of the "grand union of popular masses" may well have been inspired by the heterodoxy of the past, *Water Margin* being his favorite reading and Tan Sitong an author he admired.[50] In launching the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, he saw himself as the incarnation of the masses who, as in his version of the "Foolish Old Man" story, could

literally and miraculously move mountains. Equally remarkable, however, was the complete faith reposed in him by the idealistic and youthful Red Guards. Distressed and disoriented by economic hard times and resentful of the power of Party bureaucrats, radicals of the Cultural Revolution bombarded the headquarters of the power structure with only a dim vision of the blissful permanent revolution that Mao promised. Theirs was the millenarian frame of mind: a new heaven and a new earth were at hand, and rebelliousness was for the moment an end in itself.

From the standpoint of the ritual and social morality of late imperial China's culture and society, the Maoist Cultural Revolution must be viewed as supreme heterodoxy—this is simply a historical perspective, not a value judgment. The Buddho-Daoist egalitarianism of the Eternal Mother tradition has persisted only among a tiny minority, but the Maoist message of "Serve the people" has at one time inspired millions. On the other hand, the active millenarian movement induced by Mao, with its emphasis on militant antibureaucratic and even antiparty "class struggle," appears to have failed decisively, as many such millenarian movements had failed in the past.

Notes

1. For the meanings of the terms *xie, zuodao, yiduan,* etc., as used by the state and the elite, see the appendix in this volume. See also the excellent discussion in Paul A. Cohen's *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), esp. pp. 4–20, and in Barend J. ter Haar, *The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).

2. Frederic Wakeman Jr., "Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 36.2 (Feb. 1977): 201–237; James P. Harrison, *The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions: A Study in the Rewriting of History* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 16–37; Kwang-Ching Liu, "World View and Peasant Rebellions: Reflections on Post-Mao Historiography," *Journal of Asian Studies* 40.2 (Feb. 1981): 295–326.

3. For trends in PRC historiography in the early 1990s see, for example, the following works on family and kinship: Chen Zhiping, *Jin wubainian Fujian de jiazu shehui* [Lineage society in Fujian province during the last five hundred years] (Shanghai: Sanlian, 1991); Zheng Zhenman, *Ming-Qing*

Fujian qinzu zuzhi yu shehui bianqian [Lineage organization and social change in Ming-Qing Fujian] (Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1992); Feng Erkang and Zhang Jianhua, *Qingren shehui shenghuo* [Social life of the Qing people] (Tianjin: Renmin, 1990); Ye Xian'en, *Ming-Qing Huizhou nongcun shehui* [Rural society in Ming-Qing Huizhou] (Anhui: Renmin, 1983).

4. Max Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism,* trans. Hans H. Gerth (New York: Free Press, 1968), chaps. 5, 6, 7, esp. pp. 173, 181. See also C. K. Yang's introduction in the same volume, p. xxxiv.

5. C. K. Yang, *Religion in Chinese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 276–277.

6. Maurice Freedman, "On the Sociological Study of Chinese Religion," in Arthur P. Wolf, ed., *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 37, 40.

7. Muramatsu Yuji, "Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideologies," in Arthur F. Wright, ed., *The Confucian Persuasion* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), 242.

8. *The Oxford English Dictionary,* 1961 reprint; see also *Webster's International Dictionary of the English Language,* 1955 ed. For a discussion of concepts of orthodoxy, orthopraxy, heterodoxy, and heresy, see Sheila McDonough, "Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy"; Judith Berling, "Orthopraxy"; Kurt Rudolph (Matthew J. O'Connell, trans.), "Heresy"; and Burton Russell, "Christian Concepts," in Mircea Eliade, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 9:269–279; 11:124–132.

