Introduction

Asian Settler Colonialism in the
U.S. Colony of Hawai‘i

As indigenous peoples around the world continue to fight for their rights to their ancestral lands and self-determination, Native Hawaiians are engaged in their own struggles for national liberation from U.S. colonialism. It is no coincidence that in their own homeland, Hawaiians suffer from the highest rates of homelessness, unemployment, poverty, health problems, and incarceration for property crimes and substance abuse. Haunani-Kay Trask, a Native Hawaiian nationalist leader and professor of Hawaiian studies at the University of Hawai‘i, described Hawai‘i as a settler society in essays published in the early 1980s, later reprinted in her 1993 collection of essays, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i. Trask provides the following definition of settler colonialism.

Modern Hawai‘i, like its colonial parent the United States, is a settler society; that is, Hawai‘i is a society in which the indigenous culture and people have been murdered, suppressed, or marginalized for the benefit of settlers who now dominate our islands. In settler societies, the issue of civil rights is primarily an issue about how to protect settlers against each other and against the state. Injustices done against Native people, such as genocide, land dispossession, language banning, family disintegration, and cultural exploitation, are not part of this intrasettler discussion and are therefore not within the parameters of civil rights.

Other Hawaiian critiques of U.S. colonialism, including those by Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio, and Noenoe Silva, challenge settler historiography and legal discourse in their reexamination of the theft of Hawaiian sovereignty and land. It is in this settler colonial context that Asian Settler Colonialism reexamines the past and present roles that Asians have played in the U.S. colony of Hawai‘i.

For the past thirty years, the histories and stories of Asian ethnic groups in
Hawai‘i have been told primarily through ethnic studies and civil rights frameworks that emerged from the 1968–1969 Third World Strike at what was then San Francisco State College. The Third World Liberation Front (TWLF) brought together African American, Asian American, Latino/a, and American Indian campus groups demanding an autonomous ethnic studies program and community control over curricula and hiring. The TWLF drew critical connections between domestic civil rights struggles in the United States and international human rights struggles in imperial wars being fought in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In Hawai‘i, the anti-war movement and anti-eviction struggles at Kalama Valley, Waiāhole-Waikāne, and Chinatown led people to demand their own ethnic studies program at the University of Hawai‘i. As a historical event linking racism in the United States with U.S. imperialism, the Third World Strike reminds us that ethnic studies was founded on the pursuit of justice.

Read in the context of Hawaiian scholarship on U.S. colonialism, however, ethnic histories written about Asians in Hawai‘i demonstrate an investment in the ideal of American democracy that is ideologically at odds with indigenous critiques of U.S. colonialism. Although these historical accounts often recognize that Hawaiians have a unique political status as indigenous peoples, they do not address the roles of Asians in an American colonial system. Instead, they recount Asian histories of oppression and resistance in Hawai‘i, erecting a multicultural ethnic studies framework that ends up reproducing the colonial claims made in white settler historiography. In their focus on racism, discrimination, and the exclusion of Asians from full participation in an American democracy, such studies tell the story of Asians’ civil rights struggles as one of nation building in order to legitimate Asians’ claims to a place for themselves in Hawai‘i.

In the struggle to make the Ethnic Studies Program permanent on the University of Hawai‘i campus, for example, different ethnic groups employed a *terra nullius* argument of land in Hawai‘i being “empty” or “belonging to no one,” erasing Native peoples and places in order to celebrate their role in the “building” of the settler colony. A 1976 poster announcing an Ethnic Studies Program rally reads, “We working people of Hawai‘i cultivate the land and harvest the sea. We build every home, harbor, airport and industry. Through the centuries we’ve fought loss of lands, evictions, low pay, unemployment, and unsafe working conditions. Yes, we working people struggled for and built Hawaii!” In this and other accounts, the different ethnic groups lay a claim to Hawai‘i by claiming the labor that went into building the plantation system, the industries, the roadways, the shopping centers, the schools, and new subdivisions—in short, the physical manifestations of U.S. settler colonialism in Hawai‘i.

In his study of anti-Japanese racism in Hawai‘i from 1865 to 1945, Gary
Okihiro also argues that the struggles of Japanese in Hawai‘i, like those of other minority groups, have helped to make the United States a more egalitarian nation. He writes, “Their persistent resistance to hegemony was not a matter of mere survival but a struggle that resulted in a more democratic America.” In this way, the violence of American colonialism is ideologically transformed into “democracy,” masking the realities of a settler colony that continues to deny Native peoples their rights to their lands and resources. Moreover, Okihiro asserts a settler claim when he argues that Japanese laborers resisted their exploitation by permanently settling in Hawai‘i: “I contend that Japanese persistence in Hawaii, inasmuch as permanent settlement subverted the system of migrant labor, could be interpreted as resistance to an oppressive form of labor.” When we read Okihiro’s 1991 interpretation of Japanese settlement in the context of Hawai‘i’s history as a U.S. settler colony, however, we can see that this narrative of Japanese settlement and its affirmation of U.S. democracy actually serves the ends of the United States as a settler state and its occupation of Native lands.

In other accounts, Asian political and economic “successes” in Hawai‘i have been represented as evidence of Hawai‘i’s exceptionalism as a multicultural state, proof that Asians have been able to overcome the racist treatment and policies of the American sugar planters to form what several scholars have described as a “harmonious multiculturalism.” Many historians employ a developmental narrative that begins with the colonization of Hawaiians and ends with multicultural democracy in Hawai‘i. The story of multiethnic diversity is thus cast as the triumphant “resolution” to Hawai‘i’s colonial “past.” In one such study, Eileen Tamura constructs a generational model of Asian historiography in Hawai‘i: the first generation of ethnic histories dating from the 1920s through the 1960s largely written by white social scientists, the second generation of ethnic histories from the 1970s through the 1990s written by scholars about their own ethnic groups, and a third generation of ethnic histories from the 1990s that focuses on panethnic and mixed-ethnic “local” identity. In this trajectory, Tamura argues that second-generation scholarship on Hawaiian sovereignty has been succeeded by “seeds of a new generation of historical scholarship,” one that examines “panethnic ‘local’ identity that has derived from Hawai‘i’s century-long ethnically diverse society.” Such developmental accounts ignore Hawaiians’ ongoing struggles for self-determination as well as the tremendous political power some Asian groups have used against Hawaiians as documented in the essays in this book, and in doing so they demonstrate ideological continuities with white settler colonial historiography.

*Asian Settler Colonialism* calls for a methodological and epistemological shift away from predominant accounts of Hawai‘i as a democratic, “multicultural,” or “multiracial” state by showing us instead the historical and political conditions
of a white- and Asian-dominated U.S. settler colony. It is important to keep in mind that in 1969, at the same time that people of color were united in the Third World Strike, the struggles of American Indians and Hawaiians as indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands extended beyond a civil rights framework to challenge the very foundation of the U.S. settler state. American Indians who called themselves “Indians of All Tribes” were engaged in the second occupation of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay. Asserting American Indian title to the federal facility by right of discovery, American Indian activists at Alcatraz initiated the Alcatraz–Red Power Movement (ARPM), which led to seventy property takeovers in the ensuing nine years.14 Similarly in 1976, Hawaiians in the Protect Kahoʻolawe ‘Ohana (PKO) were engaged in their own re-occupation of the island of Kahoʻolawe, which had been used since World War II as a site for target practice by the U.S. military. Although some Asians, particularly Japanese Americans who were critical of the U.S. political system after their internment during World War II, supported American Indians at Alcatraz and Hawaiians at Kahoʻolawe in important ways, they used a framework of race and class struggle that did not account for the uniqueness of indigenous struggles for land or their own positions in a colonial context.15

In a landmark keynote address delivered at the 1997 Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States (MELUS) Conference, Trask specifically identified Asians in Hawaiʻi as settlers who benefit from the colonial subjugation of Hawaiians.16 We have reprinted in this book Trask’s more extensive essay titled “Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant’ Hegemony: ‘Locals’ in Hawaiʻi” (2000) where she describes the post–World War II rise of Asians in Hawaiʻi to political power and elaborates on the ideological narratives of immigration that Asian settlers use to claim Hawaiʻi for themselves.

Our Native people and territories have been overrun by non-Natives, including Asians. Calling themselves “local,” the children of Asian settlers greatly outnumber us. They claim Hawaiʻi as their own, denying indigenous history, their long collaboration in our continued dispossession, and the benefits therefrom. Part of this denial is the substitution of the term “local” for “immigrant,” which is, itself, a particularly celebrated American gloss for “settler.” As on the continent, so in our island home. Settlers and their children recast the American tale of nationhood: Hawaiʻi, like the continent, is naturalized as but another telling illustration of the uniqueness of America’s “nation of immigrants.”17

As Trask points out in her essay, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples distinguishes indigenous peoples from all others on a
particular land base by their indigenous human right to self-determination and self-government; minority populations do not possess this right. In other words, Hawaiians have the right as indigenous peoples to form their own nation; populations considered “minorities” in the U.S. settler state, like the Japanese or the Vietnamese, do not possess this indigenous right to form their own separate nations in Hawai‘i. Trask illustrates that the celebration of the “immigrant” success story—a story often used by Asian settler political representatives in Hawai‘i—is an attempt to legitimate Asian settler political power made possible by U.S. settler colonialism.

As Native scholars and activists argue in this book, Hawaiians are genealogically connected to their ancestral lands. Momiala Kamahele explains in her essay, “The land is our mother. Native Hawaiians call her Papahānaumoku—‘She who gives birth to lands.’ As caretakers, Native Hawaiians understand that . . . She creates and ensures a living continuity between the natural world and the human world.” Mixed-race Hawaiians are still genealogical descendants of the land despite their settler ancestries; to argue anything less is an act of colonial theft that takes Hawaiians’ genealogical heritage away from them. In the U.S. colony of Hawai‘i, Asians are settlers who come from their own ancestral homelands where their own genealogical ties lie.

