Traditional scholarship in immigration study views immigration largely as the result of “a unidimensional process of uneven economic exchange between states of origin and destination” (Zolberg 1981, 4). Immigrants are viewed as mostly uprooted manual laborers, often people with poor educations and minimum job skills, seeking job opportunities in the destination countries along with their families. Their residential areas often take the form of ghettos and ethnic enclaves and are located in run-down neighborhoods, mostly inner cities. Numerous classic studies have been done on such immigrant neighborhoods and leave a rich legacy, describing immigrants’ adaptation, assimilation, and integration to the destination countries (see, for instance, Bolaria 1984; Kwong 1987, 1996; J. Lin 1998; M. Zhou 1992). At the same time, white middle-class families—composed of a working dad, a stay-at-home mom, and their children—dominate the traditional suburbs in metropolitan areas, especially those in North America. In cases where racial and ethnic minorities, Asians included, do achieve their dream of social and economic upward mobility by suburbanizing, they are expected to be, and likely are, spatially dispersed and socioeconomically assimilated into the mainstream society. As a result, within an ethnic group those who live in inner-city enclaves are usually poor, less educated, spatially concentrated, and more likely to be low-skilled workers in an ethnic job market, whereas residents of the suburbs are well off, are professionally trained, and live in racially or ethnically mixed residential areas—as portrayed by the two traditional spatial models of ethnic settlements, the “invasion and succession” and “downtown versus uptown” models (Park and Miller 1921; Kwong 1987, 1996).

Such images, however, belie reality: In recent decades many suburban areas have transformed to multiracial and multicultural ones under the influence of international geopolitical and global economic restructuring,
changing national immigration and trade policies and local demographic, economic, and political contexts. Many new immigrants with higher educational attainment, professional occupations, and financial resources settled directly into the suburbs without ever having experienced life in the inner city. This is different from prior generations of immigrants, who normally settled in inner-city neighborhoods first and moved out to the suburbs only after they moved up socioeconomically. This pattern—as described in the 1920s by scholars of the Chicago school of sociology (Park and Miller 1921)—has been accepted widely and is deeply rooted in people’s minds. Today, demographic characteristics, social and economic structures, and residential and commercial landscapes are undergoing drastic changes in the suburban areas of many large metropolitan areas across the globe. This book presents observations and interpretations by scholars, primarily geographers and other social scientists, on such changes brought in by the new Asian immigrant or refugee streams, their impacts, and their imprints on eight different metropolitan areas in four major immigrant receiving countries in the Pacific Rim (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).

Changing Global Economy, Geopolitics, and Immigration/Refugee Policies

The histories of the four countries under consideration have always been closely associated with those of immigrants. In turn, domestic and international economic conditions, geopolitical changes, and their countries’ strategic interests historically have influenced immigration policies. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Asian immigrants to all four countries faced de jure and de facto discrimination, ranging from restrictive policies to exclusion laws. In the second half of twentieth century, all four countries have changed their immigration laws to nondiscriminative or selective ones that accommodate, if not encourage, various immigration flows from Asian countries.

Evolution of Immigration Policies: From Restrictive/Exclusive to Nondiscriminative/Selective

Historically, immigration legislation in these countries has discriminated against groups that are not of Anglo-Saxon origin (Table 1-1; W. Li 1997; P. S. Li 2003; Lo this volume; Fernald and Li 2000; Murphy 2001; Takaki 1998). Individuals from ethnic minority groups were not given the same opportunities as their white, European counterparts. For instance, the U.S.
Naturalization Law of 1790 specified that only free “White” immigrants would be eligible for naturalized citizenship. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 aimed at barring Chinese labor from entering the United States. The 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement restricted Japanese and Korean immigration. The Immigration Act of 1917 denied entry to Asian Indians and created an “Asiatic Barred Zone,” which essentially curbed all immigration from Asia. The National Origins Acts of 1924 gave no quotas for any group that was ineligible for citizenship, a category that included all the previously mentioned groups. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 added Filipinos to the list of excludables. These immigration restrictions prevented Asian groups from entering and legitimized the discriminatory actions taken against these groups by denying them the right to become naturalized citizens.

The Immigration Act of 1910 in Canada conferred on the Cabinet the authority to exclude “immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada.” The Canadian government also singled out immigrants of “Asiatic origin” requiring they have $200 in cash at landing time. Then Canada passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000; P. S. Li 2003). In Australia, one of the first pieces of legislation passed by the Australian government at federation in 1901 was the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which initiated the “White Australia Policy.” Several components of this act were written to severely limit the ability of Chinese and other Asian groups to migrate to and settle in Australia. New Zealand also passed a Chinese Immigrants Restriction Act 1881, which imposed a poll tax of ten pounds and a tonnage restriction of one Chinese passenger for every ten tons of cargo.