9. Suppression of Buddhism was carried out in 446–454 under Northern Wei, in 574–577 under Northern Zhou, in 840–846 under Tang, and 955–959 under the Later Zhou. Under the Song, there was a brief period of persecution in 1110–1119 under Huizong (r. 1101–1125). But by the Ming dynasty, Buddhism had become an integral part of elite life. See Timothy Brook, *Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late Ming China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

10. See Kwang-Ching Liu, "Socioethics as Orthodoxy: A Perspective," in *Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 53–100. See also Chen Yinko, *Hanliutangji* [Collected writings of the Cold Willows Hall] (Shanghai: Guji, 1980) 58; *Chen Yinko shiji* [Collected poems of Chen Yinko] (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 1993), 10–11. Commenting on Song ideas regarding the family, Denis Twitchett has written: "I do not think that there is anything fundamentally new in Song ideology regarding the family; a new emphasis on descent perhaps, just as there is a renewed focus on hierarchical submission in the growing emphasis on *xiao* and *zhong,* but these are hardly new ideas." There was a new emphasis on ritual forms and unity, but the major development was "the gradual change of China into an ideological society with a strong sense

of orthodoxy. Perhaps what we see is not so much any change in ideology as a change in attitudes toward existing ideology. People in the late Song began to take it all very seriously and literally." See Twitchett, "Comments on J. L. Watson's Article," *China Quarterly* 92 (1982): 625–626.

11. Hao Chang, "Confucian Cosmological Myth and Neo-Confucian Transcendence," in Richard J. Smith and D. W. Y. Kwok, eds., *Cosmology, Ontology, and Human Efficacy: Essays in Chinese Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993), 11–34.

12. Chapter 3, this volume. See also Michihata Ryōshū, *Bukkyō to Jukyō rinri* [Buddhism and Confucian ethics] (Kyoto: Heirakuji, 1968); Kenneth Ch'en, *Chinese Transformation of Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

13. Chün-fang Yü, *Renewal of Buddhism in China: Chu-hung and the Late Ming Synthesis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 18, 90.

14. Sung-peng Hsu, *A Buddhist Leader in Ming China: The Life and Thought of Han-shan Te-ch'ing 1546–1623* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), 74, 78.

15. For a general discussion of the patriarchs of the Celestial Master tradition in the Ming, see Huang Zhaohan, "Mingdai de Zhang Tianshi" [Celestial Master Zhang of the Ming dynasty], in *Daojiao yanjiu lunwenji* [Essays on Daoist studies] (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1988), 9–38. For a more detailed study on the subject, see Zhuang Hongyi, *Mingdai daojiao Zhengyi pai* [The Orthodox Unity School in Ming Daoism] (Taibei: Xuesheng shuju, 1986).

16. See Sakai Tadao, "Confucianism and Popular Educational Works," in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *Self and Society in Ming Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 341–342.

17. Shek's article in this volume, chapter 4. See also Akizuki Kan'ei, *Chūgoku kinsei dōkyō no keisei—jōmyodō no kisoteki kenkyū* [The formation of modern Daoism in the history of China—a fundamental study of the Jingming dao] (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1978); Cynthia J. Brokaw, *The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit: Social Change and Moral Order in Late Imperial China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 45 n. 56, 50–51, 62.

18. Kai-Wing Chow, *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classics, and Lineage Discourse* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

19. *Huang Zongxi quanji* [Complete works of Huang Zongxi] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji, 1985), 192–207.

20. See Judith Berling, *The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

21. For examples of such imperial pronouncements, see the essays of the Ming founder in *Ming Taizu yuzhi wenji* [Essays by His Majesty himself Ming Taizu], 20 *juan* Ming edition, 11:9b, 18b. Cf. Romeyn Taylor, "An

Imperial Endorsement of Syncretism: Ming T'ai-tsu's Essay on the Three Teachings, Translation and Commentary," *Ming Studies* 16:31–38 (1983).

22. See Robert E. Hegel, *The Novel in Seventeenth Century China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Paul S. Ropp, *Dissent in Early Modern China: Ju-lin wai-shih and Ch'ing Social Criticism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981).

23. Chapter 5, by Paul R. Katz, this volume.

24. Chapter 6, by Donald S. Sutton, this volume.

25. See William C. Cooper and Nathan Sivin, "Man as a Medicine," in Shigera Nakayama and Nathan Sivin, eds., *Chinese Science* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), 271.