A brief overview of historical events illustrates the colonial process that made possible large-scale Asian settlement in Hawai‘i. The Hawaiian peoples suffered a catastrophic population collapse due to diseases brought by foreigners: from an estimated eight hundred thousand to one million Native Hawaiians in 1778, the Hawaiian population plummeted to forty thousand in 1893, the year of the U.S. military overthrow of the Hawaiian government. Foreigners sought increasing control in the governance of Hawai‘i, and they were heavily influential in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1840 and the Māhele in 1848, which paved the way for foreign ownership of Hawaiian land. From the early 1850s white American settlers worked aggressively to secure Asian laborers to build their sugar empire. Hawai‘i was annexed by the United States in 1898 as a territorial colony, and a white Republican settler oligarchy ruled Hawai‘i politically and economically until the mid-twentieth century. In 1954, with the growth of labor unions and return of nisei (second generation) Japanese settlers who had joined the U.S. military during World War II, Japanese children of plantation laborers led the Democratic Party takeover of both houses of the Territorial Legislature. As George Cooper and Gavan Daws illustrate in their book Land and Power in Hawai‘i: The Democratic Years (1985), the Democrats gained popular support by promising land reform through land taxes and land-use laws that would benefit the working class, but historical records show that they ultimately promoted land
development and real estate deals that benefited the Asian and white settlers who came to comprise the political power structure in Hawai’i, thus ushering in a new era of Asian settler political ascendancy.21

Informed by the work of Trask and other Native scholars who critique the U.S. settler state, the contributors to Asian Settler Colonialism work collectively to examine Asian settler colonialism as a constellation of the colonial ideologies and practices of Asian settlers who currently support the broader structure of the U.S. settler state. The contributors investigate aspects of Asian settler colonialism from different fields and disciplines to illustrate its diverse operations and material impact on Native Hawaiians. The essays range from analyses of Japanese, Korean, and Filipino settlement, to accounts of Asian settler practices in state apparatuses, such as the Hawai’i State Legislature, the prison industrial complex, and the U.S. military, to critiques of Asian settler representations of their claims to Hawai’i in ideological apparatuses such as literature and the visual arts.

Since the focus of this book is the colonial context for indigenous struggles to regain lands and nation, the critical point of difference we emphasize is one that defines a settler state: the structural distinction between Natives and settlers. All Asians, then, including those who do not have political power, are identified in this book as settlers who participate in U.S. settler colonialism. Although Asians in Hawai’i are identified in academic disciplines as either “local Asians” or “Asian Americans,” we use the term “Asian settler” to emphasize the colonial context in which the essays in this book reexamine Asian settler occupation of Native lands. While “local” is sometimes used as a geographical marker to distinguish “local Asians” in Hawai’i from “Asian Americans” on the U.S. continent (as in the Japanese settler organization supporting Hawaiian struggles for self-determination, Local Japanese Women for Justice), it is more popularly used to establish a problematic claim to Hawai’i. Other groups in Hawai’i besides Asians can also be identified as settlers, but we leave it to those communities to identify their responsibilities to Hawaiians. The essays in Asian Settler Colonialism focus specifically on Asians in Hawai’i as settlers and the positions they occupy in relation to Hawaiians.

The critiques of Asian settler colonialism delivered by Asian settler scholars in this book do not dishonor the struggles of their grandparents and great-grandparents, the early Asian settler laborers who demonstrated tremendous courage and resourcefulness. As I will later illustrate, the sugar planters established the plantation as an economic base for an American settler colony by exploiting the unstable political and economic conditions in Asian nations resulting from American, British, Spanish, and Japanese imperialism. Hawai’i is described in historical accounts as a place that offered early Asian laborers economic opportunities, a political haven from universal conscription or political persecution, or a site from which
they believed they could better sustain nationalist struggles in their homelands. On the plantations, however, Asian laborers suffered under horrific conditions of anti-Asian racism. Referred to as “cattle,” viewed as “instruments of production,” and ordered as “supplies” along with “fertilizer,” many Asian laborers were flogged, beaten, imprisoned, and even killed on the plantations.22

Honoring the struggles of those who came before us, however, also means resisting the impulse to claim only their histories of oppression and resistance. The Asian settler scholars in this book are now working to restore other complex dimensions to the histories of the early Asian settlers and their descendants, ones that also acknowledge the ways that they are beneficiaries of U.S. settler colonialism. The early Asian settlers were both active agents in the making of their own histories and unwitting recruits swept into the service of empire.

As we are inspired by our family histories of struggle, we also recognize that the suffering of those who came before us does not change the fact that they entered into a settler colony, however temporary or permanent they imagined that settlement to be, and that the large-scale entry of Asians into Hawai‘i was made possible by U.S. settler colonialism. In a particularly telling way, much of Asian settler scholarship continues to privilege the United States as the center that defines Asians by their relationship to the white sugar planters. The status of Asians as settlers, however, is not a question about whether they were the initial colonizers or about their relationship with white settlers. The identification of Asians as settlers focuses on their obligations to the indigenous peoples of Hawai‘i and the responsibilities that Asian settlers have in supporting Native peoples in their struggles for self-determination.

In our work of mapping out the operations of Asian settler colonialism, we have also been able to identify a settler impulse to concede that Asians are settlers but to deny that all Asians have the political capacity to colonize Hawaiians. In these arguments, Asian settlers who are critical of the term “settler” attempt to make semantic distinctions between (1) the use of the term “settler” to refer to early groups of Asian laborers imported by the plantation owners or recent Asian immigrants who had and have no political power, and (2) the use of the term “Asian settler colonialism,” which implies being in possession of the political power to colonize. As settler studies scholars Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson argue, however, inherent in such distinctions is the “strategic disavowal of the colonizing act.”23 In Hawai‘i, the collapse of the Hawaiian population and subsequent displacement of Hawaiians physically, politically, and culturally have meant that the condition of being a settler is extricable from the processes of occupation and colonization, and as Johnston and Lawson argue, “Settlers are colonizers in an ineluctable historical and continuing relationality to indigenes and indigene-
ity.” According to these definitions, Asian settler colonialism can be said to commence with the arrival of the first Asian laborers who entered into Hawai‘i under the auspices of the white sugar planters’ Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society and occupied Native lands through colonial processes at a time when it was already a nation under siege by Western colonial powers. More recent immigrants, as I will later discuss, are settlers who enter into and occupy the colony of Hawai‘i by submitting to the laws set forth by the U.S. settler state.

Other material forces shaping Asian settler colonialism include what Eiko Kosasa, Dean Saranillio, and Peggy Choy describe in their work in this book as the indoctrination of Asian settlers by the “Americanization” movement during and after World War II mobilized by white settlers anxious over the growing Asian population in Hawai‘i. Although Eileen Tamura points out that Asians did not become the passive, subordinated workers that the Americanization movement sought to produce, the overall effect of the Americanization movement was unquestioning Asian settler support of the authority of the U.S. settler state. As Tamura points out, “Rather than seek to change the Anglo-American cultural and economic system, the Nisei sought to fit into it. Those who became successful believed in the American system and gained prominence by playing by its rules, not by challenging them.”24 As the arguments of these scholars show, Asian settler support of U.S. colonialism and what we identify as Asian settler colonialism was in place well before the post–World War II political ascendancy of Asian settlers, particularly Japanese and Chinese settlers, and their 1954 Democratic takeover of political power. The year 1954 instead marks a new dimension of an already established architecture of Asian settler colonialism and the legislative means by which Asian settlers not only assumed positions of colonial administration, but also perpetuated the subjugation of Hawaiians through state apparatuses.

The primary concern of this book, however, is Asian settler colonialism as it refers to the present participation of all Asians in Hawai‘i in U.S. settler colonialism through different kinds of settler practices, ranging from colonial administration to the routines of everyday life. As the contributors illustrate, all Asian settlers, including colonial administrators, artists, teachers, students, writers, journalists, scholars, and many others who do not see themselves as having a political role to play, support and engage in the U.S. colonization of Hawaiians. Asian settlers who support Hawaiian nationalists play a critical role in bringing about the structural transformation necessary for Hawaiian national liberation, but even supportive Asian settlers, like the contributors to this collection, will continue to benefit from and be a part of the larger system of U.S. settler colonialism until Hawaiians regain their lands and nation. Only by achieving such justice can Asian settlers liberate themselves from their roles as agents in a colonial system of violence.
There are, of course, different Asian settler groups, and the intrasettler racism and discrimination they are subjected to illuminate the complex relations of power among settler groups. Some Asian groups, like Filipinos, remain politically and economically subordinated in Hawai‘i, and anti-Filipino racism in Hawai‘i is a legacy of Spanish, American, and Japanese colonial violence and occupation of the Philippines. Situating Filipino experiences of racial profiling and discrimination in a colonial framework, however, Dean Saranillio has argued that although Filipinos seek to empower their communities, they do so as settlers in a colonial system. Saranillio writes, “I argue that our current strategy of empowerment does not disrupt the colonial power structures oppressing Native Hawaiians and instead reinforces colonialism by making use of American patriotic narratives.” 25 In his essay in this book he argues, “Because the United States invaded Hawai‘i, Filipinos, like other settlers who immigrated to Hawai‘i, live in a colonized nation where the indigenous peoples do not possess their indigenous human right to self-determination, and because of this Filipinos are settlers.” Similarly, Asians who are received in Hawai‘i and the United States under U.N. definitions of political refugees, like the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong, do not have political power yet are still settlers in relation to Hawaiians. For Asians who settle in Hawai‘i because of histories of colonization in their own homelands, the violence of their own political displacement, in some cases as a result of American military intervention and occupation, only reinforces more strongly our critique of colonialism and its global effects.

As in every settler state, there are differences and power relations that cut across settler populations, between white settlers and nonwhite settlers, among Asian settler groups, between working-class settlers and the settlers who make up the more privileged classes. Vietnamese settlers, for example, occupy a socioeconomically and politically disadvantaged position compared to Japanese settlers. Nevertheless, an analysis of settler colonialism positions indigenous peoples at the center, foregrounding not settler groups’ relationships with each other or with the U.S. settler state, but with the indigenous peoples whose ancestral lands settlers occupy. To focus only on the obvious differences among settlers evades the question of settlers’ obligations to indigenous peoples. As Eiko Kosasa has argued, “Native Hawaiians are the indigenous people of the islands. It is their nation that is under U.S. occupation; therefore, only Native Hawaiians are colonized. The rest of the population, including myself, are settlers regardless of our racial heritage.” 26

The essays in this book call our attention to the importance of distinguishing Natives from settlers in Hawaiians’ struggle for political justice, and in doing so the contributors join indigenous and settler scholars and activists in Australia and the United States in reexamining the positions of immigrants in settler states. 27 Trask’s
work and the essays in this book point out new directions for foundational as well as recent studies of settler states by scholars such as Donald Denoon, Ronald Weitzer, Daiva Stasiulis, Nira Yuval-Davis, Patrick Wolfe, David Pearson, Anna Johnston, Alan Lawson, Caroline Elkins, Susan Pedersen, and Annie Coombes.28 In their work, these scholars differentiate conventional, dependent, or franchise colonies like India from settler colonies (later settler states) such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States: in conventional colonies, the metropole directs the “outpost” of the colony, which is maintained by a small apparatus of colonial administrators scattered throughout the territory whose power is enforced by the colonial military presence; by contrast, in settler colonies, settlers occupy Native land and rewrite its history as their own. They institute political infrastructures that are designed to benefit settlers economically and politically and to subjugate and eliminate indigenous peoples. As Patrick Wolfe has argued,

The primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself rather than the surplus value to be derived from mixing native labour with it. Though, in practice, Indigenous labour was indispensable to Europeans, settler-colonization is at base a winner-take-all project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but replacement. The logic of this project, a sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the Indigenous population, informs a range of historical practices that might otherwise appear distinct—invasion is a structure not an event.29

Such historical practices range from the Australian settler-colonial policy regarding blood quantum that excluded a substantial proportion of mixed-race Aboriginal peoples from the category of “Aboriginal” to settler claims to academic authority over indigenous culture used to rationalize state policies, including the abduction of Aboriginal children for the assimilationist purpose of “breeding them white”—all practices that illustrate what Wolfe terms “the logic of elimination.” What is crucial here is Wolfe’s argument that invasion is not simply an event that can be relegated to the past; invasion continues to be constitutive of the very structure of the settler state and its persistent, institutionalized policies of elimination.