It was World War II that changed global political maps: The war prompted the countries in question to lift restrictions, at least symbolically, against immigrations from Asian Allied countries. The United States passed the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943 and ended restrictions against Filipinos and Asian Indians in 1946, granting all three groups the right to become naturalized citizens while offering symbolic immigration quotas (about 100 for each group). Canada ended its Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947, although only allowing wives and children to join their husbands and fathers in Canada. The Australian government extended temporary residency for Chinese war refugees and seamen. New Zealand introduced the Finance Act of 1944, which finally abolished both poll tax and tonnage restrictions on Chinese. The “White New Zealand Policy,” however, was still in effect until the 1980s. A 1953 external affairs memorandum, for instance, stated, “Our immigration is based firmly on the principle that we are and intended to remain a country of European development. It is in-
Table 1-1 Policies toward Asian Immigration in Four Pacific Rim Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882 Chinese Exclusion Act</td>
<td>1910 $200 in cash for “Asiatic” immigration</td>
<td>1901 Immigration Restriction Act</td>
<td>1881 Chinese Immigration Restriction Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement</td>
<td>1923 Chinese Exclusion Act</td>
<td>(dictation test; Foundation for White Australia policy)</td>
<td>(£10 poll tax; tonnage restriction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act</td>
<td>(only allows entry of wives and children)</td>
<td>1955/1958: Migration Act</td>
<td>1944 Finance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946 Naturalization rights for Filipino and Indian immigrants</td>
<td>(1967–)</td>
<td>(1972–)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 “Asia-Pacific triangle” (~100/country → 2,000 total)</td>
<td>1967 establish “points system”; allows Asian immigrants to bring families for the first time in history</td>
<td>1972 “Multiculturalism” policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 Immigration &amp; Nationality Act</td>
<td>1967 establish “points system”; allows Asian immigrants to bring families for the first time in history</td>
<td>1972 “Multiculturalism” policy</td>
<td>“Multiculturalism” policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(family reunion, 80 percent; professional, 20 percent; citizenship after five years)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(abolishes “White Australia” policy; nondiscriminatory points policy; citizenship after three-year residency)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4,400,000 employment-based, 10,000 employment creation: invest $1 million; diversity)</td>
<td>1986 Investor stream (C$400,000)</td>
<td>1990s Emphasis on skilled migration, in favor of those with English skills and not settling in Sydney/Melbourne</td>
<td>1986 Business Immigration policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 ACWIA: H-1B visa 65,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ 190,000 (2000–2003)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
evitably discriminatory against Asians. . . . we do everything to discourage [immigration] from Asia” (cited in Murphy 2001, 88).

The negative impacts of such exclusionary or restrictive policies on Asian immigrant communities cannot be overlooked. Asians were not allowed to immigrate to these countries legally in large numbers, and their families could not join them. This caused severe gender imbalance, therefore it was almost impossible to form self-perpetuating communities. Discrimination and violence from mainstream society often forced Asian immigrants to retreat to their own social world in limited geographic areas, which started the inner-city Chinatowns or Japantowns in run-down sections.

It was not until the changing international and domestic contexts (since the 1960s) that such restrictive immigration policies eventually were fully dismantled. Globally, the decolonization and independence of third-world countries became a worldwide movement in the 1960s, making the voices of such countries heard in the international arena. Moreover, the moral victory of World War II and the economic prosperity enjoyed by the United States made it the leader of the free world, while the rise of Eastern Bloc socialist countries changed the geopolitical map, giving rise to the cold war. In order for the United States to win the cold war and improve its image as a democratic country and a world leader that did not discriminate against nonwhite groups in its own country and in the international community, it was necessary to revise its traditional, discriminatory immigration legislation. Within the United States, the 1960s was the decade of the civil rights movement, which resulted in passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Minority groups, led by African Americans and Chicanos, fought for political rights and economic power.

In the wake of nationalist movements overseas and the civil rights movements at home, Congress passed the historic Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Espiritu 1992; Hing 1993). This act has been seen as a landmark change in U.S. immigration policy. For the first time in U.S. history, every national group in the Eastern Hemisphere (Asian nations included) was granted an equal annual maximum immigration quota of 20,000 people, which did not include those immediate family members of U.S. citizens, who are admitted on a nonquota basis. The 1965 legislation divided all potential immigrants into two major types: family-reunification-based and profession-based, with a total of six different preference categories. A similar law was passed in Canada in 1967 to establish a nondiscriminative points system, while allowing Asian immigrants to bring their families for the first time in history. In Australia, the Immigration Restriction Act was slowly
dismantled between 1956 and 1972 in regard to non-European immigrants. A policy of “multiculturalism,” adopted by the Australian government in 1972, was entrenched in the late 1980s. Similarly, the New Zealand government adopted a “multiculturalism” policy in the 1980s. These immigration legislations have resulted in large immigration waves from Asia to these destination countries, and chain migration has kept immigration momentum going over the years.

Global Economy and New Selective Immigration Policies

Economic restructuring has changed the global economic map and relations in recent decades. In the contemporary world, a nation’s economy has to be more competitive in order to keep, or increase, its global market share. Intense competition has been the norm between the United States, Japan, Germany, and other countries since World War II. At the same time, the economy of many industrial countries has been marked by declining manufacturing sectors and increasing new high-technology and service sectors. This leads to polarized reindustrialization of both high-tech, high-wage sectors and low-tech, low-wage sectors. On one hand, the high-tech industries of computers and advanced communication equipment firms have gained greater importance in the overall economy and have become increasingly dependent on highly skilled immigrant professionals. On the other hand, increasing numbers of technologically unsophisticated industries have emerged or are flourishing, such as the highly agglomerated, vertically disintegrated garment industry. These low-wage industries are especially prevalent in large metropolitan areas with high proportions of immigrants (Scott 1988; Storper and Walker 1989). The trend toward polarized reindustrialization not only offers jobs for highly skilled professionals (both domestic and immigrants) but also provides opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs/subcontractors and semiskilled and low-skilled job seekers.