26. Chapter 1, by Liu and Shek, this volume.

27. D. C. Lau, trans., *Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1963), 82. Slightly adjusted.

28. Chapter 3, by Whalen W. Lai, this volume.

29. See Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (Tokyo: Kaho Kai, 1924–1934), 85:1338a.

30. Chapter 2, Richard Shek, this volume. See also the two seminal articles by Erik Zürcher, "Eschatology and Messianism in Early Chinese Buddhism," in W. L. Idema, ed., *Leyden Studies in Sinology* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 34–56; and "'Prince Moonlight': Messianism and Eschatology in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism," *T'oung Pao* 68 (1982): 1–75. Wu Han's thesis regarding Manichaeism and the Ming dynasty remains basic; see his *Dushi daji* [Notes from reading history] (Beijing: Sanlian, 1956), 235.

31. The major book that brought the historical dimension of this dissenting movement to the attention of the Western scholarly world is Daniel L. Overmyer, *Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976). Unsurpassed social history of two sectarian uprisings may be found in Susan Naquin, *Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) and *Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). Suzuki Chūsei's pioneering and invaluable works are represented by *Shinchō chūkishi kenkyū* [A study of mid-Qing history] (Toyohashi: Aichi University Research Institute on International Issues, 1952); and *Chūgoku ni okeru kakumei to shūkyō* [Revolution and religion in China] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1974). Suzuki was also general editor of a special volume dedicated to the study of millenarianism in Asia. See *Sennen ōkoku teki minshu undō no kenkyū* [A study of millenarian mass movements] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1982). His younger colleagues on this project have since published monographs on their own. See Noguchi Tetsurō, *Mindai byakurenkyōshi no kenkyū* [Study of the history of the White Lotus in the Ming dynasty] (Tokyo:

Yuzankaku, 1986); and Asai Motoi, *Min-Shin jidai minkan shūkyō kessha no kenkyū* [Study of folk religious associations in the Ming-Qing period] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1990).

32. Overmyer, *Folk Buddhist Religion,* and his more recent *Precious Volumes: An Introduction to Chinese Sectarian Scriptures from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

33. Overmyer, "Values in Chinese Sectarian Literature: Ming and Ch'ing *pao-chuan,*" in David Johnson, Andrew Nathan, and Evelyn Rawski, eds., *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 219–254, esp. 253. Overmyer writes that "with the exception of the egalitarianism and utopian hope of the late Ming *pao-chuan,* values in Chinese sectarian literature are quite conservative." Ibid., 221. This "exception" is extensive! The egalitarianism and utopianism of the late Ming *baojuan* persisted as elements in later sectarian texts, including the nineteenth-century materials that the Qing official Huang Yubian saw.

34. Chapter 7, by Shek and Noguchi, this volume.

35. Susan Naquin, "The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial China," in Johnson, Nathan, and Rawski, eds., *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China,* 225–291, esp. 280. Cf. Naquin, "Funerals in North China: Uniformity and Variation," in James L. Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski, eds., *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 37–70, esp. 51.

36. See chapters 7 and 8 in this volume. For the millenarian consciousness among sectarians who did not immediately stage a violent revolt, see Richard Shek, "Millenarianism without Rebellion: The Huangtian Dao in North China," *Modern China* 8.3 (1982): 337–360.

37. Naquin, *Millenarian Rebellion in China* and *Shantung Rebellion.* See also idem, "Connections Between Rebellions: Sect Family Networks in Qing China," *Modern China* 8.3 (1982): 337–360. For a workmanlike Chinese study of the Eight Trigrams sect, see Ma Xisha, *Qingdai bagua jiao* [The Eight Trigrams sect of the Qing dynasty] (Beijing: Chinese People's University Press, 1989).

38. Chapter 8, this volume. Despite the complaint made by ter Haar in his *White Lotus Teachings,* (see note 1 above), we do not apologize for using the term "White Lotus rebellion," since this is how the 1796–1804 uprising is referred to in current textbooks without a pejorative implication. Cf. John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, *China: Tradition and Transformation,* rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 179, 240–241.