As these scholars illuminate the ways that settler states are products of specific material histories and economic systems, some have been highly ambivalent about articulating the roles of immigrants in settler states like Australia and the United States. Because Asians in these non-Asian settler states have been historically subjected to state racism, scholars like David Pearson use what he calls an “analytic triangle” of “aboriginal/settler/immigrant” to represent “immigrants” as occupying a third space that exempts them from colonial responsibilities. Pearson’s logic in constructing such a triangle is premised on his conception of the United States as a “post-settler locale,” a conclusion derived from his assumption that the “place of aboriginality” in the United States, “given the scale of competing ethnic
categories, has a far more muted presence.” Similarly, Ronald Weitzer contends that the United States is no longer a settler state because “in the United States and Australia, the indigenous population was forcibly displaced and largely eliminated.” Pearson and Weitzer ideologically construct the presence of indigenous peoples as “muted” or “eliminated” in ways that fail to acknowledge their ongoing forms of resistance, and in this way the “vanishing Indian” thesis manifests itself in new ways by representing Native peoples as “disappearing” into a “multicultural” society. Wolfe has critiqued such settler constructions of multiculturalism, underscoring the “primary Indigenous/settler divide”: “cultural pluralism is itself celebrated by an assimilationist discourse that seeks to lose Indigenous specificity in amongst the ethnic heterogeneity of immigrant populations.” As Haunani-Kay Trask argues in her essay in this book, the failure to identify immigrants in settler states as settlers makes possible the historical fantasy of settler states evolving into “multicultural nations.”

In their essays here, Hawaiians demand a recognition of the distinction between Natives and settlers of color, and they stand united with other indigenous peoples all over the world, including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia who also differentiate themselves from ethnic minorities. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have rights to ancestral lands that have been formally recognized in the High Court of Australia’s 1992 Mabo decision, which acknowledged for the first time Native title to lands colonized by the British. Des Williams, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commissioner (ATSIC) in 2002, states, “We want recognition of our attachment and ownership of this country. Not just as another ethnic group but as a peoples synonymous with this country.” Peter Yu, an organizer of Yawru and Chinese descent who has worked at state, national, and international levels on behalf of indigenous communities, further explains, “First, indigenous Australians are, at a fundamental level, part of the modern Australian nation. Within that nation we have a particular position, for we are Australia’s Indigenous people. We are not just another minority ethnic group: we are the first people of this land, and we continue to have our own internal systems, of law, culture, land tenure, authority and leadership.”

These arguments on the part of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have influenced the work of scholars in Australia who have also begun to identify Asians as settlers. Ien Ang, Ann Curthoys, and John Docker have argued that although Asians in Australia do not have political power, they are still settlers in relation to indigenous peoples. In her more recent work, Ang points out that the “opening” of Australia to Indochinese refugees, to “non-European—especially Asian—new settlers,” implicates them in the colonial process, and Asian settlers have their own responsibilities toward indigenous peoples. Ang writes, “Indeed, non-white migrants have their own moral obligation to work through their rela-
tionship to Indigenous Australia. “In her own analysis of the differences between indigenous peoples and immigrants that are leveled either by subsuming indigenous peoples into the “multicultural” or incorporating nonwhite immigrants into the “postcolonial,” Curthoys concludes, “The continuing presence of colonialism has implications for all immigrants, whether first-generation or sixth. All nonindigenous people, recent immigrants and descendants of immigrants alike, are beneficiaries of a colonial history. We share the situation of living on someone else’s land.” Docker states simply, “For Aboriginal peoples, migrants are another set of invaders, not brothers and sisters on the margins, not the fellow oppressed and dispossessed.”

The work of these Australian settler scholars is critical in pointing to the ways that the status of Asians as settlers is not defined by their political power but by their relationship to indigenous peoples in a settler state. Asian Settler Colonialism takes this argument as its premise, but it also expands upon the work being done in settler studies by analyzing the historical and political specificities of a settler colony where some Asian settler groups have come to share colonial power with white settlers. Asian settlers in Hawai’i dominate state institutions and apparatuses, and their legislation and public policies sustain the U.S. settler state. The Native and settler contributors to this book, like other scholars engaged in critiques of empire, map out the present practices of Asian settler colonial administrators in Hawai’i as symptomatic of more widespread settler colonial dynamics. They identify Asian settlers who have obstructed Hawaiians’ efforts to regain self-determination, whether in their capacities as U.S. senator, state legislator, governor, director of public safety, or high-ranking military officer. Other contributors examine the colonial practices of Asian settlers who have taken on positions on state boards and committees administering Hawaiian trust assets and issues of self-determination, including Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and the Akaka Task Force.

In other, less overtly political ways, Asian settlers in Hawai’i actively participate in the dispossession of Hawaiians through their daily identification with and participation in the U.S. settler state. Karen K. Kosasa points out in her essay that each Asian settler has a responsibility toward Native peoples. Asian settler colonialism is as much about the inertia and cynicism that perpetuate current colonial conditions as it is about the aggressive assault on Hawaiian rights. She writes,

Although many long-time settlers in Hawai’i are critical of the ways the land has been overbuilt by real estate developers and overrun by commercial enterprises, disentangling ourselves from the resulting “amenities” is no easy task. As settlers, many of us are reluctant, even unwilling, to consider how the pleasures of everyday life—dining out, shopping in malls, watching television, and
living in suburban communities—can be part of a larger colonial problem. How can these seemingly innocent activities be “hegemonic”? 41

As Kosasa illustrates, Asian settler power and privilege have become so naturalized in our lives that that they have become invisible to many in Hawai‘i. Each Asian settler, however, is implicated in practices that support existing conditions of U.S. colonialism.

As the essays in this book map out the interlocking state apparatuses of colonial power Asian settlers support and maintain, they also raise questions for Asian settlers about what they can do to change the colonial practices of their own Asian settler communities. The contributors seek to move settlers beyond the paralysis of guilt to an active participation in the struggle for political justice. They map out the colonial and racist practices in Asian settler communities and the U.S. settler state in order to provide Asian settlers with opportunities for intervention and transformation. It is in identifying the United States not as a multicultural democracy but as a settler state that we can more effectively work toward justice for Native peoples and, by extension, for settlers as well.

Some of the essays in this collection do not specifically address Asian settler colonialism in Hawai‘i, but they sketch out the larger architecture of U.S. settler colonialism that Asian settlers sustain: these include Mililani Trask’s historical outline of the United States’ violation of Hawaiians’ right to self-determination, David Stannard’s examination of interlocking social service organizations that blame Hawaiians for their health crises, and Kyle Kajihiro’s account of the impact of militarism on Hawai‘i and resistance to it. These essays resonate with and amplify arguments made elsewhere in the book that specifically outline Asian settler colonial practices. When Mililani Trask argues that Native initiatives for Hawaiian sovereignty like Ka Lāhui arose in response to the failure of the Democratic Party to resolve Hawaiians’ land claims and demands for self-determination, her arguments enlarge upon Eiko Kosasa and Ida Yoshinaga’s critique of the Japanese American Citizens’ League (JACL), its defense of U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye, and its operation in service of the Asian settler-dominated Democratic Party. Similarly, Kajihiro’s critique of the militarization of Hawai‘i recasts our understanding of the “iconography of the World War II nisei vet” largely celebrated as proof that military service enabled Japanese Americans to overcome racial discrimination. Instead, as Kajihiro argues, the mythologizing of the 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team “oversimplifies the complex convergence of events and factors that enabled local Japanese to gain power in post–World War II Hawai‘i, and it obscures the tragic consequences of this development for Kānaka Maoli.” David Stannard’s arguments about the settler colonial public policies of social service organizations also take on new dimensions when we consider Eiko
Kosasa’s argument that county, state, and federal officials in Hawai‘i are largely Japanese.42

This collection by Native and settler scholars is not a study or survey of the Hawaiian movement for self-determination, and we urge readers to seek out an extensive body of such works by Hawaiian scholars and activists. The focus of this book is an investigation of Asian settler political practices and ideologies, and the essays here by Haunani-Kay Trask and Mililani Trask that describe Ka Lāhui as a Native initiative for a self-determined sovereignty do so in order to critique present conditions where Asian settlers authorize themselves to sit on state committees and task forces that determine the future for Hawaiians. Their accounts of a Native initiative show us what Hawaiian self-determination would look like without the interference of Asian settlers or the limitations of settler interests.

The essays in Asian Settler Colonialism recast and reframe critically our knowledges and the scholarship and practices we engage in. They afford us a new vision of the world, and they demand of Asian settler scholars and readers an interrogation of their interests as settlers and the material consequences of their practices. This interrogation is critical to understanding the system of settler colonialism within which political injustices are reproduced and to seeking out ways of transforming our roles as settlers within it.

The Political Stakes behind the Native/Settler Distinction

On November 23, 1993, Congress passed U.S. Public Law 103-150, also known as the Apology Resolution, which states unequivocally, “The Congress apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination.” Despite the passage of this law, white and Asian settlers have launched multiple legal assaults against Native entitlements and compensatory programs. Legal cases such as Rice v. Cayetano, Arakaki et al. v. the State of Hawai‘i, and Arakaki et al. v. Lingle have sought to take from Hawaiians what entitlements remain to them after the American military-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian government in 1893. In these cases, white and Asian settlers use civil rights arguments to assert that there are no distinctions between Natives and settlers and that any “preference” given to Native peoples constitutes racial discrimination against non-Hawaiians. In this section, I analyze the arguments that settlers use to equate themselves with Natives in these lawsuits to illustrate the ways that civil rights arguments are often used against Native peoples.43

Under these lawsuits’ colonial classifications of Hawaiians as a racial group,
Native accounts of a genealogical relationship with land are dismissed as “metaphorical.” Contributors Haunani-Kay Trask, Mililani Trask, Momiala Kamahele, Healanil Sonoda, ku’ualoha ho’omanawanui, and Kapulani Landgraf challenge these dismissals and call for a political acknowledgment of Hawaiians’ genealogical, familial relationship with land in Hawai‘i. In their arguments we can see the complex significance of land as an ancestor that unites the Hawaiian people while feeding and sustaining their anticolonial resistance. Kahikina de Silva has described Hawaiian nationalists as “‘āipōhaku,” or “rock eaters.”