Changing trade policies worldwide, such as the establishment and growth of the World Trade Organization (WTO), have contributed to the globalization of the economy as well. The passage of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which created a free-trade area embracing over 360 million people and more than $6.5 trillion in annual economic activity, offers tremendous opportunities for foreign multinational corporations to take advantage of free trade among the three countries by establishing branch firms in low-wage Mexico and then exporting the finished goods to the United States and Canada. The Pacific Rim has emerged as a new economic power—for example, U.S. trade with the Asian Pacific Eco-
The economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), which includes all three North American countries, Australia, New Zealand, and thirteen Asian Pacific and Latin American nations, has been thriving. U.S. exports to APEC member countries amounts to $128 billion annually, accounting for 5.3 million American jobs; in comparison, U.S. sales to Europe total $102 billion annually, accounting for 4.2 million jobs (Grayson 1995). These international trade agreements at regional and world levels not only lower trade barriers between countries but also inevitably promote globalization of capital, information, high technology, managerial personnel, and labor. In so doing, they accelerate global economic restructuring.

Moreover, although globalization processes have undermined the sovereignty of nation-states, the importance of nation-states has not diminished as predicted by the “end of geography” argument in financial globalization debates, nor the “ungrounded empire” theme in cultural anthropology, which suggested that nation-states no longer matter much in a globalization era (Carnoy and Castells 2001; Ong and Nonini 1997). Just as national immigration policies traditionally and continuously serve as legal barriers to screen out certain types of immigrants by race/ethnicity, nationality, and class, contemporary immigration policies in many Western countries seek to recruit both capitalists and highly educated, highly skilled “mental laborers” to strengthen their respective positions in the global economy. In 1980, the British government revised its policy to issue work permits primarily to professional, managerial, and technical staffs and to investors who would invest at least £150,000 and create full-time jobs for the British. This provision discouraged immigration of petit bourgeois who intended to establish small businesses. The Canadian government implemented similar immigration policies to lure business immigrants by establishing an immigrant category in the “entrepreneur stream” in 1978 and introducing the “investor stream” in 1986. While an entrepreneur immigrant had to establish or buy a business and create at least one job outside his or her family in Canada, an investor immigrant had to invest at least C$400,000 and have a minimum net worth of C$800,000. The U.S. Immigrant Act of 1990, an effort to catch up with other Western nations, allocated 140,000 immigrant visas to “employment-based” categories, including 10,000 for “employment creation,” which requires, with certain exceptions, at least a $1 million investment and the creation of ten new jobs. In addition, in nonimmigrant categories, both L-1 and H-1B visas also intend to promote managerial personnel migration and resolve the shortage of high-tech professionals. The L-1 visa (offered to “intra-company transferees”) also encouraged multinational corporations to invest and set up branches and to
bring transnational managerial personnel to the United States as potential immigrants. These L-1 visa holders are eligible to apply for permanent residency after successfully operating their businesses in the United States for a whole year. In recent times, Congress—under pressure from American high-tech companies to recruit highly educated and skilled foreign professionals—had repeatedly and significantly increased the limit of H-1B visas. The bill passed on October 3, 2000, raised the number of H-1B visas from 115,000 to 195,000 in each of the next three years until October 2003. During the six-year term of their valid status, H-1B visa holders are also eligible to apply for permanent residency.

While family reunion was favored in Australia between the late 1970s and into the 1980s, it was in the 1990s that the business and skilled category regained priority. The current government favors caps or limits on the number of visas granted for family reunion subcategories (such as parental or aged family reunion). Meanwhile, the Coalition (Liberal Country parties) has promoted certain job qualifications and the choice of initial residence, notably not Sydney or Melbourne, as priority approvals for admission. Similarly, an “Entrepreneur Immigration Policy” introduced in New Zealand in the late 1970s was in turn transformed to a “Business Immigration Policy” in 1986 to encourage business immigrants and their investments. This policy is seeking business immigrants who are “expected to succeed because they were suitably qualified or of proven ability in business, or industry, or managerial or technical fields” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2000; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2001b; Ley 2000; W. Li 1997; Lowell 2000; Macdonald 1987).

It is obvious that in addition to stressing family reunion, recent policies in all four countries promote employment-based immigration and capital investment to accommodate the increasingly globalized process of economic restructuring. These new immigration regulations have greatly altered the socioeconomic characteristics of immigrant populations, especially those flows from rapidly growing third-world countries and areas such as the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs, or the four Asian “Little Dragons/Tigers”: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and mainland China. They offered new opportunities for well-educated professional people and skilled managerial personnel. Unlike traditional immigrants, these new immigrants normally are not only well educated and professionally trained but are also often wealthy, with portable assets. Because of industrialization and phenomenal economic growth, many people in these countries accumulated wealth and were ready to move out of their countries of origin.
due to various geopolitical and economic reasons, forming large pools of potential emigrants from Asia.

On the other hand, some of these new immigrants may not necessarily have high-level English proficiency or be willing to assimilate completely into the white mainstream. While some English proficiency is sufficient to handle their businesses, English skills are not prerequisites for business success. The new immigrants often choose big cities with large populations of their coethnics in order to maintain and develop their transnational businesses and personal networks. Since many of these immigrants deal with international trade or finance involving their home countries, host countries, and beyond, blending into host societies does not have to be their first priority. Instead, developing transnational or global ties are the key. The latest immigration policies breed sojourners who are as comfortable crossing oceans and countries as they are crossing main streets of host countries (Kotkin 1991).