39. Cf. Blaine Gaustad, "Prophets and Pretenders: Inter-sect Competition in Qianlong China," *Late Imperial China* 21.1 (June 2000): 1–40.

40. See Barend J. ter Haar, *Ritual and Mythology of the Chinese Triads: Creating an Identity* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997). "Its ritual and narrative lore provided a Triad group with a long term identity and a supra-local frame of

reference, thereby masking its essentially contingent nature. . . . Ultimately, the Triad groups remain local groups enmeshed in local webs of interests and conflicts" (p. 443).

41. Chapters 9 and 10, by Hsu and Faure respectively, in this volume. See also Frederic Wakeman Jr., "The Secret Societies of Kwangtung, 1800–1856," in Jean Chesneaux, ed., *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 29–47. A recent and important survey of secret societies *(huidang)* in the Qing period is Liu Zhengyun, "Qingdai huidang shikong fenbu chutan" [A preliminary chronological and spatial survey of secret societies in the Qing period], in *Zhongguo jinshi shehui wenhua shi lunwenji* [Papers on the society and culture of early modern China] (Taibei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1992), 429–479. Based on extensive archival sources, Liu's article includes data on 92 secret societies with different names (except for two with the same name known to be different groups). Of the 916 cases of incidents involving secret societies, 209 cases concerned the Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui), 184 the Three Dots Society (Sandian hui or Sanhe hui), and 222 the Elder Brother Society (Gelao hui). The former two societies shared similar organization and ritual practices, and were active mainly in the southern provinces; for the sake of convenience, they are described as Triads in the present volume. On the Gelao hui, see, *inter alia,* Liu Zhengyun, "The Ko-lau hui in Late Imperial China" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1983). See also his articles on this secret society in Chinese, including "Gelao hui de renji wangluo—Guangxu shiqi'nian Li Hong anli de ge'an yanjiu" [Personal networks of the Gelao hui—a study of the Li Hong case in 1891], *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology,* Academia Sinica, 62 (1993): 39–64. On the Tiandi hui, see Lu Baoqian's classic study, *Lun wan-Qing liang-Guang de Tiandi hui zhengquan* [On the Tiandi hui regime in Guangdong and Guangxi provinces in late Qing] (Taibei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1975).

42. Ter Haar, *Ritual and Mythology,* chapters 6–7, 224–305.

43. Ibid., 263.

44. Chapter 11 in this volume; see also Bohr's "Liang Fa's Quest for Moral Power," in Suzanne Wilson Barnett and John K. Fairbank, eds., *Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985), 35–46. The historiography on Taiping religion is simply too huge to be listed comprehensively here. But Jonathan Spence's *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (New York: Norton, 1996) is highly recommended. For another interpretation, see Robert Weller, *Resistance and Control in China: Taiping Rebels, Taiwanese Ghosts, and Tiananmen* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994).

45. See Philip A. Kuhn, "Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-Cultural Dimensions of a Chinese Rebellion," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19.3 (July 1977), 350–366.

46. This is evident in Li Xiucheng's famous deposition of 1864. For an English translation, see C. A. Curwen, *Taiping Rebel: The Deposition of Li Hsiu-ch'eng* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

47. Hao Chang, *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: The Problems of Order and Meaning, 1880–1911* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); San-pao Li, "A Preliminary Analysis of K'ang Yu-wei's Earliest Extant Essay, *K'ang-tzu nei-wai-pien* [Inner and outer chapters of Master Kang's writings]," *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies,* new series, 11.1–11.2 combined issue (1975): 213–247; and his "K'ang Yu-wei's *Shih-li kung-fa ch'uan-shu* [A comprehensive book of substantial truths and universal principles]," *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History,* Academia Sinica, 7 (1978): 683–725.

48. Chapter 12, by Don C. Price, this volume.

49. See Charlotte Furth, "Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895–1920," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China,* vol. 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 322–405; Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), esp. 22–28, 80–88, 166–170, 248–256.

50. See Frederic Wakeman Jr., *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), esp. chap. 20.