The term ‘āipōhaku is not used lightly. . . . The eating of stones is not smooth and easy. Gleaning sustenance from them does not make you fat like the kōlea bird that visits Hawai‘i each winter. But as such unyielding, solid creatures, pōhaku are also the hardened, congealed essence of Papa herself and of the land that makes us kānaka. . . . Those who do, whose mouths eat rock, consequently speak with the solidity and mana of the pōhaku they have absorbed. And, when appropriate, they may even spit those rocks at deserving audiences. The voices of such ‘āipōhaku, Trask included, are unmistakable. In an age of dislocation they remind their peers and pōki‘i that land is not simply a locale; it is our connection to each other, to ancestors gone and descendants to come. And they work endlessly to convince others to politically acknowledge this connection.44

De Silva’s description of Hawaiian political protests resonates with the 1893 anti-annexation song “Kaulana Nā Pua,” originally titled “Mele ‘Ai Pōhaku” (Rock-eating song). In de Silva’s words and in the song we can see the way in which land is central to Hawaiians’ survival as a people.

By contrast, settler lawsuits claim that in an American democracy Hawaiians’ indigenous rights to land and resources jeopardize democratic ideals of “justice for all.” They illustrate precisely what happens when settlers equate themselves with Natives. In the most egregious of ironies, settlers proclaim that Native Hawaiians are depriving them of their civil rights, but they do so in order to use the argument of equal rights to take from Natives their rights and resources as indigenous peoples. In 1996 attorneys representing Harold “Freddy” Rice argued that it is unconstitutional for the state to restrict voting to Hawaiians only in elections for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). OHA is a state office charged with disbursing the monies generated by nearly two million acres of “ceded” lands that are held in “trust” by the State for the Hawaiian people.45 Rice’s attorneys used the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from abridging the right to vote based on race, to argue that the elections deprived Rice of his civil rights. In 2000 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rice, forcing OHA to open its elections
to non-Hawaiians. As a result of the *Rice v. Cayetano* decision, other lawsuits followed. *Arakaki et al. v. the State of Hawai‘i* (2000) claimed that the *Rice* decision gave non-Hawaiians the right to run in elections for OHA trustees. The district judge ruled in favor of Arakaki, and Charles Ota, a Japanese settler who was a 442nd Regimental Combat Team veteran, a member of the Land Use Commission, and an investor in real estate partnerships, was elected to office.\(^6\) In a March 2002 lawsuit, *Arakaki et al v. Lingle*, the attorneys who filed the suit argued that OHA, the Hawaiian Homes Commission, and the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands programs are unconstitutional because they are race-based and discriminate against non-Hawaiians.\(^7\)

If the language of equal rights and “our democracy” was used for settler colonial purposes by the U.S. Supreme Court in the *Rice* case to level the differences between Natives and settlers, Asian settlers also revealed their own political interests in erasing those differences. In response to the *Rice* decision, former governor Benjamin Cayetano, a Filipino settler, stated publicly, “I’ve lived in Hawai‘i long enough to feel I’m Hawaiian.”\(^6\) In Hawai‘i, where the word “Hawaiian” is used in reference to those of Hawaiian ancestry, such a statement in and of itself seems merely comical, but Cayetano’s remark was politically motivated: as Ida Yoshinaga and Eiko Kosasa point out in their essay, he was acting on the advice of U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye by appointing a Japanese settler as interim OHA trustee following the *Rice* ruling. Charles Ota, the appointee, was also quoted in the media as saying, “I am of Japanese ancestry, but I feel I have been Hawaiian all my life.”\(^9\) Cayetano’s and Ota’s statements thus illustrate how Asian settlers attempt to “indigenize” themselves to protect their political investments in settler control over Native peoples and resources.

As these cases illustrate, an emphasis on “race” and civil rights has historically obscured the political category of the “indigenous” and a long history of Native peoples’ struggles for national liberation. As Asian settlers in Hawai‘i continue to struggle against different forms of intrasettler racism and discrimination, they can do so with a broader awareness of the effects that civil rights arguments have had for Native peoples. On one register, the erosion of civil rights by the Bush administration in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon takes place in a larger colonial context where legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act (2001) has been used by the colonial state to target not only peoples of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, but Native peoples who speak out against U.S. colonialism.\(^5\) On another register, as Kamahele illustrates in her essay, Asian and white settlers have used civil rights arguments in their attempts to revise the Hawai‘i State Constitution to take from Hawaiians their statutory and constitutional rights to gather resources of the land for Hawaiian cultural practices. The essay by Kosasa and Yoshinaga further examines the ways that Asian settler
community organizations like the JACL have used civil rights arguments against Hawaiian nationalists who are critical of Japanese political power.

The Colonial Apparatus of the Sugar Plantations and Asian Settler Labor

Extensive Asian settlement in Hawai‘i was made possible by American colonial efforts to secure a labor base for a settler plantation economy. The Kōloa Plantation was established in 1835, and as the first large-scale sugar plantation in Hawai‘i it intensified foreigners’ desire for title to Native lands. As Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa has argued, “Recently, much attention has been focused on the 1893 overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani and the demise of the Hawaiian monarchy. But the real loss of Hawaiian sovereignty began with the 1848 Māhele, when the Mo‘i and Ali‘i Nui lost ultimate control of the ‘Āina.” The Māhele instituted a devastating transformation from traditional communal land tenure to private ownership of land. As Kame‘eleihiwa’s research shows, the Ali‘i Nui believed the Māhele would end the collapse of the Hawaiian population and protect their sovereignty, but those who benefited most were the white political advisers who later started their own plantations.

Thus by 1852, when the first major contract labor group of Chinese arrived in Hawai‘i, the Hawaiian Kingdom was already a nation in distress under Western forces of colonialism. As the Hawaiian population continued to plummet, the sugar planters sought to build their empire by securing Asian laborers from China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. The planters found that British, American, Spanish, and Japanese acts of imperial aggression created social and political conditions in Asia that helped to facilitate their own efforts in the building of an American settler colony in Hawai‘i.

The Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society was established by the sugar planters in 1850, and it quickly focused on the recruitment of labor from China. In the late 1830s British “gunboat diplomacy” had forced China to open its ports to trade, and Chinese efforts to end the British trafficking of opium into China as well as conflicts over British demands for extraterritoriality led to China’s losses in the Opium War (1839–1842) and the Anglo-Chinese War (1856–1860). These international conflicts, the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), and other instances of local warfare proved to be devastating for millions of Chinese peasants. Under these conditions, the Chinese government allowed the recruitment of contract labor, and by 1882 the Chinese constituted almost a quarter of the population of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Because the Chinese left the plantations after they had worked off their contracts, many Americans perceived them to be an economic threat, while others attributed the spread of leprosy and smallpox to them.
Anti-Chinese sentiment grew with the increased influx of Chinese redirected to Hawai‘i after the United States passed the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, and successive regulations restricting Chinese immigration were enacted in Hawai‘i.55 The sugar planters then turned to securing laborers from Japan.

American gunboat diplomacy had also forced Japanese ports open in 1853, and the Japanese government saw that like China, it, too, was vulnerable to attack by British and American imperial forces. Japan launched a massive program of modernization, rapid industrialization, militarization, and imperialism financed by a new land taxation system that took a tremendous toll on landowners, tenant farmers, and agricultural laborers. The Japanese national slogan during the Meiji period (1868–1912), “Fukoku kyohei” (Enrich the nation, strengthen the military), also shaped the Japanese government’s imperialist policies.56 Under colonial duress, Kalākaua sought to preserve Hawaiian sovereignty from American imperialist interests in 1881 through proposals to Emperor Meiji for a Japan-led “Asiatic federation” including Hawai‘i, the betrothal of the Japanese prince to his niece, Princess Ka‘iulani, and the immigration of Japanese laborers to Hawai‘i.57 The emperor declined the proposals to avoid jeopardizing Japan’s hopes for treaty revisions with Western powers, but as Eiko Kosasa reminds us, the Japanese government later considered its emigrating citizens as part of its “peaceful expansion” policy.58 The first government-sponsored laborers arrived in Hawai‘i in 1885.59 By 1900 Japanese settlers constituted the largest settler group in Hawai‘i, resulting in growing debates over “the Japanese Question.”60 U.S. territorial leaders, planters, and the white settler population grew increasingly anxious over the growing collective organizing power of Japanese labor, conflicts with Japan over Japanese voting rights in Hawai‘i, and rumors about Japan’s plans to annex Hawai‘i.61 White laborers proved to be too expensive, and laborers from Puerto Rico, weakened by famine and poverty, were deemed by the planters as “unsatisfactory.” The planters sought to return to recruiting Chinese labor, but U.S. annexation in 1898 had made Hawai‘i subject to the Chinese Exclusion Act barring the immigration of Chinese.62 The planters then turned to Korea as a cheap source of labor.

Japanese gunboat diplomacy, in turn, had forced Korea to sign the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa, which was modeled on the treaties that Japan and China had been forced to sign by the British and Americans.63 Korean nationalism emerged out of Korean resistance to Japanese and Western aggression, and although this resistance had spread throughout the country since 1876, the 1894 Tonghak Rebellion was critical in establishing a grassroots base of national resistance as poor farmers rose up against the imperialist economic policies of Western and Japanese foreign powers, excessive taxation of peasants, and the instability of the Korean government.64 In response to the Tonghak Rebellion, the Korean government requested Chinese military aid. The Japanese responded by sending their own troops into Korea, and
Japan wrested control of Korea from China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The Japanese had defeated the Tonghak army, but the Japanese assassination of Queen Min in 1895 mobilized the activities of the Uibyong (Righteous Army) and its armed struggle against the Japanese. In 1902 the sugar planters enlisted the aid of Horace N. Allen, the American minister to Korea, who convinced Emperor Kojong that supporting American economic interests by setting up an emigration bureau in Korea would help to maintain Korean independence in the face of Japanese imperialism and provide economic relief for Koreans suffering from the effects of famine, a cholera epidemic, and armed conflict. The first Korean laborers arrived in Hawai‘i in 1903. Two years later, however, the Korean government prohibited emigration to Mexico and Hawai‘i due to reports of Korean laborers being mistreated in Mexico. Japan pressured Korea to close the emigration bureau so that Japan could protect Japanese workers in Hawai‘i whose organized work stoppages were being undermined by the planters who hired Korean laborers to replace them. The Philippines became an increasingly attractive new source of labor for the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA).