**Geopolitics and Immigration/Refugee Policy**

U.S. military involvement in foreign countries also had important consequences in changing specific immigration policies and situations (such as the Korean War, which resulted in immigration from Korea). More than a decade of U.S. military involvement in Indochina not only caused casualties for both the United States and the Indochinese countries but also created huge refugee waves, especially after the fall of Saigon in 1975. In order to accommodate this refugee population—the largest in U.S. history—Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which removed refugees from the regular quota system. Under this act, the president, in consultation with Congress, decided how many refugees were to be admitted annually. The three other countries have similar refugee policies to address the sudden surge of Indochinese refugee waves since the late 1970s.

Unlike typical immigrants, refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia had not planned to move to other countries before the war and were not ready to “assimilate” into hosting societies. Their arrival was the direct result of U.S. military activities in their home countries; therefore, their resettlement largely involved forced evacuation. These Southeast Asian refugees lost everything during the war and their long journey to the receiving countries—their families, friends, properties, and belongings. They had to settle and reestablish themselves in a country completely different from their own. Although many acknowledged the opportunities offered by the United States and other recipient countries, adjustment was often more
difficult for them than for “ordinary” immigrants (Hein 1991; Ong and Liu 1994). Moreover, that there were no preexisting communities to aid their transitions—as most other Asian immigrant groups have, notably the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, and Asian Indians—constituted an added burden on these refugees and their families; the transitions were so difficult that sometimes even the immigrants’ offspring were affected.

The Hong Kong situation is another good example of the impacts of international geopolitics on immigration. The governments of the People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom started negotiating the future of Hong Kong in the late 1970s. The joint declaration signed in 1984 concerning the return of Hong Kong to China’s rule in 1997 triggered large emigration waves from Hong Kong in the late 1980s and 1990s. These emigrants, after years of largely stable economy and politics (with the exception of the turbulence in 1967, see Lo this volume), were generally well off and considered “reluctant exiles,” and they favored the Commonwealth countries due to colonial ties and economic connections. It may not simply be a coincidence that both Canada and New Zealand significantly strengthened their business immigrant programs respectively to accommodate, if not lure, these Hong Kong emigrants, who were the people sought most eagerly for admission into these four countries. The U.S. Immigration Act of 1990, for instance, treated Hong Kong as “a separate foreign state, and not as a colony or other component or dependent area of another foreign state” (U.S. Congress 1991, 4985) and provided an annual immigrant quota of 10,000 to Hong Kong for fiscal years 1991, 1992, and 1993.

The impacts of these contemporary immigration and refugee legislations on various localities, however, have been uneven. As in the past, Asian immigrants continue to concentrate in large metropolitan areas rather than rural areas. The large cities with traditional immigrant concentrations (e.g., Los Angeles, New York, Toronto, Vancouver, and Sydney), therefore, have experienced disproportionately higher concentrations of the new and more diversified immigration according to census data. Additionally, these metropolitan areas are more likely to be at the center of globalized capital, commodity, information, and personnel flows. In these favored global cities, changing structural conditions at the international scale offers economic opportunities, especially for new entrepreneurs (such as subcontractors and entrepreneurs specializing in international trade, finance, and manufacturing, including high-tech products) and specific segments of the labor force (including both the high-wage, high-skilled workforce and low-wage, low-skilled laborers).

Such metropolitan areas provide ideal geographic locations and stages for
ethnic entrepreneurs and laborers to create new types of ethnic economies, integrating into and becoming part of the restructured local economic fabric. These metropolitan areas often have large preexisting ethnic minority communities and ethnic economic structures, which lure ethnic newcomers (both entrepreneurs and laborers) and their investments. In fact, all the metropolitan areas covered by this book, with the exception of Northern Virginia, have strong traditions of Asian immigrant neighborhoods, such as Chinatown, or Little Tokyo/Japantown. These preexisting ethnic concentrations also provide consumer goods and cultural institutions that can meet the newcomers' needs. In other large metropolitan areas, known as “emerging gateway cities,” the influx of recent Asian immigrants also created new ethnic (economic) enclaves in both inner cities and suburban areas. It is against these backdrops that we are looking for the changing forms of ethnic communities in the large metropolitan areas of these four Pacific Rim countries, ranging from urban enclaves to ethnic suburbs.

Changing Ethnic Communities: From Urban Enclaves to Ethnic Suburbs

Different theoretical approaches have been used to explain the formation of ethnic communities. Varying spatial location, degrees of concentration, and forms of ethnic communities are good indicators of changing racial relations and socioeconomic environments. Historically, ethnic minority groups were forced to live in contained communities due to discrimination. Urban housing dynamics were underpinned by racial discrimination, which caused various degrees of diverse forms of spatial segregation in different countries. Changing political and socioeconomic situations have resulted in a range of ethnic spatial settlement patterns, from total dispersion to new forms of ethnic concentration. Both processes can transform ethnic communities as well as society at large.

Ethnic concentrations have traditionally taken two major forms: the ghetto and the enclave (Seig 1976). Both are the results of a combination of external push factors by the host society (prejudice and discrimination) and internal pull factors (ethnic solidarity and mutual interests), whose creation can be partially attributed to the receiving countries’ historical immigration policies. De jure and de facto discrimination forced racial minorities and immigrants to live in segregated, isolated communities. The ghetto is defined as “an urban residential district which is almost exclusively the preserve of one ethnic or cultural group. . . . where ethnic concentration results from discrimination” (Johnston 1994, 231). Enclaves are more complex, generally defined as “neighborhoods or sections of a community
whose key institutions and business enterprises owned and operated by members of an ethnic group cluster together” (Jaret 1991, 327). Therefore, on the one hand, the ghetto is mainly an ethnic residential area without an internal, functional, economic system controlled by the ethnic group, and it was likely to be located mainly in inner cities. On the other hand, the ethnic enclave operates as a social and economic complex within its own boundaries. Both external forces (including global economic restructuring, the duality of ethnic economy, the situations in immigrants’ origin countries, and national and local policies) and internal factors (like factionalism or solidarity within the community, community mobilization, and social change) cause the contemporary formation and transformation of urban and suburban ethnic enclaves.

In the meantime, a new form of ethnic settlement is also emerging: the “ethnoburb,” meaning “multiethnic suburb” (the two terms are used interchangeably hereafter). An ethnoburb is the spatial expression of a unique set of ethnic relations; it appears to be characterized by a unique spatial form and internal socioeconomic structure and involves interethnic group and intraethnic class differences and tensions. An ethnoburb is a suburban ethnic cluster of residential areas and business districts in a large metropolitan area. It is a multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural community in which one ethnic minority group has a significant concentration but does not necessarily comprise a majority of the total population. An ethnoburb is likely to have been created through the deliberate efforts of that group within changing demographic, socioeconomic, and political contexts in recent decades. It functions as a kind of settlement that replicates some features of an enclave and some features of a suburb that lacks a specific minority identity. Thus, by forming multiple clusters of urban and suburban ethnic settlements, ethnoburbs form an alternative type of ethnic settlement in contemporary urban areas and coexist with, but differ from, traditional ethnic ghettos and enclaves. This section will offer some thoughts on the transformation of suburbs, the formation of those ethnoburbs, and the positions of these ethnoburbs in the contemporary urban fabric, including their distinctions from traditional ghettos and ethnic enclaves.

**Transformation of Suburbs**

Many Asians, like other ethnic groups, moved to the suburbs in the twentieth century to secure better housing, school, and neighborhood environments. Some of these early minority suburbanites, including native-born generations and better-off immigrants, formed small-scale residential clus-
ters. During this stage, these clusters were more likely the result of a natural growth process. Soon after some pioneers moved to a particular neighborhood, their relatives and friends followed and bought properties in the same neighborhood, attracted by the same reasons that drew the pioneers. The reasons may have included affordability, newer housing tracts, good schools, a nice environment, and, last but not least, the original residents’ acceptance of the influx of minorities to their neighborhood. These early small concentrations may well have served as the predecessors and geographical cores of the more recent multiethnic suburb developments.

By contrast, the combination of changing geopolitical and global economic contexts and shifting immigration policies made it possible for ethnoburbs to take root and grow. The influx of immigrants and the new economic networks created by their arrival stimulated the formation and determined the particular location of an ethnoburb within a metropolitan area. Following the major immigration policy changes of the second half of the twentieth century, unprecedented numbers of Asians with a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds immigrated to the recipient countries that had recruited them via the various mechanisms described in the previous section. The traditional small-scale, congested inner-city ethnic enclaves could no longer house all the new immigrants. Many of them, including those who were wealthy and middle class, not only did not regard the often crowded and run-down neighborhoods in inner cities as good places to live, but they also had the financial resources to avoid living in those neighborhoods. They could afford the newer houses, nicer neighborhoods, and better schools that suburbs often offered, especially in North America. Because of the changing domestic social policies in the recipient countries, these new immigrants (unlike their predecessors in the nineteenth century) in most cases also had the freedom to choose where they lived within a metropolitan area.

As a result, many of these new immigrants settled directly in the suburbs without ever having experienced living in an inner-city ethnic enclave. Such was the case in the San Gabriel Valley, where waves of new Asian immigrants settled as soon as they arrived in America, partially because the valley already housed large numbers of ethnic Asians. In many high-tech areas, such as Silicon Valley and many New Jersey towns, immigrants (especially those high-tech professionals, including H-1B visa holders) settled in the suburbs to be close to their jobs and enable their offspring to enter the suburbs’ often superior school districts. The effects of chain migration played an important role in the further agglomeration of immigrants in such areas.
Regardless of the reasons for the increased ethnic presence in suburbs, this minority population, especially first-generation immigrants, created the demand for ethnic services, following the usual pattern: When the number of ethnic minority residents reached a critical mass, ethnic specific businesses and professional services (e.g., grocery stores; real estate agents; immigration, financial, and legal services; language schools; and travel agencies) were likely to open. As the ethnic population became more visible, as ethnic businesses prospered, and as the two reinforced each other by attracting a wide spectrum of new immigrants as residents and workers, tensions between longtime residents and ethnic newcomers would sometimes arise. As immigrants became citizens, many sought to actively participate in grassroots and electoral politics and engage in local social, cultural, and economic affairs. These conditions caused some of these suburbs to emerge as or to be transformed to ethnoburbs.

During this stage of ethnic suburb formation, there could be deliberate efforts on the part of the particular minority group to further the process of agglomerations. For example, ethnic real estate agents may have directed new immigrants there; similarly, ethnic financial institutions may have provided residential and business loans to these areas. Therefore, as the following chapters demonstrate, we have witnessed emerging small- to large-scale Asian residential and business clusters in inner cities and suburban areas along with similar forms of communities across city, regional, and even international boundaries. These communities form a new spectrum of different types of suburban Asian immigrant settlements—from ethnoburb, to residential or business cluster only, to no visible clusters at all. For instance, the phenomenon of “astronaut family” and “satellite/parachute kid”—parents keeping businesses in Asian countries while traveling across the Pacific and leaving their children to live in Los Angeles, Vancouver, or Auckland—was not uncommon.