The HSPA’s recruitment of Filipino laborers illustrates the interlocking operations of American imperialism in Hawai‘i and the Philippines. The Philippines had struggled against Spanish colonial domination for more than three centuries. In the nineteenth century peasants defined their struggles against Spanish/Catholic rule in people’s movements, from that of the Cofradia de San Jose in the early 1840s to the Santa Iglesia in the 1890s. These movements, the Propaganda Movement (1880–1890) for reform, and armed revolt by the Katipunan founded in 1892 led to the Philippine Revolution in 1896. On June 12, 1898, the Philippines declared its independence, but the United States had also entered into the Spanish-American War, and by the terms of the U.S. peace treaty with Spain, the latter ceded the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the United States for $20 million. President William McKinley felt that Filipinos were “unfit for self-rule” after their war with the Spanish, and Filipino nationalists engaged in guerilla warfare to regain control over their nation. One million Filipinos were killed or died from disease as a result of the Philippine-American War. Under American occupation, independent farmers unable to pay rising taxes lost titles to their land, and caciques demanded increasing shares from tenant farmers. In 1906 Albert F. Judd, a member of the oligarchy that overthrew the Hawaiian government, was sent to negotiate with the Philippine Commission governed by William Howard Taft (U.S. president, 1909–1913) for permission to allow the HSPA to recruit Filipino laborers. That same year Filipino laborers arrived in Hawai‘i, moving from their own colonized homeland to another colonized space, from one American colony to another.

As these global events and forces indicate, the exodus of Asian laborers from...
their ancestral homelands and their occupation of Hawai‘i were shaped by both
U.S. settler colonialism in Hawai‘i and imperial contests for control in Asia. The
plantation system itself was both a colonial enterprise and a racist system that
exploited Asian laborers. As Gary Okihiro has argued, the system of migrant labor
was essentially anti-Asian because “it was designed to control and exploit the pro-
ductive labor of Asians and then to expel them when their utility had ended.” 71
Asian laborers were forced to work under conditions that white settlers publicly
acknowledged were intolerable for white laborers. In 1921 Walter Dillingham
(1875–1963), later hailed by settlers as “Hawaii’s greatest builder” because of his
role in the dredging and construction of Ala Moana Shopping Center, Pearl Har-
bor, and Honolulu International Airport, explained that white laborers would not
migrate to Hawai‘i from the U.S. continent because they could not be expected to
do the work that God had created peoples of “variegated colors” to do.72

I provide this overview of early Asian settlement to illustrate that it is not
colonial intent that defines the status of Asians as settlers but rather the histori-
cal context of U.S. colonialism of which they unknowingly became a part. Other
Asian settlers recount their family histories of social and political activism but do
so within the framework of U.S. colonialism and the complicity of their families
as settlers in the growth of a U.S. settler colony. Peggy Choy’s own family is widely
respected for their commitment to political justice in Hawai‘i, and in her essay in
this volume she explains the complexity of recognizing the accomplishments of
her Korean settler family.

My own family’s stories took place not on their own soil but on Hawaiian soil.
They did admirable things for their own community as well as for the home
country. However, they were living at a time when the islands were going
through a transition from territory to state, a time during which U.S. colonial
control over the islands was made more complete. The wider context of colo-
nial domination cannot be ignored. The legacy of their own lives—as ethically
as they lived—was tainted with unavoidable complicity.73

The oppression of the early Asian settlers does not change the irreducible,
substantive issue of indigenous claims to land and nation. Settler arguments that
criticize the “essentialism” of the terms the “Native” and “settler” or, worse yet,
accuse Native peoples of their own complicity in their colonization fail to address
this critical issue of indigenous claims to land and nation. At the same time, Asian
settlers who argue that the identification of Asians as settlers “oversimplifies” his-
torical “nuances” actually register the ways that Asian settler complicity becomes
lost in demands for “complexity.” Furthermore, it is the identification of Asians as
settlers that in fact involves a more complex analysis of colonial power in Hawai‘i
and Asian settlers’ maintenance of the colonial system from their differing locations within it.

As kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui argues in her essay in this book, Asian settlers cannot insert themselves into a genealogy of the land in Hawaiʻi, no matter how long they have lived on it or how much they or their ancestors have suffered on it. Asian settlers have their own long and rich genealogical ties elsewhere, as Eiko Kosasa explains.

I am a sansei whose grandfather journeyed to Hawaiʻi in 1898 from Iwate Prefecture in northern Japan. After Tokugawa Ieyasu seized the Ōsaka Castle in the early 1600s, my ancestors fled Ōsaka and settled in the Iwate area where they lived for 400 years. Prior to that they lived in the Ōsaka area for many generations. My genealogical heritage in Japan is long, while it consists of only three generations in Hawaiʻi. In comparison, the Hawaiian Islands and the continental land mass now called the United States are the genealogical homeland to Native Hawaiians, Alaska Natives, and American Indians. They have lived in this area for thousands of years as peoples and nations. When my ancestors arrived, they entered into a colonial space. Today is no different—we remain Asian settlers in a colonial space. The United States continues to occupy Hawaiʻi and the American continent in violation of international laws and against the consent of Native nations.74

Asian settlers may not be able to identify with the Asian homelands many of them have never seen, but that does not change their condition in Hawaiʻi: in this colonized location, they are settlers in another’s homeland.

In the present political moment, Asian settlers can no longer claim ignorance of the colonial subjugation of Hawaiians. I turn now to substantive evidence of the political power that Asians exercise in Hawaiʻi in order to provide the larger context for the contributors’ critiques of Asian settler colonial administration.

Asian Settler Political Power and Affiliations

In 2005 the demographics of Hawaiʻi illustrate the extent to which Hawaiians are outnumbered by settlers in their own homeland. Because of the sizable mixed-race population in Hawaiʻi, there are different ways in which the ethnic distribution of the population is calculated. I present the various U.S. Census and State of Hawaiʻi Department of Health figures here, even as I will be using as my own primary source the data collected by the Department of Health (see table 1).

The 2000 census data for the population of the State of Hawaiʻi based on multiple counting of multiracial/ethnic persons, data for “race alone or in combina-
“race alone or in combination” for a total population of 1,211,537, gives us a broad view of the mixed-race population of the state: whites (39 percent), Japanese (24 percent; 4 percent of Hawai‘i’s population is Okinawan, but they are listed in the census as “Japanese”), Filipinos (23 percent), Native Hawaiians (20 percent), Chinese (14 percent), Koreans (3 percent), blacks or African Americans (3 percent), Sāmoans (2 percent), Vietnamese (1 percent), and “Other Asian” (1 percent).75 A second set of figures for “race alone” provides the number of people who chose only one race, and the percentages are as follows: whites (24 percent), Japanese (17 percent), Filipinos (14 percent), Native Hawaiians (7 percent), Chinese (5 percent), Koreans (2 percent), blacks or African Americans (2 percent), Sāmoans (1 percent), Vietnamese (0.6 percent), and “Other Asian” (0.3 percent).

Because this book focuses on distinctions between Hawaiians and settlers, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Percentage of Population (Census)</th>
<th>Percentage of Population (DOH)</th>
<th>Percentage of Legislature: Senate</th>
<th>Percentage of Legislature: House</th>
<th>Dept. of Ed. (Admin.)</th>
<th>Dept. of Ed. (Faculty)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 2000 census data for “race alone or in combination” for a total population of 1,211,537.
2 Department of Health (DOH) figures from the Hawai‘i Health Survey 2000 for a population of 1,156,014. The DOH counts mixed-race Hawaiians as “Hawaiian,” mixed-race Caucasian/Asians as “Asian,” and those who list Caucasian as their sole race as “Caucasian.” The Health Survey does not list data for Koreans or African Americans.
3 Data for the 2005 Hawai‘i State Legislature collected from legislators’ offices. The DOH’s method is used for counting legislators of mixed race. Multiple counting is used for mixed-race Asian legislators (e.g., multiple counting of legislators who are “Japanese/Filipino” as “Japanese” and “Filipino”).
4 Data compiled by the Certificated Transaction Unit for the Department of Education.
5 The 2000 census lists Okinawans as “Japanese.” Population data from the Hawai‘i Okinawa Center.
Department of Health’s methods of calculating ethnic distribution figures presents a clearer picture of Hawaiian, Asian settler, and white settler population counts. The Native Hawaiian Data Book also uses ethnic distribution figures from the Department of Health’s Hawai‘i Health Survey 2000. According to that survey the ethnic distribution of a population count of 1,156,014 in Hawai‘i is as follows: Hawaiians (22.1 percent), Japanese (21.9 percent), Caucasians (21.1 percent), Filipinos (15.9 percent), Chinese (5.8 percent), and “Other” (13.3 percent). The differences between the Department of Health figures and the U.S. Census figures result from the Department of Health’s method of counting mixed-race Hawaiians as “Hawaiian,” mixed-race Caucasian/Asians as “Asian,” and those who list Caucasian as their sole race as “Caucasian.” As we can see from all three sets of figures, however, Asian settlers make up the largest group in Hawai‘i.

In addition to these population percentages, the 2000 census data regarding the educational, economic, and occupational status of different groups make visible the ethnic/racial stratification of Hawai‘i. In his study of this data, Jonathan Okamura concludes that “occupational, income and educational status data from the 2000 U.S. Census for ethnic groups in Hawai‘i indicate that Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans and Whites continue to be the dominant groups in the ethnic stratification order, while Native Hawaiians and Filipino Americans continue to occupy subordinate positions” (see table 2).

The subordination of Hawaiians in their own homeland becomes even more striking when we examine other indices that register political power in Hawai‘i. Cooper and Daws show in Land and Power in Hawai‘i that “from 1960 to 1980, Japanese averaged 50% of the total membership of both houses. From 1955 to 1980, the percentage of Japanese Democrats in the Legislature was twice the percentage of Japanese in Hawai‘i’s population. In 1960, when Japanese were 32% of population, they were 67% of Democratic legislators in both houses;” and “in 1980, with 25% of population, they were 60% of Democratic legislators.” In 1980 Chinese settlers were 5 percent of the population but 10 percent of Democratic legislators. In 1983 the percentage of Filipino Democrats (12 percent) was roughly equal to the percentage of Filipinos in the population. By contrast, in 1980 Hawaiians constituted 18 percent of the population but only 3 percent of the Democratic legislators. Eiko Kosasa extends Cooper and Daws’ analysis to examine Japanese political representation in both Democratic and Republican parties and the larger state apparatus. As she argues, “In both 1960 and 1970, nisei politicians comprised half of the elected State legislators [Democrats and Republicans] when only a third of the total island population was Japanese.” She adds, “One needs only to read the Directory of State, County and Federal Officials to find that Japanese surnames pervade the directory during the boom development years of 1960–1980s.”