On the other hand, such transformation of the suburbs also faces similar kinds of resistance from longtime local residents of various ethnic backgrounds. Sometimes this evolved into racialized incidents, and some eventually resulted in similar solutions. For instance, “monster houses,” large houses occupying the entire lot built by wealthy Asian immigrants in affluent suburbs, are a well-known and well-publicized issue in Los Angeles, Silicon Valley, Vancouver, and Auckland. As result of public debates, a few cities eventually passed local ordinances regulating what types of houses their residents could build (see chapters 5 and 7; see also P. S. Li 1994). In other areas (such as Northern Virginia; see chapter 1), in the meantime, even when no such ethnoburbs have formed, the impacts of ethnic business
clusters and cultural activities still contribute tremendously to the transformation of the suburban areas of these four Pacific Rim countries.

**Ethnic Suburbs in Society**

Ethnic suburbs have been replacing traditional inner-city enclaves as the more important “ports of entry” for new immigrants in some large metropolitan areas. Once established, ethnoburbs continue to grow and to diffuse spatially and develop socioeconomically. As a new type of ethnic concentration area, ethnoburbs occupy a unique position in the contemporary socioeconomic and political context and engage in all manner of social and economic relationships. Ethnoburbs are fully functional communities with their own internal socioeconomic structures that integrated to national and transnational networks of information exchange, business connections, and social activities. Compared to the old ethnic enclaves, ethnoburbs offer ethnic populations more space and diversified economic activities. Economic activities in ethnoburbs not only incorporate the ethnic economy in the traditional sense but also involve globalization of capital and international flows of commodities and of skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled labor as well as high-tech and managerial personnel.

The situation may vary among ethnic groups, depending on their population size, willingness to relocate, economic capacity, local response/resistance from the majority community, and promotion or restriction by government policies. Ethnoburbs are not the result of forced segregation into ghettos, but a voluntary concentration of ethnic people to maximize ethnic personal and social network and business connections and to create a place with familiar language and culture. The establishment of ethnic-owned and -operated businesses attracts more immigrants to live and seek jobs in suburban clusters. Increasing numbers of immigrants—who become entrepreneurs, laborers, and customers of ethnic businesses—strengthen the ethnic socioeconomic structure in ethnoburbs. Yet they may also increase potential tensions and conflicts between different classes within the ethnic group itself.

Ethnoburbs locate in suburbs with larger geographical areas, more ethnic population, and lower density than ghettos and enclaves. They may include many municipalities and unincorporated areas, instead of just blocks and sections in inner cities like most ghettos and ethnic enclaves. The percentage of ethnic people in ethnoburbs may be as low as 10–15 percent in some places, and they seldom become the majority of the community—although their presence can transform local residential composition and business
structure and imprint an undeniable ethnic signature on the local landscape. Both ethnic residences and businesses are relatively concentrated in ethnoburbs within identifiable clusters, but they are not highly concentrated in one single location. Ethnoburban residents are more polarized in terms of socioeconomic status and occupational structure than residents of ghettos and enclaves are. The formation and manifestation of ethnoburbs, therefore, involve not only racial conflicts between different ethnic groups but also class tensions within the ethnic group itself. Both wealthy and poor people live in these ethnoburbs, although often in different sections of one city or in different but nearby cities. Unlike those traditional ethnic neighborhoods of enclaves and ghettos—in which ethnic people are primarily inward looking and form self-contained communities—ethnoburbs are more open to the mainstream society as multiracial and multicultural suburbs. Unlike nonresidents who make occasional trips to inner-city enclaves like Chinatown or Koreatown to get some kinds of “exotic experiences” and go back to their white neighborhoods at the end of the day, ethnoburb residents are more likely to have minorities as their next-door neighbors, and their neighborhood stores may look like the shops in a Chinatown or Koreatown.

Given this mixed environment and daily contacts with people of different backgrounds, ethnic people in ethnoburbs look both inward and outward through their socioeconomic and political pursuits. They have more contact and interactions with other ethnic groups in terms of economic activities, social affairs, and political involvement. They are more actively involved in mainstream politics and community affairs than the residents of ghettos and enclaves. Ethnic people in ethnoburbs also maintain and exhibit their ethnic solidarity through the very establishment of the ethnoburbs. Once an ethnoburb is established, it becomes a new hub for the ethnic group and ethnicity is reinforced through a network of economic, social, and political relations. Although there are class differences and conflicts within the ethnic group, they often unite under the banner of group solidarity to fight for their rights whenever those rights are threatened. Cultivating an ethnic consciousness leads to growth and prosperity.

Traditionally, ethnic settlement forms (such as the ghetto and enclave) played peripheral roles in mainstream society. Seen as repositories of subaltern groups to be excluded and ignored, such areas were left alone to grapple with their concerns and problems. As broader circumstances at regional, national, and global levels shift dramatically, traditional models of ghetto and ethnic enclave as isolated communities can no longer fully explain the dynamics and linkages of contemporary ethnic settlements. Ethnoburbs
have become part of the reality in today’s urban areas. Ethnic suburbs offer ethnic minority people the opportunity to resist complete assimilation into the white cultural and social “norms” of the host society. More important, the ethnoburb model challenges the dominant view that assimilation is inevitable and the best solution for ethnic minorities. Keeping their identities and establishing distinctive communities, ethnoburban populations can nonetheless integrate into the host society through economic activities, political involvement, and community life. In doing so, these ethnic minority groups are transforming host societies.

Contents of This Book

In recent years, researchers have regarded international migration, also called “transnational migration,” as “an important transnational process that reflects and contributes to the current political configurations of the emerging global economy, . . . by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1995, 48). Hyndman and Walton-Roberts (2000) believe such transnational migration transcends or subverts the limits of the nation-state. In turn, some immigrants can be reclassified as “transmigrants” whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Blanc-Szanton 1994; Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992, 1995; Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000). Although the word transnational has been widely used since the 1960s, the application of the word to migration study and reinterpretation of immigration as a transnational process can be seen as a reflection of the broader trend of globalization, which involves both the increasing mobility of capital and population and the rise of the global city as nexus of flexible capital accumulation, communication, and control (Sassen 1988, 1994).

In contrast to traditional studies of immigrants and their impacts on society, which concentrate on unskilled and semiskilled manual laborers, recent works call for analyzing the international flows of highly skilled managerial personnel, professionals, and entrepreneurs. Their linkages to globalized financial flow and economies as the factors determining capital flow are seen to structure the global mobility of these concomitant transmigrants. Initially, such studies are more geared toward high-tech personnel and intracompany transferees who work for transnational companies that assign their personnel to different managerial posts in various parts
of the world (Koser and Salt 1997; Salt 1983, 1992, 1997). Increasingly, research also extends to capitalists, including entrepreneurs and their agents, as “such capitalists also migrate in the search for the best spatial location for investment, to develop markets” (Miles and Satzewich 1990, 345). In other words, such studies aim to deconstruct, as David Ley (2000) puts it, the myths of both immigrant “under-class” and “over-class.” A growing body of such new works also focuses on suburban areas in different countries, where increasing numbers of Asian immigrants settle and become active in community and economic lives while leaving their imprints and impacts (see, for instance, Dunn 1998; T. P. Fong 1994; Horton 1995; Ley 1998; P. S. Li 1992, 1998; W. Li 1998a, 1998b, 1999; Lo and Wang 1997; Saito 1998; Smith 1995; Wood 1997).

This book seeks to further enrich this study trend and is the first effort to focus exclusively on the Asian immigrant communities in multiethnic suburbs. It demonstrates the complexity of contemporary Asian immigrant and refugee groups and the richness of their communities in eight large metropolitan areas in four nations across the Pacific Rim. It documents how their transnational ties and networks have contributed to the transformation of the once “lily-white” suburbs to global ethnic suburbs in these global cities. Ethnic business landscapes often capture immigrants’ and refugees’ fond memories of thriving business meccas from their home countries (such as the Vietnamese in Northern Virginia, Hong Kong Chinese in Toronto, and Taiwanese Chinese in Los Angeles). However, it is the continuous flows and networks of population, capital, and information that fuel the emergence, sustainability, and growth of suburban Asian immigrant communities. For instance, all eight metropolitan areas have witnessed large inflows of Asian immigrants in recent decades. Also, transnational financial capital and financial institutions have played key roles in developing Chinese communities in Vancouver, Toronto, and Los Angeles and Asian communities in Flushing, New York.

This book’s nine chapters document the experiences of Asian immigrants, both rich and poor, and refugees, both old and new, whose communities vary from no identifiable residential cluster (the Vietnamese in Northern Virginia), to multiple residential and business clusters in both inner city and suburbs (the Koreans in Los Angeles), to the largest suburban Chinese residential and business concentration (the San Gabriel Valley of suburban Los Angeles) and high-tech mecca in the United States, if not the world (Silicon Valley, which has been and still is dependent on workers, professionals, and entrepreneurs of Asian descent).

Our journey starts on the East Coast of the United States. Portray-
ing Vietnamese Americans’ eighteen-year experiences of transforming a suburban shopping center in Northern Virginia from the somewhat run-down Plaza Seven Shopping Center to a vibrant ethnic business cluster and community center called Eden Center, Wood (chapter 1) describes a common path by which some immigrant entrepreneurs have contributed to the changing American commercial landscapes in both inner cities and suburbs and explores the meanings behind that contribution. Starting with leasing spaces in strip malls and shopping centers, ethnic entrepreneurs gradually added certain ethnic flavors and signatures, eventually converting some of these shopping centers to ethnically specific commercial entities. A similar process of ethnic commercial development reportedly also occurs in Atlanta, Georgia. Wood concludes, “Eden Center epitomizes how Americans have always reinvented ourselves and our spaces and places and landscapes, in this case on the most recent American settlement frontier, the multicultural suburb.”

From suburban Washington, D.C., we move north to New York City. The Flushing neighborhood—situated in Queens, one of the five New York boroughs—is technically not a suburb but nevertheless has experienced some of the same transformations caused by similar dynamics described in previous sections. Another New York neighborhood—Sunset Park in Brooklyn—reportedly has undergone a similar transformation process.4 In the fall 2001 local election, Flushing elected its first-ever Asian American, John Liu, to represent the neighborhood on New York’s city council. As the result of the 2004 election, the Flushing neighborhood sends a first-ever Asian American member to the New York State Assembly. Smith and Logan (chapter 2) update their previous work by demonstrating the social, economic, and political implications of demographic changes in the neighborhood in the 1990s, especially the “continuous white flight, black displacement, silent and hidden Hispanic population, and increasing pan-Asian spatial concentration.”