Today, an updated look at the ethnic breakdown of the 2005 Hawai‘i State
Legislature provides a consistent picture of political power. If we use the Department of Health’s method of counting mixed-race populations, the percentages are as follows: Asian settlers collectively constitute 63 percent of the legislature, whites 25 percent of the legislature, and Hawaiians 9 percent of the legislature. A further breakdown of these figures into the different Asian ethnic groups, however, necessitates multiple counting of mixed-race Asian legislators (e.g., multiple counting of legislators who are Japanese/Filipino as “Japanese” and “Filipino”), the final counts totaling over 100 percent (see table 1): Japanese constitute only 21.9 percent of the population of Hawai‘i, but they are 40 percent of the Senate and 40 percent of the House of Representatives. (Okinawans are often included in statistics for “Japanese,” but separately they are about 4 percent of the Senate and 12 percent of the House.) Whites constitute 21.1 percent of the population, 24 percent of the Senate, and 26 percent of the House. By contrast, Hawaiians constitute 22.1 percent of the population compared to 8 percent of the Senate and 10 percent of the House. The following figures account for other Asian settler groups in the State Legislature: Filipino settlers are 15.9 percent of the population, 20 percent of the Senate, and

Table 2. Occupational Distribution within Ethnic Groups in Hawai‘i, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category 1</th>
<th>Native Hawaiian 2</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Korean</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management, professional, and related occupations</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service occupations</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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<td>Sales and office occupations</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production, transportation, and material moving occupations</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data from Census 2000 Summary File 2 (SF 2)–100 Percent Data (figures do not always total 100 percent due to rounding off).

1 Employed civilian population sixteen years and older.
2 Census categories for race alone or in any combination.
14 percent of the House; Chinese settlers 5.8 percent of the population, 8 percent of the Senate, and 12 percent of the House; and Korean settlers about 2 percent of the population, 4 percent of the Senate, and 2 percent of the House.82

Okamura further argues that Japanese political power is upheld by a broad base of support from organized labor unions: “The substantial proportion of local Japanese in large public worker unions, such as the Hawaii Government Employees Association [HGEA] and the Hawaii State Teachers Association [HSTA], that can provide endorsements and financial and human resources for campaigning is yet another reason for Japanese election to office.” 83 We can also see the degree to which Japanese dominate the Department of Education in both numbers for teacher positions and administrative positions. Data collected by the Hawai‘i State Department of Education (DOE) in October 2005 illustrate that among 13,207 public school teachers, the largest group continues to be Japanese (34 percent), followed by whites (27 percent), Hawaiians (10 percent), Filipinos (6 percent), Chinese (5 percent), Koreans (1 percent), African Americans (0.5 percent), Sāmoans (0.4 percent), Puerto Ricans (0.3 percent), “Mixed” (6 percent), and “Other” (10 percent) (see table 1). 84 In that same year, among 855 DOE administrative positions, the largest group also continues to be Japanese (45 percent), followed by whites (20 percent), Hawaiians (14 percent), Chinese (5 percent), Filipinos (4 percent), Koreans (2 percent), African Americans (1 percent), Sāmoans (0.5 percent), Puerto Ricans (0.2 percent), “Mixed” (6 percent), and “Other” (2 percent).

The structures of Asian settler power outlined in these statistics go largely unacknowledged, particularly in studies that emphasize either white settler dominance or the “multicultural diversity” of “local society” in Hawai‘i. If white settlers continue to dominate in economic and political institutions and in educational apparatuses like the University of Hawai‘i, the figures here provide an overview of the degree to which Japanese and Chinese settlers have also come to command real power economically and politically (see table 2). These last figures for the DOE provide some of the most visible illustrations of the complex interconnections between the materiality of state politics and the ideological production of knowledge. As Japanese settler politicians are supported by Japanese settler teachers and administrators—educators who shape Asian settlers’ understanding of their roles in Hawai‘i—we can see the importance of the ways in which Asian settler histories are interpreted and taught in Hawai‘i.

Asian Settler Colonial Historiography and Problematic Uses of “Local”

Although “local” identity has been important to the working classes and people of color in Hawai‘i who used the term in the 1970s as a rallying point in their resis-
stance against forces of commercial, suburban, and resort development, we can also trace the ways in which Asian settler political power in Hawai‘i is concealed by evocations of “local” solidarity. As Haunani-Kay Trask argues in her essay, the term “local” is used as a celebrated “gloss” for the term “settler.” Like settler historiography in other places that attempts to redeem the settler state by casting it as a multicultural nation, Asian settler historiography in Hawai‘i is also premised on a linear emplotment of history that celebrates the multicultural, mixed-race “local” society as a corrective to both Hawai‘i’s colonial “past” and the “divisiveness” of Hawaiian nationalism. As Noenoe Silva reminds us, “Historiography is one of the most powerful discourses that justifies the continued occupation of Hawai‘i by the United States today.”

I return here to an examination of Eileen Tamura’s essay, “Using the Past to Inform the Future: An Historiography of Hawai‘i’s Asian and Pacific Islander Americans” (2000), and her assertion that a study of “local” identity provides a “new” direction for a historiography of “Asians and Pacific Islander Americans” in Hawai‘i. She frames her argument with a reference to Jonathan Okamura’s critique of conservatives who promote the status quo, those who “feel threatened by the Hawaiian sovereignty movement because it distinguished Native Hawaiians from all other ethnic minorities and calls for special rights and privileges for Na Kanaka Maoli, the true people of Hawai‘i.” Yet even with this acknowledgment, Tamura uses “local” as a category to focus on mixed-race peoples and panethnic identifications in order to question the distinction between Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians. Following a lengthy discussion of Hawaiian sovereignty, she asks,

How does a person, for example, of German, Portuguese, Native Hawaiian, Chinese, and Filipino ancestry self-identify? What about a person who is not a Native Hawaiian but who grew up among Native Hawaiians and identifies strongly with Native Hawaiian culture? How much of our understanding of ethnic identity assumes biological inheritance and how much cultural practices? And what about those in Hawai‘i who identify themselves as “local,” in which case cultural identity takes precedence over ethnic identity?

In the face of lawsuits threatening Hawaiian compensatory programs and indigenous rights, Hawaiians have answered these questions in terms of genealogy: mixed-race Hawaiians have a genealogical connection to land in Hawai‘i however they choose to identify themselves; non-Hawaiians, no matter how long their shared family histories with Hawaiians, do not have this genealogical connection. Tamura’s questions, however, are very popular ones in Hawai‘i, and they illustrate a settler erasure of Hawaiian identity, either by asserting that mixed-race Hawaiians are not Hawaiian or by arguing that non-Hawaiians “can be more Hawaiian” than Hawaiians. As settler studies scholars Johnston and Lawson note, “The typical set-
tler narrative, then, has a doubled goal. It is concerned to act out the suppression or effacement of the indigene; it is also concerned to perform the concomitant indigenization of the settler.”

We can further historicize the popular usage of the term “local” to illustrate the problems that have attended representations of “local” identity. Eric Yamamoto’s widely referenced 1979 essay, “The Significance of Local,” describes the way the term “local” gained a particular force after 1965, when it was used as a focal point for community control struggles in Hawai’i. In these struggles, working-class tenants sought to challenge their forced eviction from lands slated for suburban and commercial development. Yamamoto defines “localism” in Hawai’i as “a composite of ethnic cultures, emerging in reaction to domination by Western institutions and culture, composed of people of Hawaii with community value-orientations.” Newspaper photographs of local people from different ethnic groups linking arms in front of the Waiāhole Poi Factory in a human blockade across Kamehameha Highway against police-enforced eviction shape a collective historical memory of “local” strength and solidarity.

If “local,” however, evokes historical memories of the working class protesting their evictions or forming interethnic labor unions, the term has also been used by privileged classes of Asian settlers to claim a history of oppression for themselves. This is not to say that all local Asians fall into these privileged classes, but the term “local” is often used to mask the political power that Asian settlers have historically exercised, often against Hawaiians. As Roland Kotani notes in his 1985 publication The Japanese in Hawaii: A Century of Struggle, “During the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese American decision-makers of the Ariyoshi administration rejected the demands of the rising Hawaiian nationalist movement.” Kotani cites as examples the eviction of predominantly Hawaiian Hansen’s disease patients from Hale Mōhalu, a residential facility, and the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) evictions of Hawaiians from Sand Island and Mākua Beach to “clear the land” for the development of public parks. He writes,

Native Hawaiians, who had dominated the public sector work force in Territorial Hawaii, were another ethnic group which expressed resentment about the strong Japanese presence in the Democratic regime. In 1971, Matsuo Takabuki, a prominent Nisei attorney and politician, became the first AJA trustee of the Bishop Estate, the powerful landholding trust established for the benefit of Native Hawaiian youth. A coalition of Hawaiian organizations immediately organized a mass demonstration at Iolani Palace to protest this appointment.

Kotani further details the Ariyoshi administration’s refusal to turn over to OHA revenues generated by the ceded lands. Kotani’s account provides an important
record of the ways that Japanese settler politics operates at the expense of Hawaiians, but without a colonial framework for his analysis he reduces Hawaiians to “another ethnic group” and urges Japanese communities to “fight for a better life for the vast majority of people.”

It is also important that we remember the local Japanese politicians and developers who actually constituted the development interests in the 1970s. Although accounts of “local” identity tend to blame the problems of development on Japanese nationals from Japan and white investors from the U.S. continent, Cooper and Daws’ *Land and Power in Hawai‘i* is monumental in its detailed documentation of the dense interwoven connections among local Asians, development interests, and political institutions in Hawai‘i. As they explain, “In those real estate huis, among those real estate lawyers, among those groups of contractors, speculators, developers and landlords, are to be found the names of virtually the entire political power structure of Hawaii that evolved out of the ‘Democratic revolution.’”

In account after account, Cooper and Daws illustrate the ways that the Asian-dominated Democratic Party negotiated land use and rezoning issues in ways that benefited themselves or those close to them. For example, the Democratic Party supported lease-to-fee conversion bills designed to force landowners to sell land to their lessees for the ostensible purpose of redistributing land from wealthy landowners to poor tenants, but in actuality a “Maryland-type law” was used in the 1980s to target the landholdings of Bishop Estate, a perpetual charitable trust for Native Hawaiians. Such measures sought to take this patrimony from Hawaiians by forcing them to sell trust lands that they were leasing to middle- and upper-class Asians and whites in east and windward O‘ahu. As Cooper and Daws write, “Now by the 1980s, the Hawaii lessees who were seeking to own the land on which their homes stood were mainly middle and upper class haoles and local-Asians,” while “the beneficiaries of the Bishop Estate were ethnic Hawaiians,” resulting in a situation whereby “some of Hawaii’s most privileged people [were] seeking land redistribution from the least.”

There are, of course, working-class Asian settlers who have struggled against Asian settlers who do have political power, but their study points to the ways that the stories of Asian political power have been consistently erased from more popular critiques of “foreign” and “mainland” investors and developers.