Our next three stops lie along America’s West Coast. No book discussing America’s changing demography and landscape could afford to skip Los Angeles and southern California in general. In chapter 3, therefore, I document the spatial, demographic, and socioeconomic transformations of the Chinese American community in Los Angeles—from traditional downtown Chinatown to a prototypical ethnoburb in the San Gabriel Valley in the eastern suburb of Los Angeles County. While downtown Chinatown continues to survive and thrive, the San Gabriel Valley has long surpassed its role as the “port of entry” for immigrants and the center for robust ethnic business activities. Capitalizing on Los Angeles’ proximity to the Pacific Rim and Asian countries, the Chinese community in the San Gabriel Val-
ley has grown and prospered largely due to continuous flows of people and their financial, human, and social capitals and thriving international trade. Chinese immigrants, however, are not a homogeneous group; they vary by place of birth and their socioeconomic status, and these have been sorted out by American housing dynamics. Thus, we see a somewhat “barbell-shaped” development: Chinese residential concentrations in both West and East San Gabriel Valley, with not much in between.

Chapter 4 is coauthored by two German geographers, Laux and Thieme, who spent most of their summer months in Los Angeles during the 1990s conducting extensive research on the Korean American communities. From their unique international and transnational perspective, they offer detailed analyses of the spatial distributions and fragmentations, social and economic characteristics, and ethnic affinity and community life of Korean Americans in both Los Angeles and Orange Counties (based on both census data analysis and telephone surveys). They illustrate the multiple Korean residential clusters in both downtown Koreatown and suburban communities, especially in the East San Gabriel Valley.

In the Silicon Valley chapter (chapter 5), Park and I, relying on our extensive fieldwork, document how the formation and growth of a high-tech region are interrelated with the transformation of local communities. This is partially due to Asian Americans’ roles, including both immigrants and native-born, as workers as well as residents. Initially drawn by high-tech jobs, these highly educated and well-paid Asian high-tech employees and entrepreneurs—along with low-skilled and low-paid high-tech assembly workers and their families and relatives following them—nevertheless have changed the local residential, commercial, educational, and political landscapes. This type of suburban community transformation (which can probably be named “ethno/technoburb” due to the nature of the region) can also been seen in other high-tech areas, such as Orange County and San Diego County, California; many places in New Jersey; Austin, Texas; and the Research Triangle area of North Carolina, all of which have experienced rapid growth of Asian American populations in recent decades.

We then move northward across the forty-ninth parallel. Lo (chapter 6) provides a detailed analysis of the Chinese and their internal differences in the Greater Toronto area. Toronto, the largest city in Canada, houses almost 40 percent of Canada’s Chinese. Lo’s analysis ranges from their settlement trajectories, socioeconomic differentiation, and landscape imprints, to labor market participation. Of particular interest is the innovative way Hong Kong Chinese have developed in terms of commercial property
ownership: “condo-style” retail space within shopping centers has prevailed in recent decades.

Edgington, Goldberg, and Hutton examine, in chapter 7, the immigration of Hong Kong Chinese to Vancouver and their changing locational preferences and impacts; the authors offer a case study of Richmond, a suburban municipality in Greater Vancouver. The chapter also evaluates the impacts of Hong Kong business migrants, often referred to as “immigrant overclass,” and the role of the subsidiary of one particular global bank with strong Hong Kong ties—the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC)—in facilitating the Hong Kong Chinese community in Vancouver and their transnational ties in Hong Kong and beyond. The Chinese communities in Vancouver and Los Angeles differ in many ways, but the situations in both these two locations nevertheless reveal that financial institutions with ethnic characteristics often play key roles in the transformation of American and Canadian suburbs to global ethnic suburbs in the era of globalization whose scope and degree are unprecedented and ever changing.

Our last two chapters lead us across the Pacific Ocean and “down south,” to Sydney, Australia, and Auckland, New Zealand. Dunn and Roberts (chapter 8) take us to a Sydney suburb, Cabramatta, outlining its social construction as an Indochinese Australian precinct. They examine the roles of the local Indochinese community, business owners, various organizations, and city council in the creation of an “Asian theme” in this neighborhood—both as cultural products and material changes reflected in changing local landscape and the social and cultural clashes associated with such changes.

In the last chapter of the book (chapter 9), Ho and Bedford document the historical and contemporary Chinese settlement in New Zealand’s largest city, Auckland. They analyze how changing immigration policies have impacted the Chinese population’s residential pattern, occupational structure, and community life in the past 150 years. In particular, they examine the changing residential and economic adaptation of the Auckland Chinese since 1986.

We come full circle as these nine chapters discuss the differential paths of place making or remaking by various Asian immigrant groups in eight metropolitan areas across four countries on the Pacific Rim. All these metropolitan areas are immigrant “Gateway Cities” in their respective countries and are at the forefront of changes brought by and debates associated with immigration. The book demonstrates the impacts of global, national, and local dynamics on Asian immigrants/transmigrants who, in turn, have transformed suburban demographic, socioeconomic characteristics, eco-
nomic and political structures, and local residential and commercial landscapes. These changes will continue so long as the processes of globalization, immigration, and transnational connections continue. Therefore, it is imperative that we recognize these changes in a comparative sense and that from each other’s experiences and lessons we learn to ease the racial, cultural, and class clashes associated with such transformations, to work for socioeconomic justice and political empowerment for all groups involved, and to make better living and working environments for all in these metropolitan areas and beyond.