Even as I am critical of accounts that represent Asians as part of a multiethnic “local” society rather than as settlers in a colony, my own early work was also part of a move in the 1990s toward politicizing the term “local.” In 1994 I published an essay titled “Between Nationalisms: Hawaii’s Local Nation and Its Troubled Racial Paradise.” In it I argued that “local” Asians in Hawai‘i who do not identify either with Asian nation-states or the United States imagine themselves as an unstable “Local Nation” predicated upon anxieties over the illegitimacy of their claims to
Hawai‘i. Although my intent was to support Hawaiians, Haunani-Kay Trask incisively criticizes my use of the term “Local Nation” in her essay reprinted in this collection. She writes,

Ideologically, the appearance of this “local nation” is a response to a twenty-year-old sovereignty movement among Hawaiians. Organized Natives, led by a young, educated class attempting to develop progressive elements among Hawaiians, as well as to create mechanisms for self-government, are quickly perceived as a threat by many Asians uneasy about their obvious benefit from the dispossession and marginalization of Natives. Arguing that Asians, too, have a nation in Hawai‘i, the “local” identity tag blurs the history of Hawai‘i’s only indigenous people while staking a settler claim. Any complicity in the subjugation of Hawaiians is denied by the assertion that Asians, too, comprise a “nation.” . . . Thus do these settlers deny their ascendency was made possible by the continued national oppression of Hawaiians, particularly the theft of our lands and the crushing of our independence.

As Trask rightly argues, I had been trying to stake a settler claim by distancing a “Local Nation” of Asians in Hawai‘i from Asian Americans on the U.S. continent as well as from whites in the colony of Hawai‘i. Like David Pearson and other settler studies scholars, I was attempting to create a “third space” for Asians as another category of the oppressed in Hawai‘i. The attempt to ally “Locals” with “Natives,” however, created the illusion of a “shared” struggle without acknowledging that Asians have come to constitute the very political system that has taken away from Natives their rights as indigenous peoples.

In Asian settler histories and historiography, the ease with which Asian settlers turn away from Hawaiians’ demands for political justice illustrates at base a settler resistance to Hawaiian nationalism and what it might mean for Asian settlers. Asian settlers’ persistent celebration of a multicultural “local” community and their contrasting representations of Hawaiian nationalism as racially divisive reveal more about the political interests underpinning the limits of a settler imagination than about the Hawaiian nationalist movement itself. As Asian settler scholars and activists committed to the need for social and political justice that drove the Third World Strike, we need to hold ourselves accountable for the ways our settler scholarship and practices undermine the struggles of Native peoples for their indigenous human rights.

Transforming Asian Settler Colonialism

The essays in this volume also engage the question of how Asian settlers are to correct the political injustices of a settler colony and what form Asian settler support
of Native struggles should take. Native and settler contributors caution us about the dangers of settlers who see themselves as “helping” Hawaiians by attempting to direct the sovereignty process or “advising” Native peoples how they should conduct their struggles. In such cases, Asian settlers are unaware of the ways they are motivated by their own settler interests. As Trask argues in her essay,

The position of “ally” is certainly engaged in by many non-Natives all over the world. . . . But the most critical need for non-Native allies is in the area of support for Hawaiian self-determination. Defending Hawaiian sovereignty is only beneficial when non-Natives play the roles assigned to them by Natives. Put another way, nationalists always need support, but they must be the determining voice in the substance of that support and how, and under what circumstances, it applies.

Hawaiians will determine the political structure of the Hawaiian nation; Native nationalists remind us that the Hawaiian nation must be built by Native peoples themselves. If settler scholars and activists seek to support Hawaiians in their political struggles, settlers must stand behind Natives. As poet ‘Īmaikalani Kalāhele writes to non-Hawaiians in his poem “Huli,”

If to help us is your wish then stand behind us.
Not to the side
And not in front.97

The essays presented here underscore the need for Asian settlers to challenge settler ideologies and practices in their own Asian settler communities. They call on Asian settler scholars and activists to begin their work in their own home communities, to identify practices in Asian settler communities that obstruct Hawaiian struggles for a self-determined sovereignty, and to work to change those practices. In this volume Asian settlers speak out in support of Hawaiian self-determination, often against the pressures exerted by their own Asian settler communities to silence them. For example, Local Japanese Women for Justice took a stand against Senator Daniel Inouye and the JACL’s attack on a Hawaiian nationalist. Peggy Choy also describes her mother Mary Choy, who supported Hawaiians in the Kanaka Maoli Peoples’ International Tribunal in 1993 while challenging Korean communities for their failure to address the issue of Native Hawaiian sovereignty.

*Asian Settler Colonialism* asks Asian settler scholars and activists to expand upon scholarly investigations of settler states and the ways they are maintained. In what ways do Asian settler colonial administrators mobilize state and federal legislation and public policy to deny Hawaiians their rights to their lands, nation, and resources? What are Asian settler rhetorical strategies of self-representation, how do these rhetorical arguments construct the popular Asian settler imaginary,
and how are such ideological accounts effective in winning the consent of their Asian settler constituencies? Since political systems are dependent upon culture as an ideological state apparatus, Asian settler scholarship can also examine other areas, such as education, media and advertising, literature, and the visual arts, in order to expose the material contradictions between Asian settler interests and Native struggles. What “lessons” do textbooks in Hawai‘i’s elementary and secondary schools teach students about the relationships between settler populations and Hawaiians? How are ideologies of multiculturalism and “local” identity used in the media? It is in tracing these complex networks of ideology and the production of meaning that we can expose Asian settler interests in maintaining the status of Hawai‘i as an occupied colony. Contradictions between material conditions and ideological representations also point to places of rupture and possibilities for intervention.

The essays ask all Asian settlers to reexamine the conditions of their own lives and the ordinary daily practices they engage in that support the settler state. On a microcosmic level, even seemingly benign conversations that make up the fabric of our daily lives can end up constituting what scholar Erin Wright calls “microaggressions” against Hawaiians or what playwright Alanī Apī'o calls “a thousand little cuts to genocide.” Asian settlers can educate themselves about issues vital to Hawaiians’ struggles for self-determination to better understand the political implications of Asian settler practices. On a more collective level, these essays ask Asian settlers to reexamine the ways that their communities are represented in public events and practices and how political representatives and administrators represent Asian settler interests. They ask Asian settlers to speak out against and to change the many ways that their own Asian settler communities obstruct Hawaiians’ struggles for justice.

The essays in this volume are organized into two parts: “Native” and “Settler.” As we were making editorial decisions about the ordering of essays in this collection, Eiko Kosasa reminded us of Fanon’s statement: “The colonial world is a world cut in two.” The structure of the book reflects the structure of colonialism in Hawai‘i and the lesson from Kalāhele’s poem. “Native” comes first; “Settler” follows it and supports it from behind.

Native

The first part, “Native,” opens with the work of two Hawaiian nationalists who lay the foundation for the collection as a whole. “Defining the Settler Colonial Problem” features work by Haunani-Kay Trask and Mililani Trask, who broadly define the historical context in which Hawai‘i was made into a U.S. settler colony.

“Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant’ Hegemony: ‘Locals’ in Hawai‘i,” by Hau-
nani-Kay Trask, lays the conceptual foundation for this volume. Trask criticizes Asian settlers—Japanese settlers in particular—who present themselves as champions of Native interests but who obstruct the process of Native self-determination. She argues that “truly supportive Asians must publicly ally themselves with our position of Native control over the sovereignty process. Simultaneously, these allies must also criticize Asian attempts to undermine sovereignty leaders.” Trask concludes with a discussion of Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i, a Native initiative for sovereignty that represents Native concerns.

Two by Millilani Trask provide us with the historical contexts of U.S. settler colonialism and Hawaiian nationalist resistance. Mililani Trask is an internationally renowned Native Hawaiian leader who in 1993 addressed the U.N. General Assembly on behalf of the indigenous peoples of the world. In “Hawai‘i and the United Nations” she recounts the history of U.S. violations of its international trust obligations to Native peoples mandated in the Charter of the United Nations. Among its other trust responsibilities, the United States was to ensure that Hawaiians would be able to develop self-government. Instead, the United States imposed statehood on Hawai‘i without providing political alternatives such as independence, thus violating Native Hawaiians’ rights to self-government. “Hawaiian Sovereignty” then outlines what that self-government would look like under Ho‘okupu a Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i, the master plan for Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i.

The following section, “Settler-Dominated State Apparatuses: The State Legislature and the Prison-Industrial Complex,” focuses on state apparatuses and Asian settlers who serve as colonial administrators. Asian and white settlers in the State Legislature seek to pass legislative bills that criminalize Hawaiian cultural practices. Momiala Kamahele’s essay, “‘Īlio‘ulaokalani: Defending Native Hawaiian Culture,” defines Hawaiian culture in Fanon’s words as a “contested culture under colonial domination.” Kamahele describes the formation of ‘Īlio‘ulaokalani, a coalition of Hawaiian hula practitioners who joined forces in 1997 to oppose efforts by Asian and white settler legislators like Randy Iwase and Ed Case to revoke Hawaiian statutory and constitutional rights to access and gather resources of the land. Although the coalition successfully opposed Senate Bill 8, Kamahele concludes that “no matter how hard we work, if we don’t have our own nation, if we don’t achieve sovereignty, then we will never, never have clearly defined lands or clearly defined rights to practice our culture.”

Healani Sonoda’s essay, “A Nation Incarcerated,” describes the criminalization of Hawaiians and the warehousing of Native Hawaiians into correctional facilities. Asian settler colonial administrators like former directors of public safety Keith Kaneshiro and Ted Sakai, for example, saw during their terms the transferal of hundreds of Hawai‘i prisoners to continental facilities. In effect, Hawaiian prisoners were exiled away from their homeland when Hawaiians as a people are pursu-
ing domestic and international claims for sovereignty and lands. Sonoda argues that radical new answers that strive to eliminate the real reasons for and problems behind incarceration will be possible only when Hawaiian land and sovereignty are returned to Natives.

The following section, “Settler-Dominated Ideological State Apparatuses: Literature and the Visual Arts,” recognizes the critical importance of ideology in winning the consent of Asian settlers who support U.S. colonialism. In this section ku’ualoha ho’omanawanui and Kapulani Landgraf reveal and document the settler interests inscribed on Native land through literature and art. They then illustrate Native struggles to reclaim the stories and histories of that land with which they have a familial relationship. In “‘This Land Is Your Land, This Land Was My Land’: Kanaka Maoli versus Settler Representations of ‘Āina in Contemporary Literature of Hawai’i,” ho’omanawanui argues that Asian settler representations of land in “local” literature often claim Hawaiian cultural values such as a genealogical connection to the land and the “aloha spirit” even as settler literature commodifies land. Even the most supportive Asian settler writers can interpret stories about Native lands only through a settler consciousness. Ho’omanawanui argues that in a colonial context, non-Natives must recognize that Natives have kuleana (rights, privilege, concern, responsibility, authority) over all things Kanaka Maoli, including literature.

Kapulani Landgraf’s “‘Ai Pōhaku,” a series of photographic essays, documents destroyed heiau (places of worship) on O’ahu. Visually, her photographs foreground the places we see every day—Waikīkī resorts, freeways, public schools, military bases, and residential areas—that cover over sacred sites. Landgraf’s inscribed photographs, in turn, literally write over those accounts of development to call our attention to the historical processes by which the land was and continues to be colonized by haole as she reclaims the significance of these heiau and their histories. Landgraf uses the word “haole” in reference to “foreigners,” encompassing all foreigners, including Asians.100

Settler

The first section of part II begins with the “Consequences of Settler Colonialism.” In his essay, “The Hawaiians: Health, Justice, and Sovereignty,” David Stannard outlines the historical impact of colonization and the resulting complex of interlocking oppressions. Stannard argues that the oppressive colonial conditions maintained by the criminal justice, employment, and education bureaucracies are concealed by social service organizations that attribute Hawaiians’ health crisis to the self-destructive practices of Hawaiians themselves, focusing their efforts on “blaming” Hawaiians for what are actually the ongoing effects of colonization.
These conditions, he argues, will not change until Hawaiians are able to achieve the political and economic self-determination they need to support and care for themselves.

In 2008 the United States is a settler state that moves aggressively in the global arena in what it calls its “war on terrorism.” The United States has expanded its military bases in Hawai‘i to support its economic interests in the Middle East through military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, and it continues to provide financial and military support to other settler states like Israel, which has received the largest percentage of U.S. foreign aid. On July 7, 2004, the U.S. military approved the selection of Hawai‘i as a site for a Stryker brigade, which entails the acquisition of an additional 24,000 acres of land needed to support the brigade. Kyle Kajihiro examines the normalization and naturalization of the military in Hawai‘i in “The Militarizing of Hawai‘i: Occupation, Accommodation, and Resistance.” Kajihiro provides an overview of the impact of militarism on Hawai‘i, then argues that despite the ways that the militarization of Hawai‘i is presented as unassailable, this militarism presents contradictions that are openings for intervention and social and political transformation. He concludes by examining key contemporary examples of people’s movements challenging the military in Hawai‘i, including Native struggles at Kaho‘olawe, west Kaua‘i, Waikâne, Pōhakuloa, and Mâkuā.

“Whose Vision? Rethinking Japanese, Filipino, and Korean Settlement” features essays that reexamine the stories we are told celebrating Asian immigration to Hawai‘i. Karen K. Kosasa’s essay, “Sites of Erasure: The Representation of Settler Culture in Hawai‘i,” asks us to consider the ways that settlers are involved in the colonization of Hawai‘i and Hawaiians through acts of erasure in our everyday lives and artistic practices. Such acts involve settlers’ visual production of blankness—blank spaces “emptied” of Native peoples to be filled with settler visions of the American Dream. In their collaborative mixed-media projects, Kosasa and photographer Stan Tomita engage what they call “strategies of exposure” that are “crucial exercises in remembering.” As we question the ways that Asian settlers imagine their place on Native lands, we must critically reevaluate the stories they tell to construct a “multicultural Hawai‘i.”

Eiko Kosasa’s essay, “Ideological Images: U.S. Nationalism in Japanese Settler Photographs,” provides an overview of the Americanization movement and its efforts to transform the Japanese into patriotic American citizens. Kosasa examines this maintenance of American hegemony in Hawai‘i through a dialectic of force and consent visible in family portraits of Japanese settlers taken by Usaku Teragawachi in the 1920s and 1930s. Analyzing the broader meaning of these photographs as they became a part of Japanese settler discourse represented in the 1985 publication Kanyaku Imin: A Hundred Years of Japanese Life in Hawai‘i,
Kosasa challenges that master narrative of American immigration by situating the “successes” of the Japanese settler community within a colonial system.

Jonathan Y. Okamura’s essay, “Ethnic Boundary Construction in the Japanese American Community in Hawai‘i,” contrasts exclusionary descent-based eligibility arguments used by the politically dominant Japanese American settler population and arguments used in the Rice v. Cayetano lawsuit to defend a state law that reserved for Hawaiians the right to vote in elections for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. Okamura argues that economically and politically dominant groups such as Japanese Americans exclude other groups from participation in their organizations as a way of retaining control over their settler interests and resources; by contrast, Hawaiians, who remain colonized and disempowered in their own homeland, must fight to preserve rights being eroded by a neoconservative political movement.

In “Colonial Amnesia: Rethinking Filipino ‘American’ Settler Empowerment in the U.S. Colony of Hawai‘i” Dean Saranillio argues that Filipinos in Hawai‘i are settlers who have been maneuvered by the U.S. settler state against Hawaiians, despite their shared histories of American colonization. Through analyses of works by public educator Joshua Agsalud, Lilo Bonipasyo, a sakada (contract laborer) in Virgilio Felipe’s biography Hawai‘i: A Pilipino Dream, and community activist Zachary Labez, Saranillio illustrates the continuities between U.S. colonization of the Philippines and the “Americanization” of Filipinos in Hawai‘i. He concludes by contrasting former Hawai‘i governor Benjamin Cayetano’s opposition to struggles for Hawaiian self-determination with the work of ten Filipina settler activists in Hawai‘i who supported Hawaiians opposed to proposed military training on the Windward side of O‘ahu.

Peggy Myo-Young Choy’s family history, “Anatomy of a Dancer: Place, Lineage, and Liberation,” traces Choy’s own dance movements back through a family history of resistance in Hawai‘i that leaves us with important lessons for Asian settlers to consider. Her aunt’s early advocacy for Korean women in Hawai‘i and her parents’ activism in anti-war demonstrations, anti-development protests, ethnic studies protests, and Hawaiian struggles challenge the myth that we are insulated as individual Asian settler groups from each other and from complicity in the colonial domination of Hawaiians.

We conclude this volume with “Speaking Out against Asian Settler Power,” which focuses on the important work of speaking out against the political practices of powerful Asian settlers like U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye and the Asian settler community organizations that support them. In their essay, “Local Japanese Women for Justice Speak Out against Daniel Inouye and the JACL,” Eiko Kosasa and Ida Yoshinaga challenge popular assumptions about the ways that Asian set-
tlers like Inouye have “helped Hawaiians.” They show us that Inouye, who has accrued an extraordinary amount of political power for himself as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, including the Subcommittee on Defense and Military Construction and the Subcommittee on Veteran Affairs, and of the Committee on Indian Affairs, is an institution backed by highly visible community organizations like the Japanese American Citizens’ League. Kosasa and Yoshinaga challenge Inouye and the JACL for their participation in a smear campaign against Native Hawaiian nationalist Mililani Trask, who had criticized Inouye’s attempts to control the process for a self-determined sovereignty for Hawaiians.

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As the essays here show, we cannot transform the settler colony of Hawai‘i or the U.S. settler state without first recognizing and making undeniably visible the status of Asians as settlers in a settler state. The essays in Asian Settler Colonialism identify Asians as settlers in order to bring about a shift in political consciousness, to identify the problems posed by Asian settler ideologies and practices that reflect their desires for a place in the settler state. For the larger, long-term vision of Hawaiian self-determination to be made a reality, the Native and settler contributors in this volume call on Asian settlers in Hawai‘i to reexamine their interests within the U.S. settler state and to hold themselves and their communities accountable for their settler practices. Only through such accountability and anticolonial interventions can we find a way to greater social and political justice.

Notes

1. I use both “Hawaiian” and “Native Hawaiian” in reference to the indigenous peoples of Hawai‘i, regardless of federally imposed definitions based on blood quantum.


Studies East and West 17 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, College of Languages, Linguistics and Literature, 2000), 53. Franklin’s introduction to that volume provides an account of Trask’s keynote address and audience responses to it.


18. David Stannard, Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve of Western Contact (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, Social Science Research Institute, 1989); Kame‘e-leihiwa, Native Lands and Foreign Desires, 81.


26. Eiko Kosasa, review of “Forget Post-Colonialism! Sovereignty and Self-Determination in Hawai‘i,” by Dana Takagi, posted on the Association for Asian American Studies listserv (June 24, 1999).


35. In Australia, whites constitute 92 percent of the population, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples about 2.2 percent, and Asians 6 percent. The Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001 census.
40. Other studies of settler colonialism provide detailed accounts of the practices of settler colonial administrators, such as Weitzer’s *Transforming Settler States* and the essays in Coombes’ *Rethinking Settler Colonialism*.
43. The current Akaka Bill (also known as the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2005), which promises U.S. federal recognition of Hawaiians as indigenous peoples, has been strongly opposed by many Hawaiians who argue that in its current state it is “more dangerous than beneficial to our Hawaiian community.” Curtis Lum and James Gonsor, “Group urges OHA to drop support,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, October 7, 2005; Keala Kelly, Lehuannani Kinilau, and Haunani-Kay Trask, *First Friday: The Unauthorized News*, aired on ‘Ōlelo Community Television, August 5, 2005.
50. USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Pro-
viding Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” The “enhanced surveillance procedures” cited in the act include extending the power of the FBI to investigate private personal records without warrant, without probable cause, and without notification of the person being investigated.

51. Kame‘eleihiwa, Native Lands and Foreign Desires, 15.
52. Kame‘eleihiwa, Native Lands and Foreign Desires, 299.
53. For a discussion of these global implications of British, American, and Japanese imperialism, see Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991).
57. Asian settler historians tend to emphasize that Kalākaua invited Japanese laborers to “repeople the islands,” but Hawaiian historians emphasize the extreme measures he took to stop the massive deaths of his people. It was under colonial conditions that Kalākaua sought out the Japanese for aid—colonial conditions that later made possible Japanese entry into Hawai‘i. See Kotani, The Japanese in Hawaii, 12; Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawai‘i, 1868–1898 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), 55, 57; Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui, 279; Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 90.


71. Okihiro, Cane Fires, xii.


75. Data on Okinawans from the Hawai‘i Okinawa Center. I provide separate figures for Okinawans because of the colonial history of Japanese subjugation of Okinawans and its effects of racism against Okinawans in Hawai‘i.


79. Cooper and Daws, Land and Power in Hawai‘i, 42.


81. Data for the 2005 Hawai‘i State Legislature collected from individual offices. Some legislators were specifically identified as “Okinawan” while others who are also Okinawan were identified as “Japanese.”

82. Koreans are not listed in the Native Hawaiian Data Book, so I list the 2000 census figure here.


84. Data compiled by the Certificated Transaction Unit for the Department of Education.
85. Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 9.
86. Tamura, “Using the Past to Inform the Future,” 68.
94. Cooper and Daws, Land and Power in Hawai‘i, 12.